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
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FAITH AND ITS PSYCHOLOGY

BY

W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O. D.D.

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PREFACE

THE main objects of this volume are threefold. Firstly, to vindicate for religious Faith its true dignity as a normal and healthy part of human nature. Next, to insist that Faith demands the actual reality of its objects, and can never be content with a God who is only an ideal. Lastly, to show in detail how most of the errors and defects in religious belief have been due to a tendency to arrest the development of Faith prematurely, by annexing it to some one faculty to the exclusion of others, or by resting on given authority. The true goal is an unified experience which will make authority no longer external. This scheme has compelled me to state, far too briefly and dogmatically, my grounds of disagreement with certain religious opinions which are widely held, such as the infallibility of 'the living voice of the Church,' and the finality of the appeal to Holy Scripture, and also with those religious philosophies which make religion exclusively an affair of the will, or the intellect, or the æsthetic sense. My criticisms of these various theories are all intended to show the errors which result from a premature synthesis. Faith claims the whole man, and all that God's grace can make of him. If any part of ourselves is left outside our religion, our theory of Faith is sure to be partly vitiated by the omission; and conversely, an inadequate theory of Faith is likely to be reflected in one-sided or distorted practice.

When we try to analyse the contents of Faith, after claiming for it this very comprehensive range, we must

be prepared for the criticism that we have given only bare outlines, or else that we have left rival constructions side by side in the form of patent inconsistencies. For we cannot hope to understand and co-ordinate all the highest experiences of the human spirit. And our own generation, it seems to me, is not called upon even to attempt any ambitious construction. We must be content to clear the site for a new building, and to get the materials ready. The wise master-builder is not yet among us. 'Revivals' are only a stop-gap; they create nothing. They recover for us parts of our spiritual heritage which were in danger of being lost, and having achieved this, they have done their work. The words Catholic and Protestant are much like the words Whig and Tory in politics. They are the names of obsolescent distinctions, survivals of old-world struggles. When the next constructive period comes, it will be seen that the spiritual Latin empire and the Teutonic revolt against it belong to past history. Already the crucial question is, not whether Europe shall be Catholic or Protestant, but whether Christianity can come to terms with the awakening self-consciousness of modern civilisation, equipped with a vast mass of new scientific knowledge, and animated for the first time by ideals which are not borrowed from classical and Hebrew antiquity.

The great danger in our path, I venture to think, comes from the democratisation of thought, which has affected religion, ethics, philosophy, and sociology—in fact, almost every department of mental activity except natural science. We see its results in hysterical sentimentalism, which is the great obstacle in the way of using organised effort for social amelioration. We see them in the frank adoption of materialistic standards, such as the pleasure and pain calculus, as soon as we leave the region of abstract speculation. And in philosophy it is impossible to miss the connection between the new empiricism, with its

blatant contempt for idealism, whether of the ancient or modern type, and the democratic claim to decide all things in heaven and earth by popular vote. It is possible to sympathise thoroughly with the spread of education, and yet to be aware of the enormous dangers to civilisation which the false theory of natural equality brings with it. It has bred a dislike of intellectual superiority, and a reluctance to allow reason and knowledge to arbitrate on burning questions. Everywhere we find the praises of feeling or instinct sung, and the dangers of intellectualism exposed. Now instinct is the tendency in humanity to persistence, reason is the tendency to variation. Most variations, we are reminded, fail to establish themselves; instinct is therefore the safer guide. But the tendency to variation is just what has raised man above the lower animals; it is the condition of progress. And in civilised man reason has largely displaced instinct, which is no longer so trustworthy as in the brutes. Since this process is certain to go further, distrust of reason is suicidal, and to exclude it from matters of Faith must be disastrous. I believe that the Kantian antithesis between the speculative and practical reason is wholly fallacious, a residuum of the dualism which Kant found dominant in philosophy and failed to overcome. If this dualism is abandoned, the contrast between Faith and knowledge falls with it. And yet the temptation to 'heal slightly' the wounds of religion by reverting to this separation of Faith from fact has proved irresistible to very many, and I believe that it is a main source of the notorious inefficacy of our apologetics. The intellectual difficulties raised by science are not popular, and we are tempted to override them because the masses are still ignorant and superstitious; but I believe that here is still our great problem, and that we shall do well to agree with our adversary quickly, while we are in the way with him.

This is not the kind of intellectualism which paralyses

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FAITH AND ITS PSYCHOLOGY

FAITH

CHAPTER I

'FAITH' AS A RELIGIOUS TERM

(a) *In the Bible*

I PROPOSE to consider the first of the theological virtues, in order to determine, if possible, in what it consists. I will not begin by attempting a definition of 'Faith'; but a brief indication of the sense in which the word will be used in the course of the discussion seems desirable. Broadly speaking, when we use the word Faith, without special reference to religion, we mean, either the holding for true of something which is not already verified by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion,¹ or confidence in the wisdom and integrity of a person. In the former sense, the corresponding verb is 'believe,' in the latter it is 'trust.' In the former sense, the conception of Faith is independent of the character or quality of the thing believed. I may believe in a God or in a devil; in the habitability of Mars or in the man in the moon; or I may believe that if I make one of a party of thirteen at dinner it will be a good speculation to insure my life. The grossest superstition might be called Faith in this sense. But in religious language, to which the word more properly belongs, Faith has a more limited and a more dignified meaning. 'It is the general expression for subjective religion.'² It is used for conviction as to certain ultimate

¹ Cf. Fechner, *Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, p. 1.

² Dörner.

facts relating to the order of the universe and our place in it. And we shall see in the sequel that this conviction is not the result of a purely intellectual judgment, but has a more vital origin. It involves an eager and loyal choice, a resolution to abide by the hypothesis that the nature of things is good, and on the side of goodness. That is to say, Faith, in the religious sense, is not simply belief; it is inseparable from the sister virtues of hope and love.¹

After this preliminary statement about the meaning of the word, I will proceed to sketch the historical growth of 'Faith' as a theological concept. For it is a complex idea and has a history.

Let us take first the history of the Greek words πίστις and πιστεύειν. Πίστις means the *trust* which we place in any person or thing, and the *conviction*, or *persuasion*, which we hold about any subject.² Less frequently, it means *fidelity*, and so the *pledge of fidelity*, acquiring the meaning of *promise*, *security*. Æschylus (*Frag.* 276) has οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ὅρκοι πίστις, ἀλλ' ὅρκων ἀνὴρ; and πίστις became a common technical term for 'proof.'³ The word first occurs in Hesiod—πίστεις γάρ τοι ὁμῶς καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν ἀνδρας, i.e. 'in money matters be neither confiding nor suspicious'; while Theognis has learned by experience that it is safest to trust nobody: πίστει χρήματ' ὄλεσσα, ἀπιστίῃ δ' ἐσάωσα. In the first-mentioned sense it is opposed to *knowledge*, and is thus almost a synonym of δόξα, though πίστις could never (like δόξα) be contrasted with ἀλήθεια, or νόησις, but only with ἐπιστήμη, or γνῶσις. Very instructive is Plato (*Rep.* 10. 601): τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἔξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότει καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ

¹ On the connection between Faith and Hope, cf. Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, p. 256 n. 'Luther and Calvin both virtually grant that faith and hope are inseparable, or parts of one thing, though Luther (and perhaps Calvin) denies this of faith and love.' Cf. p. 15.

² Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon*, p. 495.

³ Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 156.

εἰδότης, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην (' though the implement is the same, the maker will have only a correct *belief* about the beauty or badness of it . . . whereas the user will have *knowledge* '). Πίστις is not necessarily weak conviction, but it is unverified conviction. As, however, all conviction should seek to verify itself, it may be called *incomplete science*. Plato (*Rep.* 6. 511 ; 7. 533) gives us two divisions of the mind, intelligence (νόησις) and opinion (δόξα), each having two subdivisions. The four divisions thus produced are science (ἐπιστήμη), understanding (διάνοια), *belief* (or faith or persuasion—πίστις), and the perception of images (εἰκασία). And he says that as being is to becoming, so is intelligence to opinion ; and as intelligence is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of images. Faith, for Plato, is a mental condition which still takes the visible and opinable for true ; though it possesses a higher degree of clearness than εἰκασία. It is a stepping-stone to true knowledge.

Πίστις is used in classical Greek of belief in the gods ; generally (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 414) of confidence in them rather than of belief in their existence ; but examples of the other sense are not wanting. By the time of Plutarch, Greek thought was already familiar with the idea of ' Faith ' as that which guards a traditional deposit of divine truth. Cf. *Mor.* 756 B. : ἀρκεῖ ἡ πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις, ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὐδ' ἀνευρεῖν τεκμήριον ἐναργέστερον. ' The ancient ancestral Faith is sufficient, than which it is impossible to mention, or to discover, anything clearer. If [he continues] this common foundation for the pious life is disturbed and shaken at any point, the whole becomes insecure and suspected.'

The verb πιστεύειν, when used in relation to persons, seems to have expressed a somewhat stronger emotion than the substantive πίστις, and accordingly it was not much used in classical Greek of mere belief in the existence of gods. For this belief νομίζειν was the regular word,

indicating acceptance of statutory beliefs rather than any warmer sentiment. At the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, Socrates is accused of not 'believing in' (νομίζειν) the gods whom the city worships, and Xenophon replies that since he certainly trusted in the gods, how can it be true that he did not believe in them? So a distinction is recognised which is of great importance in the history of Faith.

In the later Platonists, we have a doctrine of Faith which closely resembles that which I shall advocate in these lectures. The nature of God, says Plotinus, is difficult to conceive and perhaps impossible to define. But we are sure of His existence, because we experience, in our inmost being, expressible and definable impressions when we come near to Him, or rather when He comes near to us. The ardent desire with which we turn towards Him is accompanied by a pain caused by the consciousness of something lacking in ourselves; we feel that there is something wanting to our being. It must be by His presence in our souls that God reveals Himself to us, for we have no means of knowing things except by something analogous to contact. The light of God's presence is brighter than the light of science or reason. But none can see it who is not made like to God, and whose being is not, like that of God, brought to an inner unity. Elsewhere, Plotinus explains Faith as a kind of spiritual perception, as opposed to demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), which is the result of reasoning.¹

In Hebrew, the verb 'trust' or 'believe' is connected with words meaning 'support' and 'nourish'; and the fundamental idea is *stability, trustworthiness*. 'Whatever holds, is steady, or can be depended upon, whether a wall which securely holds a nail (Isa. xxii. 23, 25), or a brook which does not fail (Jer. xvi. 18), or a kingdom which is firmly established (2 Sam. vii. 16), or an assertion which has

¹ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, v, 5, 11; vi, 7, 24-26; vi, 9, 4.

been verified (Gen. xlii. 20), or a covenant which endures for ever (Ps. lxxxix. 28), or a heart found faithful (Neh. ix. 8), or a man who can be trusted (Neh. xiii. 13), or God Himself who keeps covenant (Deut. vii. 9), is 'faithful.'¹ The difference between 'believing *in*' (placing trust in) and simple credence is marked in the Old Testament by different prepositions following the verb. It cannot be said that the verb is very common in the Old Testament in a religious sense; and there is in Biblical Hebrew no substantive properly meaning 'Faith' in the active sense. Accordingly, the Revised Version only admits the substantive *Faith* in two places (Deut. xxxii. 20, and Hab. ii. 4). These are not translations of the same Hebrew word. In Deut. xxxii. 20, the words are: 'they are a very froward generation, children in whom is no Faith.' Here one may doubt whether the meaning is not simply, 'they cannot be trusted.' In Habakkuk, however, the active sense is apparently intended: 'the just shall live by his faith'; but even here the sense is disputed, and the margin of the Revised Version has 'in his faithfulness.' I think, however, that the marginal rendering, though more in accordance with the usage of the word, gives a less satisfactory sense, because the context shows that a contrast is being drawn between the arrogant self-sufficiency of the Chaldæan and the humble trust in God of the 'just.' We may perhaps, then, hold that in this one passage of the Old Testament we have the word Faith used in something like its full Christian or Evangelical meaning, as an enduring attitude of the mind and heart towards God.

The notion of Faith, or rather, faithfulness, in the Old Testament is largely determined by the idea of a *covenant* between God and His people. Faith, trust, or faithfulness belongs to the parties to a covenant; it has no meaning outside that relation. The covenant was made between God and His people collectively; individuals were parties

¹ Warfield in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, s.v. Faith

to it as members of the favoured nation.¹ Faith, or faithfulness, is the observance of a right attitude towards the covenant with God—it is the conscientious observance of the human side of the covenant, the divine side of which is grace and mercy. We may trace a development in the Jewish ideas about this covenant. With the decay of the national fortunes Faith became more spiritual and more individualistic. It became finally the mental attitude of those who ‘waited for the consolation of Israel,’ trusting in promises which seemed every year further from their fulfilment.

The Septuagint was not able to preserve the distinction, above referred to, between ‘to trust to’ and ‘to trust in.’ It usually renders both by πιστεύειν with the dative. Nor can the Greek reproduce all the meaning of the Hebrew words. It wavers in translating the Hebrew word for ‘trustworthiness,’ the nearest equivalent to Faith, and the corresponding adjective, rendering them sometimes by ἀλήθεια, ἀληθινός, and sometimes by πίστις and kindred adjectives. In Isa. vii. 9, there is a kind of play on words. ‘If ye be not firm’ (in Faith), ‘ye shall surely not be made firm’ (in fact); or, ‘If ye hold not fast, ye shall not stand fast.’ This is lost in translation. In the important verse, Hab. ii. 4, the Septuagint manifestly misunderstands the original, translating ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεώς μου ζήσεται=‘the just shall live through my faithfulness (to my covenant).’ Still, the word πιστεύειν is satisfactory, as it has the right association with moral trust, as well as with what may be called the earlier Greek associations of πίστις, as opposed to ἐπιστήμη.

Philo’s notion of Faith is characteristic of his position as a mediator between Jewish and Greek thought. As a Jew, he emphasises *trust* as determining Faith; but his philosophy leads him to single out the *unchangeableness* of God almost exclusively as the ground and object of Faith.

¹ A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 280.

There is not a great deal about Faith in his writings : what there is, is chiefly with reference to the standard case of Abraham's Faith. 'Abraham,' he says, 'saw into the unfixedness and unsettledness of material being, when he recognised the unfaltering stability which attends true being, and to which he is said to have completely trusted.' 'He anchored himself firmly and unchangeably on true being alone.' 'The only thing stable is Faith toward God, or toward true being.'¹ Philo's 'Faith' is thus a steady reliance on the eternal and unchangeable ideas of truth and righteousness, which lie behind the fleeting shows of phenomenal existence. The active sense has fairly established itself, but Faith for Philo differs rather widely from the Christian virtue in that it is the prize² and not the starting-point of the race, standing at the end, not at the beginning, of the religious life.

Sanday and Headlam³ have a valuable note on the use of the word Faith in the apocryphal literature. In the Psalms of Solomon it is attributed to the Messiah Himself ; in the other books it is characteristic of his subjects. Thus 4 Esdras vi. 28, 'florebit fides et vincetur corruptela' ; vii. 34, 'veritas stabit et fides convalescet.' In the Apocalypse of Baruch we have, 'incredulis tormentum ignis reservatum.' In other places we have 'Faith and works' in combination, indicating that the discussion of their relative merits did not originate in the Christian Church.

We now come to the New Testament. I think that for our purposes it will be most convenient to take the Synoptic Gospels first, as a record of our Lord's actual teaching about, and attitude towards, Faith ; the Pauline conception of Faith next ; the Epistle to the Hebrews third ;

¹ Cf. E. A. Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*.

² Philo, *De Praem. et Poen.*, ii. p. 412, διδακτικῇ χρησάμενος ἀρετῇ πρὸς τελείωσιν ἀθλοῦ αἰρεῖται τὴν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν πίστιν.

³ On Romans i. 17.

and the Johannine interpretation of our Lord's teaching last. This order is not intended to imply any disparagement of the Fourth Gospel as a historical document ; but St. John certainly wrote for his own generation, and it is possible to speak of a Johannine doctrine of Faith, which must not be taken out of its chronological place.

The Triple Tradition does not agree in any saying of Christ containing the verb πιστεῖν ; and in the use of the substantive πίστις the only verbatim agreement is ' thy faith hath saved thee,' of the woman with the issue of blood. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that our Lord spoke of ' Faith ' and ' believing ' in the technical religious sense which is characteristic of the New Testament as a whole. There seems to be no objection on linguistic grounds. Not only did the Hebrew word acquire an active meaning in Rabbinical literature, but in the Aramaic dialect (according to Lightfoot on *Galatians*, p. 154), an active form had been developed. How far this language was original with Him, it is difficult to say. It is extremely probable that the words were often on the lips of the simple folk in Palestine who ' waited for the kingdom of God.' We have seen that all was ready for the richer doctrine of Faith which was part of Christ's message. The devout country people among whom He was brought up had not much to learn about confidence in God, about conviction of the reality of the unseen, or about patient waiting for the consolation of Israel.

In the Synoptic Gospels, Faith generally means confidence in Christ's power to perform some particular thing. It would be superfluous to enumerate the cases in which Faith is mentioned as the condition of miracles of healing. In these instances, Faith is simply the psychological state which alone makes the patient susceptible to cures of this kind. There are, however, many passages, especially if we add the uses of the verb πιστεῖν to those of the substantive, in which the wider sense of trustful self-surrender

to Christ, or to God, is clearly indicated. There is only one place in the Synoptics, I think (Matt. xxiii. 23), in which *πίστις* means 'integrity'; and so strong have its theological associations already become, that it is never used of man's faith in man. When it has an object, that object is in the genitive, as St. Mark xi. 22, 'have faith in God'; not with a preposition (*ἐν, εἰς, πρὸς, ἐπὶ*) as in the Epistles. But in the large majority of cases, it is used absolutely. When 'Faith' is primarily expectation of a miracle, a deeper thought is sometimes present. In the case of the paralytic, remission of sins precedes the physical cure (Matt. ix. 1-8); and in Luke vii. 50 the characteristic words, 'thy Faith hath saved thee,' are used of forgiveness only, when there has been no miracle. Our Lord must have spoken much of the moral force of Faith, of what is now sometimes called the dynamic of religion. In the figurative and even hyperbolical language which He often used in popular teaching, He said that Faith, though no larger than a grain of mustard-seed, can remove mountains (Matt. xvii. 20), a phrase which became familiar to Christians (1 Cor. xiii. 2) at a very early date. Cf. also Mark ix. 23: 'If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.' That this Faith ought to be but is not always an abiding state is shown by the words to Peter (Luke xxii. 32), 'I have prayed for thee, that thy Faith fail not.' There are some who 'for a while believe, but in time of temptation fall away' (Matt. xiii. 20). In Matt. xvi. 17, 'These signs shall follow them that believe,' we have an approximation to the use of the participle as a designation of the Christian society, 'the believers,' which we find in the Acts.¹

One passage in the Synoptists seems to me to stand quite alone—Luke xviii. 8. 'When the Son of Man cometh, shall

¹ It is worth while also to call attention to Matt. xxiii. 23. 'justice, mercy and faith.' Cf. Micah vi. 8 of which these words may be a reminiscence. The third virtue, Faith, is added by Christ.

He find Faith' (or, the Faith) 'on the earth?' I am unable to understand these words except in the sense that though God will avenge his saints 'speedily' (see the preceding verse), yet the time will appear so long before the second coming that the love of many will have waxed cold. 'Faith,' or 'the Faith,' will hardly be found on the earth. I must confess that the words sound more like an expression of the discouragement which we know to have been felt by the second and third generations of Christians, when 'hope deferred' of the *παρουσία* was 'making the heart sick,' than what we should have expected to have from the lips of our Lord. If the words are authentic, we must take 'Faith' (with the best orthodox commentators) in the less natural sense of 'the necessary Faith,' or 'the Faith that perseveres in prayer.'

To sum up: 'Faith,' and 'to believe,' in the Synoptic Gospels, means a spirit of simple receptiveness towards the Messiah and His message, a state of mind which, unlike the righteousness of the Pharisees, requires no previous course of discipline in meritorious actions. 'Faith' is the primary motion of the human spirit when brought into contact with Divine truth and goodness. Its fruits are loyal self-devotion, even unto death, complete renunciation of all earthly ties, in so far as these could come between the disciple and his Master. untiring energy in service, and an enthusiastic temper, full of love, joy, and peace. This is really the whole content of Faith, as preached by Jesus to the simple folk whom He gathered round Him in Galilee.

We next turn to St. Paul's Epistles. I do not wish to discuss the more technical theological problems connected with the Pauline doctrine of Faith, but only to determine what the word means for him. One of the most significant passages is Gal. iii. 23, *πρὸ τοῦ ἔλθειν τὴν πίστιν*, 'before the coming of [the] Faith.' This expression proves that the Christians felt their 'Faith' to be something new in the world; as new as their 'Love,' for which they required

an almost new word in the Greek language, their 'Hope,' which the pagans conspicuously lacked (Eph. ii. 12), and their 'Joy,' which no man could take from them. The coming of Christ was the coming of [the] Faith. The Acts of the Apostles shows that the disciples soon began to call themselves 'Believers'; it was one of the earliest names of the Christian society.¹ Whether, as Lightfoot suggests,² the name indicates 'The Trusty' as well as 'The Trustful,' is uncertain; the active meaning certainly predominates. The name was familiar to friends and foes in the time of Minucius Felix, who shows that it had been Latinised—'pistorum præcipuus et postremus philosophus'³—since 'credulus' was impossible. The pagans in the time of Celsus employed it as an opprobrious term for their opponents. In other places St. Paul uses 'the Faith' almost as equivalent to the whole body of Christian doctrine and practice (Gal. i. 23; vi. 10, τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως= the Church; Rom. xii. 3, 6; Eph. iv. 13.)

The coming of Christ was the beginning of the dispensation of Faith, and the new virtue had found a name both in Greek and Aramaic. For the Jews, a bridge was found in the text about 'faithful Abraham,' which, as we have seen, was made to support a heavy superstructure of doctrine even by Philo, and was discussed with equal eagerness in the Rabbinical schools.⁴ The meaning of Faith was being defined by controversy, and the concept was as yet so fluid that St. Paul and St. James can flatly contradict each other in words without differing much in meaning.

St. Paul's theology, we are now beginning to see, must be interpreted by what we know of his personal religious experiences, which he naturally expounds by the help of current theological ideas and conceptions. Put very

¹ Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, ii. 6.

² Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 157.

³ There is a play on words here, between *pistus* and *pistor*. See the context, *Octavius*, 14.

⁴ Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 159.

shortly, his doctrine of justification by Faith was arrived at somewhat in this way. Jewish thought knew of two, and only two, roads to salvation. One was by natural descent from Abraham. This belief was discredited for various reasons. It was unethical; it was falsified by history; and it was contradicted by religious experience. The other was by righteousness. This St. Paul had tried and found wanting. Justifying righteousness was unattainable; the verdict against the claimant was a foregone conclusion. The good news of the Gospel was the assurance of a free pardon to all who would 'believe.' God will reckon their 'Faith' as righteousness. Remembering the other and older theory as to the title to salvation, descent from Abraham, he represents this saving grace also as 'adoption' to sonship, through faith in Christ Jesus (Gal. iii. 26). The true Israel, then, are the adopted 'children of Abraham,' and their faith in Christ is accepted instead of the impossible requirement of legal righteousness. The Christian, therefore, has a double title to salvation: he is a son and heir by adoption, and, by the free grace of God through Christ, he is accounted to have fulfilled the law of righteousness. The one condition is 'Faith.' Now what is this Faith? Not the mere *fiducia* (subjective assurance) of Lutheranism, even if this theory can support itself plausibly by certain expressions in St. Paul's writings. We must remember that at this time Faith involved the open acceptance of Christianity, adhesion, in the face of the world, to a persecuted sect. St. Paul never even contemplated an inner state of confidence in God's mercies through Christ that did not exhibit itself in this overt, decisive, initial step. 'If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.'¹ And assuredly Faith included also a changed life

¹ Rom. x. 9.

as a member of the new society.¹ In short, we must beware of forgetting the very different terms on which a subjective confidence in the merits of Christ's death may be held now and in St. Paul's time. What St. Paul dreads, and protests against in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, is a baptized Pharisaism which would remain in all essentials pre-Christian. He is determined that Faith shall not lose its new *active* meaning, as a decisive moral act of trust; he dreads that it may become again Jewish and *passive*, a mere fidelity to the terms of a covenant. He is fighting for the new content of the word Faith, as a Christian virtue. But it is as a Christian virtue bound up inextricably with the other Christian virtues, and especially with Love, which is its proper activity or *ἐνέργεια* (Gal. v. 6), that he claims such importance for it.

This consideration, that 'Faith' in St. Paul includes not only subjective trust in Christ's promises, but all that such trust necessarily led to, in an honest and consistent man, at that time, that is, that it included public relinquishment of paganism or Judaism, and adhesion to the Christian Church at a time when the Christians were regarded as the scum of the earth (1 Cor. iv. 13), will help us to understand, in particular, what Faith in the atoning blood of Christ meant for St. Paul. I will not now discuss the sacrificial aspect of Christ's death. But it is right to insist that the key to the whole of St. Paul's Christology is the doctrine of the mystical union of the believer with his Lord, which is for him the necessary fulfilment of the life of Faith. To understand the Pauline doctrine of justification by Faith as summed up in such ideas as 'resting in the finished work of the Redeemer,' or any other detachment of Christ for us from Christ in us, is an unfortunate

¹ Dobschütz (*Christian Life in the Primitive Church*, p. 368 *seq.*) has justly emphasised the remarkable standard of moral purity which was demanded and, on the whole, attained in the primitive Church.

mistake. The 'whole process of Christ' must be re-enacted in the experience of the believer, and the culmination of the whole is spiritual crucifixion and resurrection. 'The new and significant peculiarity,' says Pfleiderer,¹ 'in Paul's conception of Faith, is the mystical union with Christ, the self-identification with Christ in a fellowship of life and death. In this unreserved, self-forgetting surrender of the whole man to the Saviour, in which the revelation of the Divine love, as well as the embodiment of the ideal for man, is beheld as a personal life, the believer feels himself to be 'a new creature. . . . That is expressed in the fine saying: "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me; and the life that I now live in the flesh I live in the Faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me." Life in the Faith means the same as "Christ liveth in me."'

In Romans xiv., Faith is represented as a graduated progress in the mind of Christ. 'Weakness in the Faith' shows itself by anxiety to keep formal rules, by superstition, in fact. 'Faith to eat all things' is a strong Faith. So in Colossians, feasts and fast-days are 'shadows of things to come.' This chapter contains also the declaration (v. 23), 'whatever is not of Faith, is sin'; which has been taken out of its context and made to support the contention that 'the virtues of the heathen were splendid vices,' or that 'all works done before justification are sinful.' St. Paul, however, appears only to mean that in matters of abstinence or indulgence we ought to have a clear conscience. The half-superstitious man is likely to wound his conscience, whether he keeps his fast or breaks it.

In the well-known words, 'We walk by Faith, not by sight' (2 Cor. v. 7), St. Paul means, as the context shows, that the form (*εἶδος*) of the exalted Christ is hidden from us. Faith is the condition of our present life (*διὰ πίστεως*

¹ *Primitive Christianity*, vol. i. p. 347.

περιπατοῦμεν), as 'seeing face to face' will be our condition in the future life. Then Faith will not be abolished, but will become eternal (1 Cor. xiii. 13).

Faith, for St. Paul, blends with hope, and is almost identified with it (Rom. xv. 13 ; iv. 18-21 ; viii. 24). Hope adds joy and peace to believing ; it has a moral basis, and may even be identified with the Christ in us (Col. i. 27).

One other important aspect of Faith in St. Paul's Epistles must be mentioned before we pass on to the Epistle to the Hebrews. In Faith, as St. Paul understands it, lie the roots both of new ethical power and of a deeper knowledge of God.¹ Practical and theoretical Christianity are both contained in it. The Christian stands fast in the Faith (1 Cor. xvi. 13), but also grows in Faith, and attains the stature of the perfect man by coming 'unto the unity of the Faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God' (Eph. iv. 13). Behind the Rabbinical subtleties, which we find here and there in St. Paul's Epistles, we can trace plainly enough a sublime and profound conception of Faith, which may well be our guide in our coming investigation.

The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has done for Faith what St. Paul has done for Love in 1 Cor. xiii. The eleventh chapter of the Epistle is a hymn in honour of Faith. It begins with the famous definition ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων. 'Now Faith is the assurance of [or, the giving substance to] things hoped for, the proving [or, test] of objects not seen.' (R.V.) Πίστις has here no article. This is significant ; for in this Epistle Faith is not the Christian Faith, but a psychological faculty. In this sense it is as wide as the human mind, and even Rahab may be adduced as an example of it. The meaning both of ὑπόστασις and of ἔλεγχος is disputed. For the former, the Revised Version gives the preference to 'assurance,' a meaning which is

¹ Pfeiderer, *ibid.*, p. 350.

also assigned to it, probably rightly, in iii. 14, 'We are become partakers of Christ if we hold fast the beginning of our confidence (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως) firm unto the end.' The Greek Fathers say that ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑποστάσεως is Faith, as the 'beginning of our true nature,' that which causes us to become what we in truth are.¹ (The paradox is indicated by the tenses γεγόναμεν, εἴνπερ κατάσχωμεν.) This is a very interesting interpretation, and the thought is a fine one; but since the use of ὑπόστασις in the sense of 'assurance' or 'resolution' is well established in later Greek, it seems more natural to take it so in this place. But we are not therefore obliged to take ὑπόστασις as 'assurance' in ch. xi. 1. In i. 3 it has the meaning of 'substance' or 'reality'; and all through the Epistle the distinction between heaven and earth, between spirit and flesh, is conceived Platonically as that between substance and shadow, truth and appearance, pattern and copy. Moreover, the passages quoted to justify the translation 'assurance' do not convince me that the unquestioned late-Greek meaning, 'firm endurance,' 'steadfastness,' is sufficient authority for translating ἐλπίζομένων ὑπόστασις 'assurance with regard to what is hoped for.' Such an explanation seems not to have occurred to any commentator before Luther, and the Greek Fathers are not lightly to be set aside in such a case. Chrysostom's note is: 'For whereas things that are matters of hope seem to be unsubstantial, Faith gives them substance; or rather, does not give it, but is itself their being. For instance, the resurrection has not taken place, and is not in substance, but Faith gives it reality (ὑφίστησιν) in our soul.' If we take it so, the writer says that Faith gives substance, or reality, to things which we hope for, but which have not yet taken place. It does so by raising us above the categories of time into those of eternity, so that,

¹ The reader should consult Bishop Westcott's edition of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* for a fuller discussion of this passage.

even as Faith shows us that Christ offered Himself to God 'through an eternal Spirit' (ix. 14), in the world of timeless reality, so to the eye of Faith the future is as real as the present. Ἐλεγχος must correspond in meaning to ὑπόστασις, and probably means 'proof,' 'test,' that which establishes (or rejects) the reality of unseen objects. Thus the full meaning of this noble definition—I cannot agree with Westcott's inference from the order ἔστιν δὲ πίστις that 'the object of the writer is not to give a formal definition'—is that Faith is the faculty which makes real to us the future and the unseen, and moreover enables us, in this region, to discern the true from the false. 'Things which in the succession of time are still hoped for, have a true existence in the eternal order; and this existence Faith brings home to the believer as a real fact.' (Westcott.) When we remember that Plato distinguishes knowledge (γνῶσις) from opinion (δόξα), as being concerned with reality and not with appearance, we may say that this Epistle claims for Faith the rank of potential Gnosis, instead of allying it with opinion, as the classical usage of πίστις tended to do.

Dr. Du Bose is in substantial agreement. 'Beneath or behind the things that are seen and are temporal there is an Eternal Unseen. What is it? The Word of God. If that answer is not true, there is no object or function of Faith, and no religion. Suppose it to be true, and that not only is the Word of God as the reality of things the true objective matter of Faith, but that Faith is the true subjective apprehension and possession of that objective reality, does the fact without us produce the intuition of it within us; or is the intuition itself the proper *prius* and reality? Does *hypostasis* mean objective substance or subjective assurance? I ask simply to bring out this fact, that in the divine and absolute religion of Jesus Christ Faith and fact are treated as having been made one, as being now identical. Faith is not only assurance; it is the present

possession, the very substance and reality of its object. Assurance is substance, Faith is fact, promise is fulfilment, hope is possession and fruition—all not so much through any inexplicable virtue in Faith itself, as because Faith is the laying hold of and uniting itself with that Word of God which is at once the substance of all reality and the light of all truth.’¹

This notable chapter contains other important dicta about Faith. ‘Without Faith it is impossible to please Him; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him’ (v. 6). Faith demands the *existence* of its Object; God is a fact, not an ideal. Faith also demands that its Object shall be *active*—that God shall be experienced, and not merely thought of as existing. Again, Faith is explained to be ‘a seeing of the invisible’ (v. 27). ‘The invisible’ is God, as the gender shows. Faith is seeing God during our earthly pilgrimage. Augustine’s comment is true and fine. ‘Errabant quidem adhuc et patriam quærebant; sed duce Christo errare non poterant. *Via illis fuit visio Dei.*’²

The doctrine of Faith in this Epistle is not at variance with that of St. Paul, but it is liberated from the Rabbinical form which is the result of St. Paul’s Jewish education. The idea that Faith consists in accepting the free gift of the righteousness of God, has no place in this Epistle. On the other hand, the notion of Faith as exalting us above the trammels of our life in time, enabling us to view history as a whole, and to assume a heroic attitude in face of temporal sufferings by regarding events *sub specie æternitatis*, is peculiar to this Epistle, and is a most inspiring thought. It has affinities to Philo’s conception of Faith, and is, no doubt, a line of thought natural to Alexandrian idealism.

The Epistle of St. James contains an energetic protest

¹ Du Bose, *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*, pp. 224-6 (abridged).

² Augustine, *Ad I Joh.*, Tract. 7; Westcott on Heb. xi. 27.

against the notion that 'Faith,' whether understood as mere *fiducia* or mere orthodoxy, is of any saving value without 'works'—consistency of life. He uses 'Faith' in a narrower sense than St. Paul, and insists passionately on what to St. Paul would have been a truism, that Faith must be known by its fruit. St. James was a moralist, and would have agreed with Matthew Arnold that conduct is all but an insignificant fraction of human life. The protest was needed, but it does not touch St. Paul or his teaching. It is not even certain that the author of this epistle, whoever he was, was thinking of St. Paul's teaching on the subject. The relation of Faith and works was a standing thesis for discussion in Jewish schools, and naturally was also debated by Christians.¹ But though there is no contradiction between St. Paul and St. James, the protests of the latter do touch some post-Reformation teaching about Faith. We cannot be surprised either at Luther's contemptuous judgment of this epistle, or at his subsequent acknowledgment that he had spoken too hastily.

St. James's real meaning is well brought out by the eloquent Julius Hare,² whose discourses on Faith ought never to be forgotten by English theologians. 'Faith without works is a dead Faith, not a living, a nominal Faith, not a real, the shadow of Faith, not the substance. And why is this, except because Faith, if it be living, if it be real, if it be substantial, is a practical principle, a practical power; nay, of all principles, of all powers, by which man can be actuated, the most practical; so that when it does not show forth its life by good works, we may reasonably conclude that it is dead; just as we infer that a body is dead when it has ceased to move, or that a tree is dead when it puts forth no leaves.'³

¹ See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 157 seq.; Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, pp. 104-6. The Jewish discussions were based on Gen. xv. 6.

² Hare, *The Victory of Faith and other Sermons*, p. 36.

³ The use of *πλῆρις* in 1 and 2 Peter, and in Jude, is not important for this discussion. See Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. 36.

In the Acts of the Apostles, *πίστις* and *πιστεύειν* occur very frequently. With the definite article, *πίστις* means the Christian faith (ch. vi. 7; xiii. 8; xvi. 5; xxiv. 24). On the other hand, *πλήρης πίστεως* means 'full of enthusiasm and strength based on Faith in Jesus Christ' (vi. 5; xi. 24). 'Faith in the Lord Jesus,' in the Acts, involves mainly belief in His resurrection and exaltation, and in 'the forgiveness of sins' (v. 30, 31). Profession of this Faith is followed at once by baptism (xvi. 31-33). Sanctifying Faith (xv. 2; xxvi. 18) must be distinguished from this first impulse to become a believer. Contrast the past tense in xiv. 23; xviii. 27; xix. 2 with the present in ii. 44; xxii. 19.

It remains to consider the teaching of the Fourth Gospel about Faith. Let us assume that this treatise was written between 100 and 120 A.D., and that, though it is based on genuine recollections or traditions of our Lord's teaching, it was written with the special design of offering a certain presentation and doctrine of the Person of Christ, as a solution of doubts and controversies which pressed for settlement at the beginning of the second century.

We have seen that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has his own presentation of Faith to offer to the world. Steeped in Alexandrian philosophy, which called men to 'flee hence to our dear country,' he conceives of Faith as life in the eternal order, in the heaven which is all around us if we could only see it, and dilates on the heroism which should be the fruit of this heavenly vision. The writer was a scholar and thinker, and he has written for the scholars and thinkers of all time. St. John (I will keep the traditional name without raising the question of authorship) writes for a wider circle. The Church at the end of the first century was already distracted by the beginnings of the movement known as Gnosticism. It is true that the great Gnostics of the first half of the second century were outside the Church, and only half Christian.

But within the Christian societies a party of knowledge and a party of Faith contended against each other. St. Paul's enthusiastic praises of growing knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) had encouraged the professors of knowledge 'falsely so called' (ψευδώνυμος γνώσις, 1 Tim. vi. 20) to graft their barbarised Platonism on Christianity, even in the lifetime of the Apostle (Col. ii. 6-9). On the other side, the party of bare Faith (ψιλλή πίστις) had already come to deserve the taunts of the educated pagans. Faith, for them, was not a moral, but an anti-intellectual principle. They said, as Celsus tells us about the Christians of his own generation, 'Do not inquire, only believe' (μὴ ἐξέταξε, ἀλλὰ πίστευσον). And their belief was of a childish, apocalyptic character, full of miracles and dreams of a coming reign of the saints. In fact, the situation which St. Paul already discerned was now clearly defined. 'The Jews require miracles; the Greeks metaphysics.' St. John, even more fully than St. Paul, presents both with 'Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God' (1 Cor. i. 22-24).

St. John studiously avoids the two catchwords γνώσις and πίστις, and uses only the verbs, which really agree better with the essentially dynamic character of Faith and knowledge in his theology. He tells us frankly that his object in writing is that his readers may 'believe' that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing they may have life through His name. Faith in the Person of Christ is everywhere central in this Gospel; and he teaches us, by various indications, what Faith is. He uses πιστεύειν with five constructions. It is used absolutely; with the dative; with εἰς; with εἰς τὸ ὄνομα; and with ὅτι. Origen distinguishes 'believing on the name of Christ' as a lower grade of Faith than believing on Christ Himself. This sounds over-subtle, but is probably correct. To believe on the name of Christ has special reference to the public confession of Faith at baptism. 'They that believe on His name' (i. 12; ii. 23) practically means 'baptized

Christians.'¹ The office attributed to the Holy Ghost in our catechism—that of 'sanctifying all the elect people of God'—is quite Johannine. In ch. i. 7 we have, 'John came to bear witness to the Light, that all men through him might believe.' This shows that Faith is the trust of those who see things as they are, and not blind credulity. Nathaniel 'believes' that Christ is the Son of God and King of Israel, through a sign : Christ promises him a more spiritual basis for a higher kind of belief. In iii. 16-21, the evangelist's comment on the discourse with Nicodemus, we have Faith opposed to rebellion or disloyalty (for this is the Biblical sense of ἀπειθεῖν), and thus we get a nearer determination of Faith as including obedience and loyalty. In the discourse about the Bread of Life, in ch. vi., the persistent demands of the Jews for a sign are rebuked by our Lord : 'Ye have seen Me, and yet believe not'; and their question, 'What must we *do*, that we may work the works of God?' is met by the remarkable declaration, 'This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He sent.' Personal devotion includes the 'works of God,' and these works will never be done without it. In xii. 44 Christ says, 'He that believeth on Me, believeth not on Me, but on Him that sent Me.' Faith in Christ and Faith in God are identical; but the former is the way to the latter. Those who seek 'glory' one from another, instead of the glory that cometh from the only God (v. 44), cannot believe. In the last discourses there is less about believing, and more about the peace and joy to which Faith conducts. In ch. xvii. Christ does not pray that His disciples may 'believe,' but for higher things. Lastly, in the all-important concluding words of ch. xx., Faith without sight receives the last beatitude.

If we compare all the places where πιστεύειν is used in St. John, we shall conclude, I think, that the two meanings of intellectual conviction and moral self-surrender are

¹ Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*.

about equally emphasised. Faith is allegiance to Jesus Christ, and as such a condition of eternal life (i. 6 ; vi. 40), which latter is also a progressive stage, depending on knowledge (xvii. 3) as well as Faith. 'Believing is not a consummation or a goal, but a number of different stages, by which different individuals pass towards the one Centre, in whom they are to have life.'¹ Thus the rival claims of Faith and Knowledge are reconciled, by lifting both into a higher sphere, and fixing both on the Person of Christ.

In this short review of the development of the concept 'Faith' in the Bible, I have tried to show how here, as in other cases, there was a fusion of Jewish and Hellenic modes of thought. At the end of the first century we find Faith established as a characteristic Christian virtue or temper, with a full and rich meaning. The Christians called themselves 'Believers,' and spoke of 'the Faith' without further specification of what they believed or trusted in. But they were conscious that the word included moral devotion and self-surrender to Christ, a firm conviction that by uniting themselves to Him they would find remission of sins and eternal salvation, and intellectual conviction that certain divinely revealed facts are true.

¹ Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*.

CHAPTER II

FAITH AS A RELIGIOUS TERM—*continued**(b) In the Church*

IN order to form an adequate judgment on the meaning of 'Faith' in Christian theology, we must pursue our investigation into the writings of Christian theologians.

The 'Apostolic Fathers' do not yield us much in the way of illustration, until we come to Ignatius. This writer employs (*Ep.* ix.) a curious metaphor: 'Ye were drawn up on high by the cross of Christ, using the Holy Spirit as a rope, while your faith was the means by which you ascended, and your love the way which led you up to God.' Here Faith is the motive force, love a kind of inclined plane. In ch. xiv. of the same epistle he says: 'Faith and love towards Christ Jesus are the beginning and end of life. The beginning is Faith, and the end is Love.'¹ We shall find this delimitation of the provinces of Faith and Love repeated more than once by Clement of Alexandria. Cf. especially *Strom.* vii. 10: 'Christ is both the foundation and the superstructure, through whom are both the beginning and the end. Faith is the beginning, Love the end.' And *ib.* ii. 13: 'Faith leads the way; Fear edifies; Love perfects.' There are signs even in the New Testament that this was an accepted maxim in the Church: in 2 Pet. i. 5-7, Faith and Love begin and end the list; and in 1 Tim. i. 5 we have, 'the end of the commandment is Love.' So Hermas (iii. 8) has the following scheme:

¹ Cf. also *Smyrn.* 6, 'Faith and love are everything.'

'From Faith arises Self-restraint; from Self-restraint, Simplicity; from Simplicity, Guilelessness; from Guilelessness, Chastity; from Chastity, Intelligence; and from Intelligence, Love.' The pedigree is silly enough; but the positions of Faith and Love are evidently fixed.¹

The writer of the *Epistle to Diognetus* has (ch. viii.): 'He has manifested Himself through Faith, to which alone it is given to behold God.' Theophilus (i. 8) uses Faith as equivalent to Trust, and argues that without Faith almost all action would be impossible. In the Clementine *Recognitions* (ii. 69), Peter is made to say, 'It is not safe to commit these things to bare Faith without Reason, since truth cannot be without reason. He who has received truths fortified by reason, can never lose them; whereas he who receives them without proofs, by simple assent, can neither keep them safely, nor be sure that they are true. The more anxious any man is in demanding a reason, the more secure will he be in keeping his Faith.' This language reminds us of the Cambridge Platonists, especially of Benjamin Whichcote, who says, 'When the doctrine of the Gospel becomes the reason of our mind, it will be the principle of our life.'

More interesting and important is the doctrine of Faith in Clement of Alexandria, whom I have already quoted.² 'Faith,' he says (*Strom.* ii. 2), 'which the Greeks disparage as futile and barbarous, is a voluntary anticipation, the assent of piety—the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, as the inspired Apostle says. Others have defined Faith to be an uniting assent to an unseen object. If then it be choice, the desire is in this case intellectual, since it desires something. And since choice is the beginning of action, Faith is the beginning of action, being the foundation of rational choice, when a

¹ Cf. a similar list in *Hermas*, ix. 15.

² The second book of the *Stromateis* contains a full and very instructive discussion of Faith.

man sets before himself, through Faith, the demonstration which he anticipates. Voluntarily to follow what is useful is the beginning of understanding it. Unswerving choice, therefore, gives a great impetus towards knowledge. The exercise of Faith at once becomes knowledge, built on a sure foundation.'

The followers of Basilides, he proceeds, regard Faith as a natural endowment, defining it as 'finding ideas by intellectual comprehension without demonstration.' 'The Valentinians assign Faith to us simple folk, but claim that knowledge arises in themselves (who are saved by nature) through the advantage of a germ of higher excellence, saying that it is as far above faith as the spiritual is above the animal.' To this Clement objects, as making Faith an innate faculty and not a matter of rational choice. We cannot justly be punished for lacking a power which is given or withheld by external necessity; and if this is the true account, he who has not Faith cannot hope to acquire it.

First principles are incapable of demonstration. The First Cause of the Universe can be apprehended by Faith alone. For knowledge is a state of mind resulting from demonstration; but Faith is a grace which from what is not demonstrable leads us to what is universal and simple.

We can learn nothing without a preconceived idea of what we are aiming at; Faith is such a preconception. This is what the prophet meant when he said, 'Unless ye believe, ye will not understand,' and what Heraclitus meant when he said, 'If you do not hope, you will not find what is beyond your hopes.'

The Basilidians (ch. vi.) define Faith to be the assent of the soul to any of those things that are not present to the senses. This assent is not supposition, but assent to something certain. Faith is the voluntary supposition and anticipation of comprehension.

Faith must not be disparaged as simple and vulgar. 'If

it grow, and there is no place where it is not, then I affirm that Faith, whether founded in love or (as its disparagers assert) in fear, is something divine. Love, by its alliance with Faith, makes men believers; and Faith, which is the foundation of Love, in its turn introduces the doing of good. Faith is the first movement towards salvation; after which fear and hope and repentance, in company with temperance and patience, lead us on to love and knowledge.' Knowledge (ch. xi.) is founded on Faith. But Faith is also founded on knowledge, which may be defined as 'reason, producing Faith in what is disputed [by arguing] from what is admitted.' There are two kinds of Faith, one resting on science, the other on opinion. (Therefore, it would seem, Faith is the condition of attaining knowledge, and knowledge, so far from superseding Faith, gives it back transmuted into a higher form.) Obedience to the commandments, which implies Faith or trust in God ($\delta \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \pi \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \nu \tau \hat{\omega} \theta \epsilon \hat{\omega}$),¹ is a mode of learning: and 'Faith is a power of God, being the strength of truth.' (That is to say, Faith is essentially progressive and dynamic; it has its proper activity in a certain energy of thought, will, and action, which issues in an assurance of the truth, based on knowledge and experience.)

'Fear is the beginning of love (ch. xii.). Fear develops into Faith, and Faith into love.' (This is a remarkable echo of the well-known '*Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*' of Statius and Petronius.) 'But I do not fear my Father as I fear a wild beast; I fear and love Him at once. Blessed, therefore, is he who has Faith, being compounded of love and fear.'

In the fifth book of the *Stromateis* he returns to the subject of Faith. What follows is an abridgment of his argument. It is incorrect to say that Faith has reference to the Son, and knowledge to the Spirit. We cannot so

¹ So Clement of Rome makes the faith of Abraham consist in obedience (ch. 19).

separate either the Persons of the Trinity, or Faith and Knowledge.

‘Faith is the ear of the soul.’ It admits of growth, as is shown by Rom. i. 11, 17; Luke, xvii. 5. We must not, with Basilides, regard it as ‘a natural endowment, dispensing with the rational assent of the self-determining soul,’ for then we should not have needed a Saviour. But we do need revelation, and Faith accepts it. Nevertheless, Faith always goes hand in hand with inquiry.

In the seventh book he speaks of Faith as a short cut to perfection, by which the unlearned and ignorant may outdistance him who is learned in the philosophy of the Greeks. ‘Faith is a compendious knowledge of essentials, while knowledge is a sure and firm demonstration of the things received through Faith, carrying us on to unshaken conviction and scientific certainty. There is a first kind of saving change from heathenism to Faith, a second from Faith to knowledge; and knowledge, as it passes on into love, begins at once to establish a mutual friendship between the knower and the known. Perhaps he who has reached this stage is ‘equal to the angels’ (ἰσάγγελος, Luke xx. 36.) Faith is preceded by *admiration* (ch. xi. § 60), which is thus the beginning of Faith, as Plato says it is the beginning of philosophy. Compare the words attributed to Christ: ‘He who wonders shall reign, and he who reigns shall rest,’ and Wordsworth’s, ‘We live by admiration, hope, and love.’

I have dwelt on Clement’s doctrine of Faith at what may seem disproportionate length, because I believe that he is the one of the Christian Fathers who deals with the relations of Faith and knowledge in the most enlightened and illuminating way. We at any rate feel that we can understand and sympathise with his point of view, because the problems with which he had to deal were in many ways very similar to our problems. Clement had to steer between the unqualified intellectualism of the Greek Gnostics, and the

obscurantism of the *simpliciores*, with their watchword of 'Faith only' (*ψιλή πίστις*). When Clement speaks of Faith, he has often in view the Faith of these simple Christians. And his main object is to show what are the true relations of this simple belief to the Gnosis of which cultivated Christians were so proud. Faith, he maintains all through, is the foundation, Gnosis the superstructure. There is no generic difference between them. The true Gnostic is merely the man of Faith come to maturity, a Christian who has drawn out of his faith all that it virtually contained from the first. Faith is an immanent, implicit good (*ἐνδιάθετος*), which Gnosis renders explicit. It is the condition of all knowledge of God ; there is no royal road for the philosopher, through the intellect alone, to divine knowledge. All alike must begin with Faith, which demands a *θεοσεβείας συγκατάθεσις*, a personal assent to an attitude of adoration, an act of piety. But since it is the nature of Faith to develop into knowledge, the door cannot be shut upon inquiry. The way is open for a Christian philosophy. So Clement refutes the obscurantism of Tertullian, who wishes to break altogether with Greek philosophy and science.

But Faith is not only the condition of knowledge. It is the condition of the moral life of the Christian, even at the highest stage. 'All the virtues are daughters of Faith.' Faith and knowledge, as concurrent activities of the soul, are the principles of its growth, and also of its consistency and stability. 'Faith and knowledge prepare the soul which chooses to live by them, making it self-consistent and stable.'

Clement goes still further, making Faith the foundation of knowledge in general. I will not trouble you with his theory of knowledge, which has no great philosophical value, being a mixture of Platonism and Stoicism ; but by putting Faith in the place of the Stoic *πρόληψις*, and knowledge in the place of their *κατάληψις*, he has hit upon a

profounder truth than he knew. He half sees that at the origin of thought itself, as of will, there is an unconscious act of Faith.¹

Clement was not a great philosopher, and does not altogether escape the inconsistencies which beset the eclectic thinker; but he makes out a good case for his main thesis, which he thus sums up: *πιστὴ τοίνυν ἡ γνῶσις, γνωστὴ δὲ ἡ πίστις*. In fact I know no other author, ancient or modern, who has written so well upon our subject.

Of the obscurantism of Tertullian I have already spoken. For him Faith is a sacred deposit, to be accepted and handed on intact. Faith is practically identified with the *regula fidei*. I need not give you any quotations to illustrate this familiar attitude, except the characteristic '*adversus regulam nil scire omnia scire est*.' The famous '*credo quia absurdum*' (not an exact quotation) does Tertullian and his disciples injustice. They do not believe a thing because it is absurd; but its absurdity is no reason, to them, for not believing it. Authority for them is a primary principle of Faith. It is accountable to no other tribunal; it reigns supreme and alone. Such was the immediate result of translating *πίστις* into Latin. 'The language of the Roman people,' says Heine, 'can never belie its origin. It is a language of command for generals; a language of decree for administrators; an attorney language for usurers; a lapidary speech for the stone-hard Roman people. Though Christianity with a true Christian patience tormented itself for more than a thousand years with the attempt to spiritualise this tongue, its efforts remained fruitless; and when Tauler sought to fathom the awful abysses of thought, and his heart overflowed with religious emotion, he was compelled to speak German.'²

My object in this lecture is to illustrate the meanings of

¹ De Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, p. 198.

² Quoted by Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 249.

Faith, as a theological concept, in the Church. I need not, I think, quote at length from other Fathers, with whom the meaning and scope of Faith is a less prominent part of their teaching than it was with Clement. Tertullian's conception grew in favour. We hear more and more of the *regula fidei*, though it is admitted that grace, which is only the divine side of Faith, is fettered by no rules.

St. Augustine's writings contain some noteworthy sayings about Faith. 'Faith is not only knowledge in the intellect but also assurance (*fiducia*) in the will.' He recognises three elements in Faith—*notitia*, *assensus*, *fiducia* (*Confessions*, iii. 183). 'There are three classes of things credible: those which are always believed and never understood, *sicut est omnis historia, temporalia et humana gesta percurrrens*: those which are understood as they are believed, *sicut sunt omnes rationes humanæ*: and those which are first believed and afterwards understood, such as those about divine matters, which cannot be understood except by the pure in heart; and this condition comes from keeping the moral law' (*De Div. Quæst.*, lxxxiii. qu. 48). '*Fides quærit, intellectus invenit*' (*De Trin.*, xv. 2).

Anselm's famous '*credo ut intelligam*' was changed by Abelard into *intelligo ut credam*; and henceforth Faith and knowledge appear, in the Schoolmen, as principles which may not always work together harmoniously.¹

A very brief summary of the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas about Faith must suffice, as a specimen of the doctrine of the Schoolmen. Divine truth, he says, is divided, not in itself, but in its relation to our knowledge. Part of it can be known by human reason, part only by revelation.² Revelation is necessary for some truths

¹ Bernard's most characteristic utterance about Faith is rhetorical and anti-rationalist: '*Fides attingit inaccessa, deprehendit ignota, comprehendit immensa, apprehendit novissima, ipsam denique aeternitatem suo illo sinu vastissimo quodam modo circumcludit. Beatam trinitatem quam non intelligo credo, et fide teneo quam non capio mente.*'—*Serm. in Cant.*, 76

² *Contra Gentiles*, i. 3.

which entirely transcend human knowledge, but it is not confined to what is essentially beyond our faculties. There are truths, such as the existence of God, which are capable of demonstration, but only by a course of reason which few have brains enough to follow; and therefore God has revealed them. The distinction between reason and revelation corresponds to the distinction between knowledge and Faith. Faith comes between opinion and knowledge; it involves an act of the will. 'The intellect,' he says, 'assents to a thing in two ways, in one way because it is moved to assent by the object itself, which is known by itself, or by something else; in the other way the intellect assents to a thing, not because it is sufficiently moved to assent by the object itself, but by a certain choice, by which it voluntarily inclines to one side rather than the other. If this choice is made from doubt and fear of the alternative, it is opinion; if with certainty and without fear, it is Faith.'¹ He also says that the objective ground of Faith is authority, of knowledge, reason. And since the authority is divine truth, it may be said that Faith has a greater certainty than knowledge, which relies on human reason.² Since, however, the objects of Faith are less fully apprehended, being above the intellect of man, knowledge from another point of view is more certain than Faith. The certainty of Faith, on one side, comes from the will, which is guided by '*veritas prima sive Deus*.' Faith, however, is not an act of arbitrary choice; it presupposes some knowledge: '*cognitio fidei præsupponit cognitionem naturalem sicut et natura gratiam*.'³ Faith cannot demonstrate what it believes; else it would be knowledge and not Faith; but it does investigate the grounds by which a man is led to believe—e.g. that the words were spoken by God.⁴

¹ *De Veritate, Quaest. xiv., art. 1.*

² *Summa Theol., 2. 2, qu. 4, art. 8.*

³ *De Veritate, Quaest. xiv., art. 9.*

⁴ *Summa Theol., 2. 2, qu. 1, art. 4.*

It is plain from these passages that Faith, for St. Thomas Aquinas, necessarily involves both an intellectual and a moral act; and also, I think, that he has shrunk from subjecting the basis of Church authority to a searching scrutiny. The practical question which we all have to face is whether we ought to allow 'the will to believe' to influence us in our choice of authorities—*e.g.* whether we may *choose* to follow the authority of the Church in preference to that of a naturalist or metaphysician. St. Thomas Aquinas says that the will is guided by 'the primary Truth, which is God.' If so, Faith would seem to be only the human side of divine grace, immanent in the human mind; and it must be ultimately independent of and superior to all external authority, even that of the Church. The authority of the Church can only be accepted as final on the further assumption that the *donum veritatis* belongs to one institution and one only.

With the Reformation, controversy about the meaning of Faith became, for the second time in the history of the Church, acute. Every one knows that 'Justification by Faith' was the corner-stone of Luther's doctrinal system. His own account of the process by which he found the light is as follows. When he first read the words of the Epistle to the Romans, *iustitia Dei in eo revelatur*, he said to himself, 'Is it not enough that wretched sinners, already damned for original sin, should be overwhelmed by so many calamities by the decrees of the Ten Commandments, but God must threaten us, even in His Gospel, with His justice and anger?' But at last, he says, 'I perceived that the justice of God is that whereby, with God's blessing, man lives, namely, Faith. Thereupon I felt as if born again, and it seemed to me that the gates of heaven stood wide open.' It is not easy to see how the justice, or righteousness, of God can be *identified* with Faith, if Faith has a human side at all; but Luther found ineffable peace in the thought that those who, through

Faith in Christ as the revelation of God's righteousness, have accepted Him, are clothed with a righteousness not their own—with the righteousness of Christ imputed to them. The form of this doctrine is derived chiefly from the Epistle to the Romans, studied in Latin with St. Augustine's commentary. In the sixteenth century, however, it was a crucial question, What is the proper instrument of justification? This 'justification' (to 'justify' means to *pronounce righteous*,¹ by judicial decree, but with no suggestion of a legal fiction) was regarded as the application of the merits of Christ to the individual, which application, it was agreed on all hands, must be through an instrument divinely appointed. An important passage, often appealed to, in Clement of Rome,² says: 'We also are not justified by ourselves, neither by our own wisdom or knowledge or piety or any works which we did in holiness of heart, but by that Faith in which God Almighty has justified all men from the beginning.'

Both sides were also agreed that Faith justifies. But the Catholics distinguished between *fides informis*, inert opinion, and *fides formata*, which is perfected by the love and good works which spring from it. Among the propositions anathematised by the Council of Trent were: that a man may be justified without grace: that man is justified only by the imputation of the justice of Christ, or only by the remission of sins, without inherent grace, or charity: that justifying Faith is nothing but confidence in the mercy of God, who forgives sins for the sake of Christ: that man is absolved and justified because he firmly believes that he is absolved and justified.

On the other hand, the Reformers held that Faith is the one principle which God's grace uses for restoring us to His favour. We need a radical change, which change is

¹ As in Chrysostom's comment: 'When a just judge's sentence pronounces us just (*δικαίους ἀποφαίνει*) what signifies the accuser!'—*Hom. in Ep. ad Rom.* 15.

² Clem. 1. 32.

called justification from God's side, and regeneration on our side. It is initiated by the secret influence of the Holy Ghost, co-operating, as a rule, with the Word of God, or some other means of grace ; and it *appropriates* salvation, leading to a feeling of absolute peace and confidence that our sins are forgiven. 'Justification,' according to this theory, 'is a change in God's dealings with us ; and Faith means trust.'¹

This is clearly an attempt to narrow the meaning of Faith, by excluding from it some of the elements which it had been made to contain ; and accordingly the Reformers defined Faith largely by negations. It is not intellectual belief, *e.g.* in the fact of the Incarnation ; it is not knowledge and acceptance of any dogmas ; it is, in itself, quite separate from charity or any good works ; if it must be defined, it is a trust in Christ's merits for salvation. From this trust, all the fruits of the Spirit are said to flow. Melancthon, the Confession of Augsburg, and the more moderate Lutherans generally, defined Faith as 'fiduciary apprehension' of Gospel mercy. Faith in itself has no virtue, the meritorious cause of justification being the death and satisfaction of Christ, which Faith appropriates. Faith is to be defined rather by what it does than by what it is : this is a favourite answer to the objection that Faith is certainly not *only* fiduciary apprehension, which may be destitute of any moral element. A real apprehension of Christ, they say, must necessarily be beyond explanation. But if so, it is not adequately explained as being 'fiduciary apprehension.' The word 'apprehension,' moreover, needs definition. It is an ambiguous term, which tends to confuse the reception of news with the appropriation of a gift.

As for the exclusion of love and good works from justifying Faith, the question seems to be little more than a scholastic dispute of no great practical interest. Faith

¹ Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, p. 6.

from our point of view, is in its earliest stage a vague and undifferentiated apprehension of God, the first stirring of divine grace, which is an active principle working in and through the natural faculties. It is intended to develop and find explicit expression in all parts of our nature. If we must answer the question whether Faith or love is the formal cause of justification, we can only say that Faith is the beginning, love the crown, of the spiritual life, and that those who put love first, in time as well as in dignity, are in error. The Catholic doctrine is that Faith, as a disposing condition, is prior to justification, and that *caritas* is posterior to it. The only antecedent of Faith is a *bona voluntas*, a *pia affectio*. This accords with the view taken in these lectures.

Melanchthon recedes considerably from the rigour of Luther's doctrine of justification by Faith only. He explains that it only means that we must renounce the merit of the good works which are undoubtedly associated with Faith; and he calls justification by Faith '*Paulina figura*.' Nothing can show Melanchthon's position more clearly than the following passage from his *Directions for Visitors*, sanctioned by Luther. 'Although there are some who think that nothing should be taught before Faith, and that repentance should be left to follow from and after Faith, so that the adversaries may not say that we retract our former doctrine, yet the matter must be thus viewed: Because repentance and law belong alike to the common Faith (for one must believe of course that there is a God who threatens and commands) let it be for the man of degraded character that such *portions* of Faith [Luther had taught that Faith has no portions] are allowed to remain under the names of precept, law, fear, etc., in order that they may understand more discriminately the Faith in Christ which the Apostles call justifying Faith, *i.e.* which makes just and cancels sin, an effect not produced by Faith in the precept and by repentance, and that the man

of low character may not be misled by the word Faith and ask useless questions.' ¹

The English Reformers attempted no definition of Faith, and no definition is to be found in our Articles. But in the Homilies we read : ' A quick and living Faith is not only the common *belief* of the Articles of our faith, but it is also a true *trust* and confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, and a steadfast *hope* of good things to be received at God's hand.' The Homily goes on to say : ' Dead Faith is not the sure and substantial Faith that saveth sinners. Another Faith there is in Scripture, which is not idle, unfruitful, dead, but worketh by charity, as St. Paul declareth.' ² Elsewhere : ' There is one work in the which be all good works ; that is, Faith that worketh by charity. If thou have it, thou hast the ground of all good works : for the virtues of strength, wisdom, temperance, and justice, be all referred to this same Faith.' ³ This is a popular statement of a sound doctrine of Faith.

The difference between the Catholic and the Protestant view of Faith may be made clearer if I quote a few sentences in which Newman sums up his own view of Faith, in opposition to that of the Reformers. ' Justifying Faith is Faith developed into height and depth and breadth, as if in a bodily form ; not as a picture but as an image ; with a right side and a left, a without and a within ; not a mere impression or sudden gleam of light upon the soul, not knowledge, or emotion, or conviction, which ends with itself, but the beginning of that which is eternal, the operation of the indwelling Power which acts from within us outwards and round about us, works in us mightily, so intimately with our will as to be in a true sense one with it ; pours itself out into our whole mind, runs over into our thoughts, desires, feelings, purposes, attempts, and

¹ Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vii. p. 255.

² *Sermon of Faith*, Part I.

³ *Of Good Works*, Part I.

works, combines them all together into one, makes the whole man its one instrument, and justifies him into one holy gracious ministry, one embodied lifelong act of Faith, one sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is his reasonable service. Such is Faith . . . existing indeed in feelings, but passing on into acts, into victories of whatever kind over self. . . . These acts we sometimes call labours, sometimes endurances, sometimes confessions, sometimes devotions, sometimes services; but they are all instances of self-command, arising from Faith seeing the invisible world, and Love choosing it.' ¹

Now hear Luther. Perhaps you will think that the difference is after all mainly one of emphasis. 'Faith is a divine work in us, through which we are changed and regenerated by God. Oh, it is a living, busy, active, powerful thing, this Faith, so that it is impossible for it not to do us good continually. Neither does it ask whether good works are to be done, but before one asks it has done them, and is doing them always. But any one who does not such works is an unbelieving man, who gropes and looks about him for Faith and good works, and knows neither what Faith is nor what good works are. Faith is a living, deliberate confidence in the grace of God, so certain that for it it could die a thousand deaths. And such confidence and knowledge of divine grace makes us joyous, brave, and cheerful towards God and all creation.' ²

In the nineteenth century, and at the present time, there has been and is much controversy about the meaning of Faith. In the popular teaching of the Roman Church there is a disastrous tendency to regard it as an act of violence exercised by the will upon the intellect, in obedience to external authority. The quotations from St. Thomas Aquinas, though they contain nothing to which we could object, show how easily this view might be taken.

¹ Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, p. 302.

² Luther, *Preface to Epistle to the Romans*.

But the Thomist philosophy was an honest attempt to place theology on a rational basis. At the present day, even so liberal a Romanist as Father Tyrrell can define Faith as 'voluntary certainty,' and as 'an actively free belief.' 'Under the force of evidence,' he says, 'our mind is passive and receptive like a mirror; but in the case of free assent, like Faith, we have to assert ourselves. A certain sense of unreality, one might almost say of pretence, is the normal and natural accompaniment of these freely chosen beliefs.' 'The difference between this and mere fictions or working hypotheses is that in the case of Faith we hold to the belief in obedience to the command of God as made known to us by the voice of conscience. But all this will not prevent that seeming black to us, which God tells us, and which we sincerely believe, to be white. Therefore a certain sense of unreality is part of the trial of Faith.' 'The great mass of our beliefs are reversible, and are dependent for their stability on the action or permission of the will.' I shall deal with this strange theory of Faith in a later lecture. Here I merely wish you to note its existence. It has had two logical and inevitable developments. With the help of the Kantian philosophy, or later systems based on Kant, the intellectual aspect of things has been disparaged, and the 'will-world' exalted to supremacy. All mere 'facts' being thus discredited in advance, Faith can create its own world with considerable independence. On the other side we see the larger and stronger party in the Roman Church scorning and prohibiting all attempts to accommodate dogmas to modern discoveries, and falling back upon implicit, unquestioning obedience to whatever the Church has chosen to declare.

We have now sketched the career of this remarkable word during the two thousand years of its life. Πίστις—Fides—Glaube—Faith: they are not exact equivalents; each has had a history of its own. The conception has been narrowed in various ways—now into bare assent,

now into bare trust and confidence in a divine Person ; now into a subjective assurance which claims to be its own evidence ; now into vague feeling ; now into a cheerful optimistic outlook upon the world ; now into implicit obedience and submission to authority. It will be my object in these Lectures to do justice to the partial truth contained in these various one-sided views, while exposing their limitations.

CHAPTER III

THE PRIMARY GROUND OF FAITH

WE have sketched the history of the word Faith and its cognates in the Bible and in the Church, and have shown how from the first it has been, for Christians, the accepted term for the religious temper traced back to its source. Faith, Hope, and Love, with Faith at the beginning, Hope in the middle, and Love at the end, as the crown and fulfilment of the other two—this is Christianity in a nutshell. And we have seen how the two meanings of intellectual conviction and moral trust, which both legitimately belong to the words πίστις, *fides*, Faith, and to the Christian virtue which they describe, were brought together in the New Testament, never again to be divided, but also never, as history shows, to work quite smoothly together. In this lecture I wish to approach our subject from a very different side—the psychological—and ask, What is the primary ground of Faith, as a human faculty or state of consciousness?

What is the seat of Faith? Does it spring from the intellectual side of our nature? Do we attain to Faith by carefully weighing the evidence for the existence of God, for a future life, for the Resurrection of Christ, or the Virgin Birth, or the historical accuracy of the narratives in the Old Testament? Or shall we, still within the province of the intellect, agree with Fichte that ‘we are saved, not by history, but by metaphysics,’ and base our Faith on the conclusions of some philosophical system? Or, with

orthodox Romanism, shall we maintain that the main facts of religion, the foundations of theistic belief, have been demonstrated by the scholastic philosophy, confirming and supplementing the divine revelation which has also been given us? Or shall we, with Schleiermacher, abandon rationalism, both orthodox and unorthodox, and make religion a matter of pure feeling? Or, with some of the mystics, shall we affirm the existence of direct intuition, through a special organ, which puts us into immediate connection with God and the spiritual world? Or shall we follow the voluntarists, and make Faith an affair of choice, an act of the will? Or are the pragmatists right in treating it as a working hypothesis, determined by practical needs, and to be accepted, if we choose, 'at our own risk'? Or, lastly, is it founded solely on external revelation, a body of divine knowledge and precept dropped from the sky? These alleged grounds of Faith will all have to be considered in turn, though not in the order in which I have just named them. But I am constrained to regard them all as, at best, only secondary grounds of Faith. None of them singly, nor all of them collectively, are adequate to the idea of Faith. Faith is something deeper, more universal, more fundamental, than anything that can be assigned to the independent activities of the intellect, will, or feelings. Behind all these determinations lies the deep-seated religious instinct or impulse.

This innate instinct or impulse arises in the psychological necessity which obliges us to assign *values* to our experience.¹ It is our nature to pass judgments, to call some things good, others bad, to acquit and condemn, accept and reject. We rearrange our world according to what we consider the *worth* of its ingredients to be. Objects, after passing through our minds, are no longer all on the same

¹ So Lotze says, 'Faith is the feeling which is appreciative of value.' But I shall show that Faith is not only feeling, if 'feeling' excludes the will and intellect.

level. They are ranked and classified ; a hierarchy of values is established.

It is impossible for the human mind to inhibit this native propensity to assign values. We may try to force ourselves to regard nature objectively, as a concatenation of facts upon which we forbear to pass judgment. But the most rigorous and detached scientist, unless he confines himself to pure mathematics, which are independent of existential truth, cannot abstain from some kind of valuation. (There are other values besides ethical values, as we shall shortly explain.) However rigidly we may confine ourselves to quantitative categories in the course of our investigations, we have set before ourselves a purpose—to establish the general laws to which the changes of phenomena conform ; and we could never embark on such an enterprise unless we believed that the knowledge of general laws has either an intrinsic or a practical value. In most cases the assumed value is intrinsic ; the man of science seeks truth for its own sake. It is sometimes worth while to prove to the materialist (for the creed is not extinct, though the name is disavowed) that he has imported into his system a great deal that on his own principles he has no right to touch ; that all sympathetic interest in the results of molecular movements is an intrusion of the value-judgment into a field from which it has been by hypothesis excluded ; that he has no right to talk about ‘ progress,’ or ‘ degeneration,’ or ‘ the survival of the fittest.’ For the truth is, that to investigate the purely quantitative aspect of things without reference to the qualitative, to discard all reference to meaning, interest, or value, is to attempt an abstraction which is impossible to the human mind. These are aspects of reality which we cannot keep out of sight, even when we wish to ignore them.¹

¹ Cf. Miss Benson's *Venture of Rational Faith* :—‘ There is nothing in the scientific aspect of phenomena which can make anything in any possible way worth while ; for even the idea of “ worth ” does not enter into the conceptions of science, and thus the essential nature of everything we care for is

The world, then, has values as well as existence. And I do not mean only values for ourselves, but intrinsic values—or, if this phrase be objected to, values which for all who can apprehend them are ends in themselves, not means to something else. We do not create or imagine these values; they are as much given to us as the existential aspect of things. We cannot *prove* that the world exists; and we cannot prove that our valuation is anything more than subjective; but Faith accepts these values, not as assigned by ourselves, but as objectively real. Somewhere, some day, or somehow, the real world is arranged according to their pattern.

Faith has usually connected this realm of values with the name of God. God—whether the God of theism, pantheism, agnostic monism, or deism—is the self-existent *summum genus* in whom we believe that our highest ideals are realised. Those who deny or doubt the existence of God, while retaining the conception of God as a regulative idea or ideal, seem to me to be, strictly speaking, non-religious.¹ If the idea of God is only a device, empirically discovered to be serviceable for strengthening our wills and straightening our aims—just as a man might use a pair of spectacles to correct his faults of vision, or a pair of dumb-bells to increase his muscular strength,—God is lowered to the position of an instrument; and this is an

entirely outside it. Science can analyse the production of sound, and ignore the soul of music; it can show the cause of colour, and miss the joy of beauty; it can show the genesis of all manner of social institutions, and miss the heart of love; it may even find the conditions of life, but cannot ask what life is; it may sweep the heavens with its telescope, and fail to find God.²

¹ This limitation does not exclude Buddhism, though that religion believes in no personal God. For in Buddhism the 'Nothing' to which all is reduced is (in spite of its name) a positive conception. 'It is the absolute world-ground, the fact behind the illusions of the world; the absolute being, the static basis of all phenomena; it is the absolute world-aim, after which the world-process strives and in which it finds its deliverance; the bearer and producer of the religious and moral world-order, which brings out what alone is true and enduring in illusion, and turns the illusory world-process into an actual salvation-process.'—Hartmann, *Religion des Geistes*, p. 5. Buddhism is not atheism; it only deifies the 'α-privative.'

irreligious Faith in God. Faith, we may perhaps say, is a realist, as ascribing reality to ideas, but an idealist, since it is ideas to which it ascribes reality.

Now on what principles do we construct our world of values? Why do we prefer some things above others? What qualities give or involve intrinsic worth? Our answers to these questions will determine the whole character of our Faith, and our whole judgment as to the meaning and content of Faith generally.

The simplest and lowest standard of valuation is that of pleasure and pain. This has very little to do with Faith, because it is almost entirely subjective and particular. Sensuous perceptions do not point to any universal beyond themselves. We are conscious of no contradiction, no problem clamouring for solution, when we acknowledge that 'tastes differ'—even when they differ so much that one man's meat is another man's poison. We cannot argue with any confidence from pleasure and pain to the objective value or nature of things. All we can say is that pleasure is the frequent (not the universal) accompaniment of right action and of a healthy condition, and pain of wrong-doing and disease. Pleasure and pain have thus (in Kantian language, though in opposition to Kantian theory) some degree of regulative value; they have not a constitutive value. And their regulative value, their usefulness in apprising us whether we are doing well or badly, is not that of an infallible criterion.

If we reject the pleasure and pain calculus, not as worthless, but as belonging to an inferior, subsidiary class, we shall find, I think, that there are three attributes of things which have an absolute, intrinsic value. They are constitutive, not regulative principles of reality regarded as spiritual.

First, we value what is universally *true*, and we arrange our experience in order of value, according as it illustrates, more or less, universal truth. We value law above acci-

dent, or what we call accident ; we value the rule above the exception ; more decidedly, we value fact above fiction, our waking life above our dreams. Our thoughts are valuable, or worthless, according as they correspond with, or contradict, the actual nature of things. A theory is valuable if it explains or accounts for a great number of phenomena. A religion or philosophy is valuable if it gives an intelligible explanation or a plausible theory of the constitution of the universe and the laws of human nature. Whenever we succeed in establishing the correspondence of idea with fact, we feel that we are enriched ; we have gained something which is valuable for its own sake.

I shall have, in the course of these lectures, to defend this conception of truth against the sceptical subjectivism which denies that our thoughts can ever convey to us genuine knowledge of reality external to ourselves. I will not argue the question in this place, but will only say that my position is a ' moderate realism.' I believe that we are in contact with external reality, and that we may trust our faculties when they tell us (as they do with the utmost emphasis) that our knowledge is not merely of our own mental states, but of facts which exist independently of our mental states. At the same time, I hold that this confidence is a matter of reasonable Faith, and can never, from the nature of the case, be anything more.

Secondly, we attach an absolute, intrinsic value to what we call *moral goodness*. However we came by it, we are in possession of the category of the *ought-to-be*, the partly unrealised supplement of given experience. The greater part of our experience is capable of being arranged on a scale of ethical values. We may, if we choose, for the sake of greater clearness in ethical study, abstract from other aspects of reality, and regard the world simply as a place where some things are morally good, and others morally bad. We may picture to ourselves human life as simply and solely a school of character, a place of moral discipline.

And if we are asked, 'Why is this or that called good?' we must not answer, 'Because it promotes the interest of the whole,' or 'Because it leads to the greatest happiness,' or anything of that kind. If we do, the Positivist will prove to us that the 'Good' is, by our own admission, only a means to an end, or only relative, or only determined by public opinion. The Good cannot be made an instrument of pleasure and pain, though utilitarianism has subjected it to this degradation; nor can it be subordinated to the True and the Beautiful, any more than they to it. The *form* of the moral standard, 'You must,' is essential as well as the content. It is clearly a law of our being; we point to it as a magnetic needle points to the North.

In a later lecture I shall have to deal with the exclusive authority attached by some philosophers to the moral sense. I do not agree that the 'categorical imperative' belongs to moral judgments only, in such a way as to make a generic difference between them and intellectual or æsthetic judgments. The peremptory command, 'You *must* take account of this,' is not always the voice of conscience. It is the mark of all reality, and it compels our attention to the true and the beautiful in the same masterful tone as to the ethical demand. The contrary impression has arisen from the fact that the moral imperative usually prompts to some external act, which for a superficial view is more 'real' than a change of mind or feeling.

The third order of values, which, though with the majority of men it holds a subordinate place, is quite incapable of being reduced to subjection to either of the other two, is the quality of *Beauty*. When we say that a thing is beautiful, we mean that it is objectively, universally beautiful, not that it gives us pleasure to look at it. The æsthetic sense is more than an instrument of pleasure. We cannot speak of pleasure or pain without immediate reference to individual feelings, from which there is no appeal, but we regard it as a defect in others if they cannot

see beauty in what we admire. We believe that the laws of beauty reign in the real world; and this for the Theist implies that the Creator values beauty for its own sake. In natural history, we see that æsthetic perceptions determine choice in the case of creatures quite low down in the scale; Darwin and others have shown what elaborate and exquisite adornments Nature provides for beasts, birds, and insects, decorations which have no other object than to attract mates by appealing to their highly developed sense of beauty. Personally I have no doubt that many of the unsatisfactory features in our civilisation are due to the fact that we see nothing wrong in unnecessary ugliness, and so continually affront the Creator by disregarding one of His primary attributes.

The essence of beauty seems to be the suitableness of form to idea. A beautiful object is perhaps always valued as the just translation of an idea into expressive form. When Aristotle said that the primary necessity for a poet is to be good at metaphors (using 'metaphor' in the widest possible sense), he spoke the truth. There is a low but positive degree of beauty in mere symmetry, which is a symbolical expression of the order, proportion, and uniformity of Nature—the *τάξις* and *πέρας* which, according to Plotinus's scheme, we are to begin by learning, through the study of Nature. Subtler harmonies, which express and interpret, we know not how, the deeper and more complex secrets of life, have a higher value as beautiful things. A beautiful face and person attract us because they are the index of a healthy body, a sound mind, and a fine character. Rising higher still, there is beauty of thought, of feeling, and of action. A man's life may, as Milton says, be a true poem. And ugliness is always, I think, essentially discord between form and idea. The ugliest thing in Nature, a human face distorted by evil passions, is hideous because the face is that of a man made in the image of God, a sharer in the humanity redeemed by Christ.

The discord here becomes revolting. The ugliness of vulgarity, in all its forms, is caused by the inappropriateness of form to content, or the juxtaposition of incompatibles. It is the misuse of symbols by those who do not understand them.

We have, then, three schemes of value,—truth, goodness, and beauty, which cannot be reduced to each other. They are the three aspects under which the life of God is known to us.¹ They are not independent of each other; beauty cannot fall entirely out of relation to truth or goodness without ceasing to be beautiful, as the history of decadence in art has proved again and again. Neither can morality wholly forget the claims of truth or beauty, as the history of Jesuitism and of Puritanism respectively should have taught us. Neither can metaphysics despise the ethical and æsthetic ideals without falling into falsehood; for though science may rightly and honourably accept limitations and consent to a partial and one-sided view, since it does not profess to guide us to absolute truth, philosophy, which is the quest of universal truth, is bound to leave nothing out.

I hope you will agree with me in regarding these three lines of revelation as distinct without being separate, and as constituting, collectively, what we may call natural revelation.

So the poets have taught us. Goethe (translated by Carlyle) thus asserts their triune harmony :—

As all nature's myriad changes
Still one changeless power proclaim,
So through thought's wide kingdom ranges
One vast meaning, e'er the same :
This is Truth—eternal Reason—
That in Beauty takes its dress,
And, serene through time and season,
Stands complete in Righteousness.

¹ Lotze says that they are given intuitively, and thus have a certainty which cannot belong to mental concepts.

And Tennyson says that

Beauty, Truth, and Goodness are three sisters
That dote upon each other, friends to man,
Living together under the same roof,
And never can be sundered without tears.

These three have, each of them, the marks of the spiritual world. That is : Firstly, they claim to exist in their own right, and will not be made means or instruments to anything else, nor to each other. Secondly, they take us out of ourselves : they are not our tools, but we are rather their instruments. Thirdly, they are, each in its own manner and degree, a permanent enrichment of our life—a fund of inalienable spiritual wealth. The mark of spiritual wealth as opposed to the other goods of life is that spiritual wealth is unlimited in quantity, being manifestly free from such mechanical laws as the conservation of energy. In the spiritual world one man's gain is not another man's loss. The spiritual wealth of the world is capable of indefinite increment.

We are confronted, then, with a world of existence, and a world of values. The former, when contemplated in a barely abstract way, and stripped of all extraneous importations from the world of values, consists simply of brute facts, unclassified, unappraised, and even unrelated. The latter, when viewed in an equally abstract way, consists of the whole contents of the moral, intellectual, and artistic consciousness. What is the relation between them ?

The relation of the world of values to the world of existence is a problem, perhaps we should say *the* problem, of philosophy. And what is sometimes called the Venture of Faith is the assumption that not only are the two related, but that all existence is capable of being truly stated and arranged in terms of value, and all value in terms of existence. Faith assures us that truth, goodness, and beauty, which are attributes of the eternal order, are also

attributes of the world of existence, so that in living for and in these eternal ideas, so far as we can do so here, we are living in accordance with the fundamental laws of the world in which we are placed. I do not say that all Faith could be correctly described in the words of the last sentence; obviously it could not. But I think I am right in saying that all Faith consists essentially in the recognition of a world of spiritual values behind, yet not apart from, the world of natural phenomena.

If this be granted, it will be plain that there are several states of mind which are incompatible with Faith. There is the merely dull and stupid temper, which takes each day as it comes, eats, drinks, and sleeps, and never thinks about the meaning of things. There is the pessimistic temper, which sees behind phenomena only an alien and hostile power. There is the sceptical temper, which refuses to admit that any clear revelation of God has been made to us through truth, beauty, and goodness. There is the ironical, indifferent temper, of which Renan sometimes poses as an exponent. There is the grumbling and rebellious temper, which leads either to *acedia*¹ or to reckless impatience. 'By far the largest part of human misery is the work of human impatience and discontent. By impatience of thought we pervert or set aside the evidence before us, that we may give ourselves licence to believe what pleases us better than truth. By impatience of action we rush at something we like better than right and goodness, pushing our neighbours out of the way, and, if need be, tyrannising over them. In a more passive discontent we cherish our grievances against the order of things, and fill our hearts with bitterness.'² Lastly, there is the selfish temper, which by attending to nothing and noticing nothing but what promotes or thwarts our own

¹ One of the 'seven deadly sins'—a compound of gloom, sloth, and irritation—St. Paul's 'sorrow of the world that worketh death.' See the interesting discussion in Bishop Paget's *Spirit of Discipline*.

² Professor Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, i. p. 130.

private interests, becomes wholly blind to whatever of truth, beauty, or goodness God has spread before us for our delight and edification.¹

It is plain, then, that Faith requires certain personal qualities. If we are too stupid to ask for any meaning in our experience, too self-absorbed to be interested in anything that does not concern our petty affairs, too frivolous to care seriously for what can only be cared for seriously, too gloomy to hope, or too wilful to learn, we are labouring under fatal disqualifications for the experience of Faith. This is the meaning of the words of Christ: 'If any man is willing to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine,' and 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.'

What distinguishes Faith from existential knowledge is the recognition of an objective, external, and ideal standard of value—of an idea, or system of ideas, of goodness, truth, and beauty, by which things given in experience may be judged and classified. It is an essential part of Faith that this standard should be applied to given experience, and it is also requisite that experience should be appealed to in verification of the claims of Faith. This last point is important; and it leads us to recognise a peculiarity of the conditions under which Faith is exercised. The verification to which Faith appeals can never be complete while we live here. Truths of the eternal order seem to be always broken and refracted as they reach us. They manifest themselves to concrete experience in an oppositional, bipolar form, so that we continually find ourselves confronted by an obstinate negation. Truth, we may almost say, is a spark which is only generated by friction. This, it may be, is a necessary condition of the world of becoming.

¹ The word 'selfishness' must here be extended to cover all purely self-regarding motives. Faith must have an object outside self. Theoretical self-knowledge, egoism, refined or otherwise, the desire of self-improvement as an absolute end, are outside the religious sphere. *Religious* attention to one's own character, knowledge, or circumstances has always reference to an objective standard, and derives its sanction from a principle outside the self. Cf. Hartmann, *Religion des Geistes*, p. 4.

One reason why Faith cannot verify itself is that the world is still in the making. In the words of St. Paul, 'we see not yet all things put under' the Son of God, 'in whom (nevertheless) all things consist.' In all probability humanity (even if, with the latest authorities, we push back the beginnings of civilisation ten or fifteen thousand years) is still a child, and will scale heights yet undreamed of. It would indeed be strange and, to a thoughtful man, disquieting, if our experience were symmetrically rounded off, so that no further growth in knowledge could be expected. Faith, then, 'transcends experience'; it appears as a constructive activity. It employs the imagination to fill out what is wanting in experience. Faith endeavours to find harmony in apparent discord, and to anticipate the workings of the divine purpose. In a sense, all thought may be said to 'transcend experience,' if by experience we mean sense-perception; and Faith, as we have seen, is not merely a function of thought, but a basal energy of the whole man. It includes an element of will; and the office of will is not to register experience, but to make it.

Faith, therefore, always contains an element of risk, of venture; and we are impelled to make the venture by the affinity and attraction which we feel in ourselves (through the infusion, as Christians believe, of a higher light and life from above) to those eternal principles which in the world around us appear to be only struggling for supremacy.

So far we have maintained that the primary ground of Faith is a normal and ineradicable feeling, instinct, or attraction, present in all minds which are not disqualified from having it by peculiarities which we should all agree, probably, in calling defects, a feeling or instinct that behind the world of phenomena there is a world of eternal values, attracting us towards itself. These values are manifested, and exercise their attraction, in and through phenomena, though the section of the world which we know,

and from which we generalise, is an inadequate receptacle for them. Further, these values have been classified as ideas of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, a threefold cord which is not quickly broken. This is the most general description possible of the objects and contents of Faith, and it is, I believe, all that this primary ground of Faith gives us. It contains vast implications, which can only be unravelled by the full experience of life, developing our personality along the lines of thought, will, and feeling. These three faculties have a natural connection with the ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful respectively, though we must avoid most carefully the error of separating things which can never exist independently of each other.

CHAPTER IV

FAITH AS PURE FEELING

IN my last lecture I tried to keep to the most universal and primary aspects of Faith. But I have gone further in differentiating its activities and aspirations than some would wish to follow me. There are some who wish to keep the Faith-feeling uncontaminated by thought and will; who desire that it should remain a vague, mysterious apprehension of the infinite, an immediate intuition of the ineffable.

It would be a mistake to include all the mystics under this class. The greatest mystics have not made the mistake of identifying the primary ground of Faith with feeling, if by feeling is meant the faculty which psychologists recognise as constituting, together with thought and will, our psychical life. The *differentia* of mysticism is an intense inner life; the drama of the mystic's spiritual ascent, his struggle after purification, illumination, and unity with the Divine, is played out within his mind and not on the stage of history. But whatever may be his notion of the perfect state, when he shall have attained the Beatific Vision, his life is by no means one of pure emotion; it is characterised by intense striving, and often by profound thought. The mystics with whom we are concerned in this lecture are the Quietists—those whose favourite maxim is, 'Be still then, and know that I am God'; and we have also to deal with emotional theism, which is not quite the same as mysticism.

We cannot be surprised that many have supposed that

Faith is a pure feeling. For our feelings seem to us to be the deepest and most vivid of our experiences. Thought never shows us what a thing is in itself, but only how it is related to other objects. Feeling, especially those most characteristic feelings, love and hate, goes deeper. As Tennyson says in that wonderful poem, *The Ancient Sage* :—

For Knowledge is the swallow on the lake
That sees and stirs the surface-shadow there,
But never yet hath dipt into the abysm,
The Abysm of all Abysms, beneath, within
The blue of sky and sea, the green of earth. . . .

Religion, too, in its various moods is intimately connected with the emotions. Fear, humility, love, trust, remorse, the joy of reconciliation, the pain of estrangement, are all emotional states. Moreover, there is a vast and half-explored background of vague feeling which fades away into the subconscious, a reservoir of life behind consciousness, which seems as if it might be the very soil out of which Faith springs and grows. If we could tap this subliminal self, and force it to give up its secrets, should we not find our Faith definite, explicit, and self-sufficing? So the mystic wishes to interrogate this dark background, to bring it into the light. He does not wish to contaminate it with infusions from his surface consciousness, but to see what the twilight conceals.

Now the genuineness of the pure mystical experience—the feeling which the devout mystic interprets as the immediate presence of God—is proved beyond cavil. I am not speaking now of that rare trance which Plotinus enjoyed four times and Porphyry once, but of something much more familiar—those ‘consolations’ which almost all religious people enjoy at times during their devotions. There is reason to believe that the majority of people who believe in God do so because they consider that they have

had immediate experience of Him. An American psychologist found that out of seventy-seven persons whom he questioned on the subject no less than fifty-six rested their Faith on the experience of immediate communication with God.¹ I am surprised, indeed, that the proportion was not even larger. For who that has prayed regularly has failed to have at times an intensely vivid experience that his prayers are being heard and answered? The following description is typical. 'Times without number, in moments of supreme doubt, disappointment, discouragement, unhappiness, a certain prayer-formula, which by degrees has built itself up in my mind, has been followed in its utterance by quick and astonishing relief. Sometimes doubt has been transformed into confident assurance, mental weakness utterly routed by strength, self-distrust changed into self-confidence, fear into courage, dismay into confident and brightest hope. These transitions have sometimes come by degrees—in the course, say, of an hour or two; at other times they have been instantaneous, flashing up in brain and heart as if a powerful electric stroke had cleared the air.'²

I will not now dispute with those who would remind me that what the devout person calls God may be only a deeper or higher state of his own consciousness. Perhaps the very deepest and highest state of our own consciousness is nothing else but beholding the face of God and hearing His voice; but that is not my point just now. What is the rank and value, in the religious life, of this very common feeling of the presence of God? Is it a great enough thing to be the complete satisfaction of Faith, so that we need go no further, but may rest content with the statement that Faith is an immediate feeling or consciousness of God's presence?

In order to do justice to this conception of Faith I will give you some extracts from Schleiermacher (1768-1834),

¹ Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 245.

² *Id.* p. 276.

who may be taken as one of the best representatives of the religious type which we are considering in this Lecture. You will observe that in this writer the object of Faith is not analysed even so far as I analysed it in my last Lecture. It is not determined as the triune ideal of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. It is the vague Infinite. The religious instinct is fixed in its primary form; it is identified with feeling, instead of being the common ground of our intellectual, moral, and emotional activities.

Schleiermacher is the theologian among the German romanticists. He conducted a campaign against the so-called 'Enlightenment' (*Aufklärung*), with its crude and self-satisfied rationalism. We shall meet with this poor type of intellectualism in a later chapter. It encouraged a cold, common-sense view of life, and despised enthusiasm. The romantic movement rushed to the opposite extreme. Its first principle was to value immediate impressions above reflection and reason. In the sphere of religion this means that emotional experience, devout feeling, is the sole foundation of religious belief. 'Why,' Schleiermacher asks, 'do you not fix your eyes on the religious life itself, and in particular on those pious elevations of the mind in which all other activities are checked or almost suspended, and the whole soul fused in an immediate feeling of the infinite and eternal, and of her own union with it?' 'Religion resigns at once all claims on anything that belongs to science and morality.' (This energetic repudiation is directed, firstly, against the rationalism of the eighteenth-century Deists, who held that Faith is related to knowledge only as probability to certainty, being an intellectual judgment based on examination of evidence; and, secondly, against the austere moralism of Kant.) 'The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and

through the Eternal. Religion is to have and know life only in immediate feeling, as existing in the infinite and eternal. Where this is found, religion is satisfied ; where it hides itself, she is in anguish and disquietude. Religion is not knowledge or science, either of the world or of God. The pious man, as pious, knows nothing about ethical science. It is the same with action itself. While morality always appears as manipulating, as self-controlling, piety appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man. The pious man may not know at all, but he cannot know falsely. His nature is reality which knows reality. True religion is a sense and taste of the Infinite. If a man is not one with the Eternal, in the unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains for ever apart.' Schleiermacher reserves his keenest scorn for those who make religion ancillary to morality. 'A high praise it would be for the heavenly one, if she could only look after the earthly affairs of men in this poor fashion ! Great honour for her, to quicken men's consciences a little, and make them more careful ! What is loved and valued only for an advantage that lies outside it is not essentially necessary, and a reasonable man will put no higher price upon it than the value of the end for which it is desired. And I cannot attach much importance to the wrong acts which it prevents in this way, nor to the right acts which it is said to procure. What I maintain is that piety springs up, necessarily and spontaneously, from the inward parts of every better soul, that she has in the heart a province of her own, where she bears unobstructed sway, and that she is worthy to be welcomed and acknowledged by the noblest and most excellent, for her own inner nature's sake.' ¹

Faith, then, for Schleiermacher, is a spontaneous, im-

¹ The English reader will find a useful and characteristic selection from Schleiermacher's writings in Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 256-304.

mediate feeling of the Infinite and Eternal, with which the human spirit identifies itself. The feeling must be wholly general and undifferentiated. He bids us to ponder on our own experiences, but not to analyse them. 'You must know how to listen to yourselves before your own consciousness. What you are to notice is the rise of your own consciousness, and not to reflect upon something already there. As soon as you have made any definite activity of your soul an object of contemplation, you have begun to separate. The more your own state sways you, the paler and more unrecognisable the image becomes.' 'Ideas and principles are all foreign to religion.' 'Religion by itself does not urge men to activity at all.' Doctrinal propositions, he came to believe and to teach, are only descriptions of pious states of consciousness. They are secondary products.

These quotations will give you an idea of what this conception of Faith or Religion as immediate intuition of the Infinite means. It not only finds but leaves us extremely vague as to the contents of Faith. Whether a man represents the Infinite Being as personal or impersonal depends, says Schleiermacher, on whether his tendency is towards a voluntaristic or an intellectual view of things. He himself, it would appear, believed neither in a personal God nor in individual immortality, though he expresses himself very cautiously on both subjects.

Another classical example of Intuitionism is Jacobi (1743-1819), who, being more of a philosopher than a theologian, advocates the emotional ground of religion from an external and (one might almost say) an intellectualist standpoint. He has been called 'a pantheist in head and a mystic in heart'; but it appears to me that he maintains intuitionism largely from a perception of its strategic advantages in controversy. It is hard to refute a man who declares that he has received private and authentic information that what he says is true. Jacobi

holds that just as we apprehend the sensible world by our bodily senses, so we apprehend the spiritual world by another organ, to which he gives different names.¹ God requires no proof, for His existence is more evident to us than our own. 'If God were not immediately present to us through His image in our hearts, what is there which could make Him known to us? A revelation through external phenomena can at best only stand in the same relation to that which is internal and original, as that in which speech stands to reason. Just as man feels himself, and pictures himself to himself, so, only with greater power, he represents to himself the Godhead.' It is plain that for Jacobi the only source of our knowledge of God is an intense inner consciousness, unaided by reflective thought, by moral effort, or by knowledge of the external world. He is not afraid to deduce from this self-consciousness, not only the existence of a transcendent God, but the other two dogmas which to Kantians are fundamental—freedom and immortality. How these truths can be proved by immediate feeling he nowhere tries to explain, nor, I fear, is any explanation possible.

Jacobi, as I have said, gives different names to the faculty by which we apprehend supersensual truth. Sometimes he calls it the Reason. It is not easy to classify intuitionists who claim an immediate, *a priori* knowledge which is different from feeling; but perhaps this is the best place to deal with them. This position has been taken by several well-known writers, among whom we may name the American divine, Theodore Parker. It is 'refuted,' under the name of 'ontologism,' by the very able Jesuit philosopher, Boedder.² The claim of 'ontologism' is that the mind of man, by its very nature, has a certain direct con-

¹ *E.g.* 'Glaubenskraft über die Vernunft': 'Geistesgefühl.' 'Reason,' he says elsewhere, 'is the faculty of assuming the absolutely True, Good, and Beautiful, with the full persuasion of the objective validity of this assumption.'

² Boedder, *Natural Theology*, pp. 12-29.

sciousness of the existence, and of some of the attributes, of God. If this were true, no effort, it would seem, could be needed to realise God's presence in relation to His creatures; for it is in relation to His creatures that the alleged consciousness belongs to us. It is difficult to understand the grounds of a 'rational certainty' which can give no account of itself. The certainty of the 'ontologist,' which he calls immediate apprehension, has the appearance rather of 'voluntary certainty,' pure choice, in which case he classifies himself wrongly, or of a mixture of will and feeling illegitimately used to establish matters of fact (the Ritschlian value-judgment intruding into metaphysics). In short, immediate certainty, which does not rest upon feeling, is little more than a refusal to listen to arguments on the other side. The error of 'ontologism,' from the standpoint of these lectures, is its refusal to admit the necessity of an act of Faith. The Beatific Vision which we hope for will be an immediate perception of God, and Faith confidently anticipates this consummation; but neither feeling nor any ill-defined and mysterious special faculty can make Faith superfluous by giving us at once the immediate apprehension which is to be our final reward.

A more recent example of Intuitionism is to be found in the philosophy of Lotze, with whom it is a desperate expedient to escape the pure subjectivity and phenomenalism in which his theory of knowledge threatens to land him. Like many other German thinkers he appears to confound the *feeling* of value with the *judgment* of value. There can be no judgment of any kind without an intellectual process. Wherever the 'feeling of value' has any well-defined contents, the intellect has been at work.

In France, A. Réville holds that 'Religion rests on a sentiment, *sui generis* and spontaneous.' He follows Schleiermacher, but insists very rightly that this 'sentiment' is not merely a feeling of dependence, but a feeling of unity. This sentiment, he says, gives a certain *valua-*

tion, which 'imagination and thought' translate into the idea of God. De Pressensé postulates a 'Verbe Intérieur' as the source of 'religious sentiment.'

The theology of pure Feeling has not been largely represented in this country, which has generally been distrustful of sentiment. The great eighteenth-century mystic, William Law, approaches this type, in consequence of his distrust of 'Reason,'¹ but he does not belong to it, because he has a very firm grasp of the truth that Faith must be *lived into*. When he became a mystic he did not forget the austere morality of the *Serious Call*. 'The truth of Christianity,' he says at the end of his treatise on *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, 'is the Spirit of God living and working in it; and where the Spirit is not the life of it, there the outward form is but like the outward carcase of a departed soul. For the spiritual life is as much its own proof as the natural life, and needs no outward or foreign thing to bear witness to it.'

Robert Browning, in later life, seems to preach a purely emotional theism. Such lines as:—

Wholly distrust thy knowledge, then, and trust
As wholly love allied to ignorance;

or:—

So let us say—not, Since we know, we love,
But rather, Since we love, we know enough,

are indeed startling from the most learned of our poets.

¹ Examples of Law's *μωσολογία* (the only blot on his fine and manly religious writings) may be found in *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, e.g., p. 51. 'Reason is so far from being able to help man to that knowledge, which his nature and condition wants, that it can only help his ignorance to increase and fructify in doubts, fictions, and absurd debates. And the thing cannot be otherwise: Man must walk in a vain shadow, so long as Reason is his guide. . . . He who turns to his reason, as the true power and light of his nature, betrays the same ignorance of the whole nature, power, and office of reason, as if he was to try to smell with his eyes or see with his nose. For reason has only its one work or power, which it cannot alter nor exceed; and that one work is to be a bare observer and comparer of things that manifest themselves to it by the senses,' etc. Law cannot be confounded with the anti-mystical moralists; his rejection of reason, therefore, implies a reliance on pure intuition, though it is a progressive intuition, conditioned by growth in grace.

Such an attitude can only be explained as a resolute adherence to moral and emotional optimism, in spite of a growing intellectual pessimism.¹

We may now attempt to answer our question, What is the rank and value of this immediate feeling of the Divine, which psychologically, at any rate, is a well-established fact of experience ?

Schleiermacher tells us that this feeling is present 'in almost every better soul.' This, I think, is true ; for it is, as I have said, an essential part of prayer. All religious people pray ; and all, I suppose, have a vivid consciousness, at times, that prayer is not merely a soliloquy, but a form of intercourse with a higher Being. But it is surely significant that the mystics, with one consent, tell us that these 'consolations'—this vivid consciousness of the presence of God—are most common at the beginning of the spiritual ascent. The young aspirant after holiness may expect them at first, but he must also expect that after a time they will be withdrawn. The best spiritual guides warn their consultants not to attach too much importance to them. This fact, so contrary to what might have been expected and desired, seems to indicate that immediate feeling of the Deity is characteristic of an early and undeveloped stage of the religious life.² Its very emptiness gives it a mysterious attractiveness, born of awe and curiosity ; but in the normal course, the purely mystical intuition partially loses itself for a time in the multiplicity of the tasks which it enjoins, and only draws together again when its work is near its close.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that there have been many religious geniuses in whom this immediate 'feeling and taste' of the Eternal, to use Schleiermacher's phrase, has been the most intense experience of their lives, persist-

¹ Cf. my *Studies of English Mystics*, pp. 224-5.

² The strict Quietists, however (*e.g.* Molinos), regard the withdrawal of these consolations as a call to ascend into a still more rarefied atmosphere. Cf. *The Spiritual Guide*, *passim*.

ing through all stages of their spiritual growth. A large collection of evidence on this subject has been made by a Canadian writer, Dr. Bucke, in a very queer book called *Cosmic Consciousness*. The author maintains that Cosmic Consciousness is a higher degree of perception which is being slowly evolved in the progress of the race, just as the sense of colour is a recent acquisition, which was possessed only in a rudimentary manner by the ancient Greeks and the authors of the Indian sacred literature. At present, the feeling is weak and fitful, and manifests itself in an almost infinite range of intensity. Very many can go no further, from their own experience, than to endorse the well-known lines of Browning :—

Oh, we're sunk enough here, God knows !
But not quite so sunk that moments,
Sure tho' seldom, are denied us,
When the spirit's true endowments
Stand out plainly from its false ones,
And apprise it if pursuing
Or the right way or the wrong way,
To its triumph or undoing.

Or, as suggested by Wordsworth's famous Ode, they may remember a time when the vision, which has now faded into the light of common day, was frequently with them.

But this higher faculty, so our author thinks, has begun to appear sporadically, in the most advanced specimens of the race, as an assured possession, and it is becoming more frequent as the centuries go on. Out of many hundreds of cases, which he considers authentic, he selects thirteen which are ' so great that they can never fade from human memory.' This odd list consists of Buddha, Jesus Christ, St. Paul, Plotinus, Mohammed, Dante, Las Casas, St. John of the Cross, Shakespeare (whom he chooses to call Bacon), Böhme, Blake, Balzac, and Walt Whitman. The book, in spite of the author's critical vagaries, is full of interest to the psychologist, and I am not disposed to

dispute the main thesis, that if the conditions of civilised life ever promote the improvement of the race, instead of its deterioration, as I fear they do at present, the man of the future may be able to live habitually and consciously in a larger air than is possible to any except the most favoured spirits at the present time.

But the important question for us now is, whether this immediate perception of the Eternal is capable of forming the contents of Faith, or whether in fact it has any contents at all until it has been translated into thought, will, and action. 'Pure feeling,' says Professor Flint curtly but truly, 'is pure nonsense.' Schleiermacher's conception of Faith is anything but 'simple feeling'; it is a highly elaborate product of the peculiar ideas of his age. And even so, it is very empty. I have already mentioned the *blankness* of the picture, which is insisted on by Schleiermacher. This, as is well known, is a common feature of mystical literature. The pure mystical state (which even William James says is identical with the Faith-state) is without form and void. But ideas must be given through something; there can be no purely internal revelation, just as there can be no purely external revelation. Some mystics have claimed that they have got beyond forms and differences, which are the mark of the transitory phenomenal world, and that the undifferentiated feeling which they prize so much is an intuition of the unity which underlies all difference. Others only lament that they cannot *utter* what they have seen and felt :—

O could I tell, ye surely would believe it !
O could I only say what I have seen !
How should I tell, or how can ye receive it,
How, till He bringeth you where I have been.¹

But there is all the difference between a Unity which excludes all difference, and a Unity which includes all

¹ Myers, *St. Paul*.

difference. And I cannot doubt that many mystics have believed themselves to have completed their journey when in reality they have not even begun it. Faith, which Philo, as we have seen, puts at the end of the journey, should, as Christian theology has always maintained, be placed at its beginning. Faith and Love, says Clement, are not taught or teachable (τὰ ἄκρα οὐ διδάσκειται); but between Faith, which is the starting-point of the Christian race, and the perfect Love that casteth out fear, which is its end, there is a long series of lessons which have to be learned.

Feeling is the mirror which reflects ideas and ideals. It has been defined as the 'passive echo in consciousness of the unconscious psychical process.'¹ It creates nothing; it seems to project ideas and ideals, because it reflects unconscious motions of thought and will. Feeling in itself is neither good nor bad, true nor untrue.² It is simply a fact of the soul-life. Its truth depends on the truth of the idea which determines it; its goodness on the goodness of the motive which is bound up with it. Schleiermacher, in his later editions of *Reden über die Religion*, smuggles in *Anschauung*, the most primitive form of ideation, into his conception of Feeling; in the earlier he admits *Anschauung* by the side of Feeling, as a religious function. This enables him to speak of the 'truth of Feeling,' determined by the truth of the contents of the idea. But 'pure Feeling' does not include any form of ideation.

In fact, *religious* feeling (much feeling is not religious) is only aroused by religious ideas of objective truth and value. 'Mere dependence' is nonsense, unless there is a known object on which to depend.

It is, therefore, in my opinion, a mistake to regard the primary ground of Faith, the immediate feeling of an eternal world, as sufficient. Feeling is formless and life-

¹ Von Hartmann.

² So Hegel says: 'That anything is in our feeling proves nothing good about the thing itself. The most royal flower blooms there side by side with the most mischievous weed.'

less ; it gives us no definite beliefs, and prescribes no definite duties. Even the three aspects which I have mentioned, the good, the true, and the beautiful, are, strictly speaking, products of reflexion on the spontaneous instinct ; they are the first applications of it to life. And moreover, the affirmations of this primary instinct, wrongly identified with feeling, need sifting and testing ; they are not all ready to take shape as determinations of the good, the true, and the beautiful. The world into which the Cosmic Consciousness, to use Bucke's word, admits us, is not purely a better world, though it is a larger one. It is hell as well as heaven. This the mystics who have tried to fix the immediacy of feeling as the basis of their moral and spiritual life, have found to their cost. The great problem which has confronted them has been how to distinguish between the genuine irruptions of the Divine into their consciousness, and what they were constrained to regard as diabolical imitations. For those who denied themselves the aid of the discursive intellect, of the will, and of practical tests, there was no satisfactory solution of this problem, and they were frequently tormented through life by doubts whether their most intimate spiritual experiences were not sometimes wiles of the Evil One for their undoing.

In primitive religions, even more than in the discipline of the mystics, deliberate attempts are made to fix this immediacy of religious feeling, without analysing or developing it, and to render it more intense by various artificial means, empirically discovered. I do not include prayer among these means, because I doubt whether this highest of our privileges can be resorted to, even in an ignorant manner, without some real gain. But fasting, and other ascetical exercises, have been and are used with the object of intensifying vague religious emotion, without unravelling or transmuting it. The self-induced trance of quietistic mysticism, procured by such methods as

gazing intently at a luminous chink or even on some part of one's own body (the navel among the monks of Mount Athos, the tip of the nose with some Indian contemplatives), is one method of hypnotisation. Religious music and orgiastic dancing are also very potent methods of achieving this result. I will quote part of Rohde's description of the Thracian worship of Dionysus.¹ 'The rite was performed on hilltops, in the darkness of night, by the doubtful light of torches. Amid the sound of music, the clashing of brazen cymbals, the rolling thunder of a great drum, and the deep note of the flute "enticing to madness," the band of worshippers danced over the hillside in a whirling, raving, rushing circle. When their emotions were raised to the highest pitch, they hurled themselves upon the beast chosen for sacrifice. This powerful intensification of feeling had a religious meaning, in that only through such overstrain and expansion of his being did man feel able to come into touch with the god and his attendant spirits.' 'Emotion carries its own credentials with it';² and by such methods the undifferentiated primary emotion of Faith may be stimulated to a pitch which may leave abiding traces on the mind.

This is one of the most important empirical discoveries about the religious emotion which man has made. The result of employing it is to arrest the development of Faith at a very early stage. This kind of religion may be intense; it may become the predominant interest in life; but it can hardly produce any of the proper fruits of Faith: it is an abortive Faith, a monstrosity and a perversion. The undifferentiated Faith-state was not given us to use or enjoy in this way. It must be developed, rendered explicit, unravelled, as it were, through will, thought and appropriate action.

The result of deliberately playing upon the emotions in

¹ Rohde, *Psyche*, ii. pp. 18-20.

² Pratt, *Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 62.

the manner described is often seen in terrible reactions. If the joys of the ecstatic state are (as is said by some who have experienced them) too great to be described, so also are the miseries of 'dereliction,' and the hallucinations of religious melancholy. Every fanatical 'revival' produces a crop of insanity. The normal development of religion is calm and self-collected, though deep and strong. Religious feeling, if not abused, pricks us with a sense of our imperfection, and forces us to seek, through thought and will, for the cause of our disquiet and for a means of satisfying our need.

The normal history of religious feeling is summed up in the words, Fear, Dependence, Love. Assuredly none of the three is 'pure feeling'; but I am protesting all through these lectures against separating our faculties in this way. Love is the crown of the soul's victory, and love, though it contains intellectual and moral elements, is primarily an emotion. Christianity has seemed to many to give the last word to the affections or emotions, by its exaltation of love as the only gift that 'never faileth'; and certainly love is the only virtue which we can imagine as persisting without much change in the eternal world, when faith shall have become sight, hope been turned into satisfaction, and knowledge into contemplation.

Love is implicit in Faith from the first. As aesthetics is a power of recognising beauty practically inseparable from the love of beauty; as ethics is a power of recognising the morally right practically inseparable from the love of right, so the aim of theology is an intellectual recognition of God practically inseparable from the love of God. And so Augustine is right when he says that a man's spiritual state may be best gauged not by what he knows, but by what he loves.¹

¹ Pascal's 'Human things need only be known in order to be loved, but divine things must first be loved in order to be known,' is valuable, but needs safeguarding, as making the acquisition of divine knowledge too independent of rational thought.

But if Faith thus loses itself at last in Love, Love must not, like mere feeling, be immediate at a level *below* distinction and relation. The religion of feeling cannot become true till it has passed through the crucible of the will and the intellect. Our problem is to find the intellectual and volitional equivalents of this vague religion of feeling, certainly not to regard it as a third stage, destined to override the intellect.¹

In the following lectures I shall try to consider in what manner, and under what limitations, the activities of the will and intellect, brought to bear upon the spontaneous Faith-state, which Professor Baldwin calls 'reality-feeling' as opposed to self-conscious belief, may conduct us towards a unified spiritual experience, in which the contradictions and divisions which analysis brings to light may be partially reconciled. But there is one other principle, besides the intellectual and practical, which is of immense importance. This is the principle of Authority, the effect of which as a secondary ground of Faith, determining its form and content, can hardly be overestimated. Religion is a racial affair, and authority is the principle of continuity, the memory of the race. I think, therefore, that a discussion of authority in relation to Faith should take precedence even of the practical and intellectual grounds of belief.

¹ As (*e.g.*) Pratt does in his *Psychology of Religious Belief*.

CHAPTER V

AUTHORITY AS A GROUND OF FAITH

To class Authority as a secondary ground of Faith is a proceeding which needs some defence. For it is certain that in individual experience Authority is the earliest ground of belief. We are none of us born with a belief in God ; but we are all born with a tendency to believe what we are told. A child can be made to believe almost anything. He does not believe because he wishes to believe, or because the things presented to him for acceptance appear to him to be useful or beautiful or desirable in any way. He is quite as ready to believe in ghosts and hobgoblins as in angels and good fairies. As he began to speak by parrot-talk, so he begins to think by accepting facts without criticising them, and assumes that whatever he hears and understands has a place in the world of reality. It is only after sad experience of the deceitfulness of appearances that he unlearns his first confidence, and begins to doubt and question and disbelieve.

This natural tendency to believe what we are told remains with us, though more or less impaired by experience, through life. Some may protest that no one except a young child believes anything merely because he is told, without any thought of the trustworthiness of the authority ; but I am convinced that this is a mistake. A great many grown persons will accept almost any statements put before them (not on all subjects, of course, but on some subjects) from pure inertia, because it is easier for them to believe than to disbelieve. Some popular superstitions,

which show such astonishing vitality, must be transmitted and accepted in this lazy fashion. Such notions as that it is unlucky to walk under a ladder, or to be married in May, could not survive a moment's thought about the value of the evidence in their favour. They are simply taken at their face value, with no questions asked.

If pure credulity is an actual cause of belief, even in cases where disproof is possible and easy, we cannot be surprised that it is largely instrumental in forming beliefs about the unseen world, where no contradiction from experience is possible. Among savages, myths about gods and spirits are handed down from father to son, and believed implicitly. They become part of the mental capital of the tribe or nation, and any attempt to damage their credit is visited with great indignation. This is quite natural. When an 'old master' has been in a family for generations, the owner is not likely to be grateful for being told that it is a sham. Or if he has acquired it himself without asking questions, and has frequently spoken of it as undoubtedly genuine, he will be at least equally unwilling to admit that he has been deceived. As a general rule, we say a thing for the first time because we have heard some one else say it, and stick to it because we have said it ourselves.

It follows that the diffusion and persistence of a belief is not always a presumption in favour of its truth. Many beliefs, which are purely silly and destitute of any foundation, have been kept alive by mere credulity, even in Europe, for thousands of years. When a superstition once establishes itself, it does not become any more respectable by growing old. Its antiquity gives it a sort of prestige which helps to keep it alive, but adds nothing to its weight. For instance, all housemaids everywhere believe that you can make a fire burn by tilting a poker against the bars. I dare say this curious manœuvre was originally an attempt

to make the sign of the cross, and so conjure the fire to burn ; but for centuries it has been a purely irrational superstition. Or take the cock-and-lion story, solemnly told by Aristotle—that the lion is afraid of the cock. This superstition lasted till Cuvier at last thought of putting a cock into a lion's cage, with results fatal to the cock. Intellectual indolence has perpetuated a great many bits of antiquated science. The history of popular quack remedies supplies a mass of instances of a highly instructive kind ; for the same mental attitude which leads uneducated people to resort to quacks when they are ill makes them victims of religious imposture when they are in trouble about their souls.

Excessive reverence for tradition, deference to the opinions of our forefathers, ' who had more wit and wisdom than we,' must be distinguished from mere credulity. This reverence for the supposed wisdom of the past, which we find everywhere in primitive societies, must have been very useful in the early stages of civilisation, when the difficulty of preserving the hardly-won gains of humanity was far greater than at present. The tendency to put the golden age in the past may have been caused partly by a consciousness of the real sacrifices which civilisation entails. The fruit of the tree of knowledge, as I have said elsewhere,¹ always expels us from some paradise or other, even if it be only the paradise of fools. And when the art of writing was discovered, a superstitious veneration for the written word was universal, and so persistent that I do not think it is extinct yet. If the words of wisdom were enshrined in verse, that made the glamour even more potent. The old Greek sentiment about the inspiration of poets survived to the end of the classical period. ' To the poets sometimes,' says Dion Chrysostom,—' I mean the very ancient poets—there came a brief utterance from the Muses, a kind of inspiration of the divine nature and truth,

¹ *Truth and Falsehood in Religion*, p. 153.

like a flash of light from an unseen fire.' ¹ It was thus that the belief in an infallible literature grew up, of which I must say more in a later lecture. To-day my subject is Authority in general, its meaning and significance for Faith. And I have to justify my classification of it as a secondary ground of belief.

Authority is defined by Professor Gwatkin ² as 'all weight allowed to the beliefs of persons or the teachings of institutions beyond their reasonable value as personal testimony.' The phrase 'reasonable value' raises at once the question as to the relation of authority to reason. 'Reason' is one of those ambiguous words which have been the cause of endless controversies, because the combatants have not been careful enough to define their terms. It is a pity, I think, that we have not accepted Coleridge's distinction between reason and understanding, corresponding to the German words *Vernunft* and *Verstand*, and (less exactly) to the Greek *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* as used by Platonists. 'Reason' would then be used for a philosophy of life based on full experience, a synthesis doing justice to the claims of the moral and æsthetic consciousness, while 'understanding' would be reserved for logical reasoning of a more abstract kind. We should then have been spared such confused arguments as are found, for example, in Mr. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief* (in which, as Leslie Stephen said, the foundations are ingeniously supported by the superstructure), or Mr. Kidd's *Social Evolution*.

It is by no means certain that we are right in looking for the 'Foundations of Belief.' The metaphor may be a misleading one. Some things have no foundations. An organism, for instance, has no foundations. Perhaps rational Faith may prove to be part of the life of the universe, in which case we need not look for its foundations outside of itself. Perhaps there is no 'elephant' to hold

¹ Dion Chrysostom, *Orat.* 36, vol. ii, p. 59; Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 51.

² Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, vol. i, p. 3.

up the world of ideas, and no 'tortoise' to support the elephant.¹

Mr. Kidd is anxious to prove that there is 'no rational sanction for progress,' and he chooses to regard 'reason' as a shortsighted, selfish faculty, which has nothing to do with any existence but the present, which, it insists, it is our duty to ourselves to make the most of.² Professor Wallace, usually the most courteous of critics, is for once goaded into using a sharp expression. 'It is simply impossible to allow any one thus to play the fool with language.'³ Similarly for Mr. Balfour, authority is called 'the rival and opponent of reason.' Authority 'stands for that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.'⁴ To authority, he considers, we owe the order and stability of the moral world; by it the operations of reason are 'coerced to a fore-ordained issue'; it generates 'psychological climates' (like the 'atmosphere' of Church schools, I suppose, about which we heard so much two years ago), that is, habits of belief which reason has no power to influence. Indeed, 'it is from authority that reason itself draws its most important premises.' 'To authority, in the main, we owe, not religion only, but ethics and politics.' 'Reasoning is a force most apt to divide and disintegrate.'

This is a return to a long discredited method of apologetics. In the Middle Ages John of Salisbury wrote: 'As both the senses and human reason frequently go astray, God has laid in Faith the first foundation for the knowledge of truth.' So Bayle, the French Encyclopædist, says, not very sincerely, perhaps: 'Human reason is a principle of destruction, not of construction; it is capable solely of raising questions, and of doubling about to make

¹ Cf. Professor H. Jones in *Hibbert Journal* (Jan. 1906), p. 301.

² Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 73.

³ W. Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*, p. 104.

⁴ Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, p. 219.

a controversy endless. The best use that can be made of philosophy is to acknowledge that it can only lead us astray, and that we must seek another guide, which is the light of revelation.' ¹

I shall have occasion to show that religious belief is largely affected by 'psychic processes other than reasoning.' But why these should be grouped together under the name 'authority,' I cannot imagine. We believe, as I shall show, partly on practical grounds, because we find that a certain mental attitude towards the unseen and unknown *works*, helps us to live as we wish to live, and since we believe that the world is all of one piece, it is reasonable to assume that what is true for us is true for all; and partly also (in many cases) on æsthetic grounds, since order and beauty seem to be part of the Creator's design, and ends in themselves.

These may be called non-rational grounds of belief (using rational in the lower sense), because reason (in the higher sense) has to find room for them, and cannot pronounce them invalid. Irrational they are not. And they have nothing, so far as I can see, to do with authority. The passage about 'coercing the operations of reason to a fore-ordained issue' seems to be a dignified phrase for the operation which schoolboys call 'fudging' their sums. Unless the world is purely irrational, such a manœuvre is a wilful deception practised at our own expense or at that of others. There is nothing more harmful to the cause of truth than a lip-service to logic or science, when we have predetermined in our own minds the conclusion at which we mean to arrive. If we have decided to accept our opinions at second-hand, it is most candid to say so, and abstain from arguments which have nothing to do with our position.

If by all this opposition of authority and reason it is simply meant that there are some things which we dis-

¹ Quoted by Rickaby, *First Principles*, p. 191.

cover for ourselves, and other things which we accept because we have every reason to believe that our informants are trustworthy, or because we have not the leisure or ability to test them for ourselves, that is a very obvious truism. I accept the fact that Buenos Ayres is the capital of the Argentine Republic because the evidence for the statement seems to me sufficient, because there is nothing intrinsically improbable in it, because I can think of no reason why there should be a conspiracy to deceive me on such a point, and because there is no testimony on the other side. I accept without question anything that a distinguished mathematician tells me about the higher mathematics because I am incapable of following his calculations, and because I have generally found mathematicians honourable men. But acceptances of this kind are really intellectual processes. I have my reasons for believing, or disbelieving, in each case. This is, as I have said, psychologically quite different from bare credulity, which is a thoughtless condition.

Once more, I may accept certain traditions, principles, and maxims as embodying the stored wisdom of the race, the racial instinct. But this, I contend, is again acceptance on intellectual grounds. My studies of sociology and biology, we will suppose, have led me to attach a great importance to these traditions, as embodying a deeper practical wisdom than mankind has been able to make explicit and justify by argument, or, at any rate, deeper than I could hope to arrive at by my own wisdom and experience ; and therefore I submit to the authority of the race as exercised in these social or religious traditions. This is a very wise and respectable line to take, but it is purely intellectual and reasonable, and to class it as non-rational betrays a mere confusion of thought.

Nor is there anything non-rational in the respect and homage which we pay to men of deep spiritual insight. 'Our weak Faith may at times be permitted to look

through the eyes of some strong soul, and may thereby gain a sense of the certainty of spiritual things which before we had not, and which we lose when we return within ourselves.' ¹ We do not pay this deference unless we have reason to think that our guide has indeed 'a strong soul'; and this is why personal influence is so potent in religion. Our reason tells us that much religious eloquence is mere professional advocacy; we do not trust our guide until we feel that we know him.

But now suppose that the tradition relates to some fact in the past or future, for which the personal testimony of my teacher is obviously an insufficient warrant, and which is not recommended to me by any of the considerations just mentioned. Is it unreasonable for me to believe it? The answer is No, if I believe that the doctrine in question was supernaturally imparted, or that it is supernaturally guaranteed.

If I accept a theological proposition as supernaturally revealed, then I am really believing on authority—Divine authority. The question is, whether Divine authority is or can be independent of what we have called the primary ground of Faith, the inner, personal attraction towards the good, the true, and the beautiful.

A purely external revelation of truths, which are not related in any way to our own consciousness, would of course be impossible. You cannot teach a blind man by showing him pictures, nor a deaf man by talking to him, because there is no communication with him through the sense which he has lost. And we may say reverently that God could make no revelation in such a way to man, without breaking the laws under which He governs the universe. Revelation must be either of truths which are at present unknown to us, but which when imparted to us are intelligible, and carry conviction with them by their agreement with the rest of our experience; or else, there must be an

¹ Stanton, *The Place of Authority in Religious Belief*, p. 32.

inward revelation, parallel to the outward, and assuring us of its trustworthiness.

Now any revelation of facts which, though they are within our comprehension, are unverifiable, must be guaranteed in some way. This obviously applies to all historical facts which are presented to us as having a significance for Faith. No inner light can re-create the past. Lessing, like many others since, found this difficulty insurmountable. 'Contingent truths of history,' he said, 'can never be made the proof of necessary truths of reason. That is the ugly ditch which I cannot get over, though I have often and earnestly attempted the leap.' We are not, however, called upon to attempt this *salto mortale*. It is enough if the historical facts fall naturally into their place in the scheme of the world as it reveals itself to Faith.

Now, what kinds of guarantee are possible, when a prophet comes to me, saying, 'Thus saith the Lord'? What credentials is it possible for him to produce?

The most primitive kind of prophet seems generally to say: 'God is the Lord of nature, and makes its laws bend to His will. Through His power, I will do the same; and then you will know that He has sent me. I will call down rain by my incantations, or I will smite an unbeliever with grievous sickness.' But if God does not act in this way, if He does not suspend or interfere with the operations of nature by way of giving signs to men, this proof is wholly worthless. And it remains wholly worthless even if rain does follow the prophet's prayer, and if the sceptic goes home sick unto death.

Or the prophet may seek to establish his credit by predicting the future. Maeterlinck has argued that it is one of the most mysterious things about human nature that we cannot predict the future—that, while the past is partly open to us, the future is a closed book. No doubt it is strange, but such do seem to be the limitations of our nature; and there is no evidence at all convincing to the

modern mind that those who are entrusted with a message by God have any supernatural powers of foretelling future events. The old Jewish prophets no doubt had a very clear insight into the issues of national policy. They saw that Egypt was likely to prove a broken reed, and that the cruel and barbarous empire of Assyria could not long terrorise the continent of Asia. But it is an inexcusable obscuring of issues to confound this kind of penetration with the old idea of prophecy, which made it possible to accept a verse in which Cyrus is mentioned by name, as having been written generations before the birth of that prince.

The famous arguments from miracles and prophecy are in principle condemned by our Lord, whose warnings against seeking after a sign have been preserved by the candour of His biographers, though they themselves attached great value to such evidence. They are no longer arguments for us.

It remains that the prophet should commend his message to us by awaking a response in our own hearts. This is in reality the only way in which a revelation is or can be made to us. The revelation comes to us with authority from outside, as the voice of God. The true prophet at any rate believes sincerely that God is speaking through his mouth; and those who hear him are constrained to believe it too. Our hearts leap out to meet his words; we recognise that this is what we wanted; that here is the truth which we could not find for ourselves, the good news which we should not have dared to believe. We recognise in the prophet himself a man of God. We trust him instinctively; when he speaks to us about the unseen world, we feel that he knows what he is speaking about, that he 'has been there' himself. When we read the words of Jesus Himself, our hearts tell us that even this language is inadequate.

This will show why I regard prophetic authority as

a secondary ground of Faith. It is not independent of the primary ground, the inward tribunal which accepts or rejects it. It is this primary ground which alone makes belief on authority a religious act. Without it, belief in authority is inert opinion, or lazy acquiescence, or blind partisanship ; and none of these things has anything to do with Faith.

Revelation is wholly within the sphere of religion. Nothing can be revealed to an irreligious mind, and nothing can be revealed to the religious mind that falls outside the sphere of *religious* truth. Neither can the natural man discern the things of the Spirit of God, nor can the spiritual man claim the inspiration or guarantee of the Spirit of God for beliefs which belong to the scope of the natural man.

This, however, is a restriction of the province of authority which has not been generally accepted in practice. Authority, by those who appeal to it, is usually treated as the final court of appeal. Belief on authority, thus understood, has a psychological affinity to intuitivism, and is in fact often held in conjunction with it. The mystic who refuses to analyse or criticise his intuitions is often baffled by the emptiness or formlessness of his religious conceptions, and so tends to fall back upon the clearly defined images or symbols which his church provides. He accepts these on authority, since he is not interested in the proof of them, and would even value them less if they were based on ordinary evidence. Whether consciously or not, he only needs them as helps to his imagination. But they may easily become so indispensable to him that he will be as stiff a dogmatist as if his Faith really rested on external authority ; and he will often protest vehemently that external authority, in the form of supernaturally revealed doctrines, is in truth the basis of his Faith, which would fall in ruins if this support were withdrawn. Just because the dogmas

of his church are accepted uncritically, as outside discussion, they are capable of being used as external supports of a Faith which in reality sprang up independently of them, and only requires them to give form and colour to its vague intuitions. The typical dogmatist is a confused half-mystic, whose intuitive Faith is neither strong enough nor clear enough to bring him strength or comfort. He accordingly fortifies himself by calling in the help of an external authority, whose credentials he would think it impious to investigate, and willingly accepts its guidance whenever the inner light burns dim.

This is the most rudimentary and crudest form of working Faith ; since we have found that reliance upon undifferentiated feeling does not provide a working Faith at all. It is the working Faith of the simple orthodox believer ; and however unsound it must appear to the philosopher, it works fairly well in practice. It is a wholesome safeguard against rash individualism ; since the doctrines which are supposed to be externally revealed by God are in truth supported, in part at least, by the legitimate authority of the collective religious consciousness, the value of which can hardly be overestimated. If a 'universal Church' really existed, and if its judgments were articulately represented by its official spokesmen, it would be rash indeed for an individual to disregard its authority. Even under the present state of things, 'orthodoxy' provides a well-balanced view of life, and a safe guide in ordinary cases. But it remains true that the simple believer places the seat of authority wrongly, and allows authority to throw her shield over various beliefs relating to particular events, some of which may be untrue, while others have no religious significance. This kind of belief on authority, therefore, may be a source of danger to Faith, by loading it with burdens which it is unable to bear.

Those who lean heavily on authority soon discover,

if they allow themselves to think seriously, that it provides no solution of the enigmas of Faith. Just as, in considering the hypothesis of Faith as immediate perception of divine truth, we found that the devout mystic is haunted by nightmares, *contresaçons diaboliques* of his most precious visions, which he has denied himself the means of testing, and cannot possibly test without being false to his principle that divine truth is communicated immediately; so the believer on authority is dismayed to find that authority is not all of one mind.¹ Not only are his senses confused by the clamour of rival teachers, all equally confident that *their* prophecy is the true word of the God of truth, but his intellect, conscience, and feelings are touched on different sides by appeals which are sharply antagonistic to each other. Unless he shuts his ears tight to all advocates except one (a very common but rather undignified way of deciding a case to one's own satisfaction), he will find that the rival authorities give him no peace, and that he *must* somehow decide among them, weighing his authorities against each other, and thereby abandoning the attitude of unquestioning submission. Now these rival claims cannot be settled offhand, by an intuitive method; we cannot go back for external authority to pure mystical experience, which answers no questions about particulars. It is thus that we are driven to admit the necessity of those other secondary grounds which will form the subject of my later lectures—the practical principle, the intellectual principle, and the aesthetic principle. Without them we cannot say what kind of facts can be guaranteed by authority, and which voices it is safe to trust.

I am trying to arrive at a conclusion as to what Faith ought to be and may be, not as to what in the majority of cases it actually is. I have already said that the

¹ Alanus of Lille (thirteenth century) said wittily: 'Auctoritas cereum habet nasum; id est, in diversum potest flecti sensum.'

great mass of religious people stop short at this second stage, which the medieval Church called *fides implicita*, and which the German reformers called 'charcoal-burner's faith.' In the case of these simple believers the contents of their creeds—nearly the whole concrete body of their beliefs—are determined by pure accident. The authority to which they pin their Faith is that under which they were brought up. It matters little that a Protestant may have a mind *naturaliter Catholica*; he will rarely change his profession. Somehow or other, his religious instincts will find expression in the church or denomination to which he belongs. If he has been brought up as a Catholic, he will find grace and help in the Sacraments; if as a Methodist, he will expect and generally experience the crisis which is known in those circles as sudden conversion, and which is supposed to occur usually between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. The means of grace suggested to men and women by their teachers may not be, and in fact are not, equally wholesome and good in all cases; there may be, and in fact is, spiritual loss in belonging to a religious body whose tenets are meagre, defective, and out of correspondence with some of the ingredients of a rich spiritual nature. But when the driving force, the religious instinct, is strong, it is able to stretch inadequate dogmatic theories to a very considerable extent. They become merely pegs on which the believer hangs his best thoughts.

Clement of Alexandria called Faith (and it was precisely this common kind of religious belief—the belief of the average church-goer—which was in his mind), 'compendious knowledge' (σύντομος γνῶσις). It is a kind of short cut to divine knowledge, for those who have not yet had enough spiritual experience, or who have not the leisure, or the intellectual ability, to 'beat out the music' of their Faith for themselves. It is a working principle for all (Clement would say) until they have attained to philosophical truth. This is obviously true. The average Christian

possesses, in the tenets of his Church, a much richer Faith than he could have found for himself, a much more complete scheme of beliefs than individually he has any right to call his own. It is not possible for him to suspend his judgment until he has balanced the claims of rival authorities. He feels that his wisest course is to admit and accept the claims of the authority under which he finds himself, to be a divine revelation, and to make this the mould, as it were, into which he can pour the treasures of his religious experience. The treasure is in earthen vessels, no doubt, and he is very helpless if called upon to give a reason for the Faith that is in him ; but he has a receptacle for his religious emotions, a rule of belief, and a rule of life.

I have now perhaps shown sufficiently the partial justification, and the necessary limitations, of that kind of Faith which passively accepts the body of orthodox beliefs, as a man has learnt orthodoxy at school, or at his mother's knee. In my next lectures I must consider the chief historical forms which the belief in authority has taken.

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AS A GROUND OF FAITH—*continued*

AUTHORITY in religion, as I showed in my last lecture, means Divine authority; and to rest one's Faith on Authority means to act on the belief that information about divine things has been communicated to mankind, immediately and unmistakably. I have shown that this belief is held by most religious people, and that they for the most part accept unexamined, and maintain through life, the forms of Faith which were first presented to them, refusing even to contemplate any change. I have admitted the necessity of this naïve, childlike Faith; but I have shown that its forms are determined by the accidents of early surroundings, and that by excluding self-criticism it is condemned to stationariness in the midst of a changing world.

In this lecture and the next I wish to consider the historical forms which the belief in authority has taken.

The chief of these are the theories of the Infallible Church, and of the Infallible Book. But there is another form of supernatural authority, which is historically prior to these, and which even in the history of the Christian Church comes before them. I mean belief in the supernatural inspiration of individual men, prophets, seers, visionaries, and the like. I have already mentioned this as the most typical form of religious authority properly so called.

The prophet conceives himself to be the mouthpiece of

God, and his utterances as prophet are held to convey direct information about the will and purposes of the Almighty. This is a case of belief on authority, in the true sense. It differs from the intuitivism which we discussed the other day, in that the prophet regards his message as something special and miraculous. He is merely the vehicle, not the organ of the revelation. Other men accept his utterances as coming straight from God. They have lost nothing, it is thought, by passing through a transparent medium.

In the New Testament this individual inspiration is spoken of as being 'filled with the Holy Ghost.' The religious instinct, which is the foundation of true Faith, was justly traced to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit of God. But there is a right and a wrong view of individual inspiration. In St. Paul, the action of the Holy Spirit is looked for in all that goes to make up character in its widest sense, and it appears in all religious experience. The Holy Ghost is the guide of prayer, the illuminator of the intellect, the kindler of love, the inspirer of every noble deed and work. But the operation of this Spirit is not wholly miraculous, wholly foreign to their own true nature. It is, in truth, their own best nature. 'God in them is the fulfilment of the best that they have it in them to become. The higher nature begotten in them is the first-fruits of the Spirit, with promise of ever richer fruition. The groanings which cannot be uttered, with which the Spirit comes in on our behalf, are identical with the groanings which we ourselves utter in the longing for a fuller experience of God (Rom. viii. 23-27). And so the light within is the light of God, as we allow Him to become one with us.'¹ But St. Paul's contemporaries could not all rise to this conception. They traced the operation of the Spirit rather in fitful and unaccountable manifestations of religious enthusiasm. The more strange and

¹ Grubb, *Authority and the Light Within*, p. 82.

wild these were, the more sure they were that there was something divine in them. In the various *charismata*, especially, they found unmistakable evidence of an influx of the supernatural. The 'pneumatic' or spiritual man was one who spoke with tongues or prophesied. This undisciplined enthusiasm was discouraged, and in the end suppressed or expelled by the Catholic Church, though it lived on in a different form, in the strange belief in *visions*. Tertullian, writing about A.D. 200, has the startling and very significant statement that 'the majority of men derive their knowledge of God from visions.'¹ In the following centuries, the visions of the monks and nuns were the chief sources of supposed information about the life after death. All the horrors of the medieval Inferno were thus guaranteed, and a great part of the terrible pictures of hell, which seem to us so grotesque and wantonly cruel, was the direct result of the supernatural authority attributed to the nightmares of holy men.

In our own day, the belief in directly inspired prophets among our contemporaries has practically disappeared, as it disappeared in Palestine between Malachi and John the Baptist. But the belief in supernatural guidance vouchsafed to individuals survives both in its true and in its more dubious form.

The distinguishing mark of this belief in individual illumination is the acceptance of the supposed divine communication simply and without question. A man, for instance, will hesitate about accepting an appointment until he feels a distinct 'leading' to say yes or no; then he will act at once, putting aside any self-questionings as to his fitness for the post.

I must try to indicate what measure of truth and error I consider to reside in this Faith in direct inspiration.

¹ See the interesting note in Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. i. p. 53 (English translation).

Assuredly all good men are guided in various degrees by the Spirit of God who dwells, St. Paul says, in all but the reprobate. We have within us a tribunal before which it is our right and our duty to bring every doubtful case. And in this 'discerning of spirits' we may hope that we are guided not by our own unaided wisdom, but by the divine gift of grace which is only the other side of the human virtue of Faith. In trusting miraculous 'leadings,' the error is in supposing that we can accept any mental suggestion, without question, as coming from God. The suggestion may come to us in a mysterious manner—in a vivid dream, or associated with a strange coincidence, or in some other way unlike our usual mental processes. But these are no necessary tokens of divine inspiration; it is superstition, not religion, to suppose that they are. Divine guidance is given us; but the degree of it is determined by our spiritual and mental condition, and it is not communicated in a magical manner, so as to save us the trouble of further inquiry. If the man who, when he has been offered an appointment, waits for some 'leading,' and does not try to weigh the pros and cons fairly, were to consider the reasons for and against acceptance, prayerfully, but with the best use of his reason, he would be more likely to be guided aright in his decision. In short, the error is in trying to fix the immediacy of special inspiration, as Quietists try to fix the immediacy of general, diffused inspiration. Special guidance in emergencies comes to us through our ordinary faculties if it comes at all. Sanctity does not confer the power of divination.

The theory of individual inspiration, if pushed to its logical conclusion, is too absurd to be widely held. It would result in making each Christian, who believed himself inspired, his own church and his own Bible. But even in a democratic age it would seem ridiculous to apply the theory of 'one man one vote' to religion. This

type of Faith can be studied in its most favourable form in the writings of the earlier Quakers. In the words of a living member of the Society of Friends, whom I have already quoted in this lecture, 'they made the inner light something wholly alien to man's nature. It was not an attribute of man, but a substance entirely separate from man's own being. "The light of which we speak," says Barclay, "is not only distinct but of a different nature from the soul of man and its faculties." It is not to be identified with the conscience any more than a candle is the same as the lantern that holds it.'¹ The error here, which, as this passage shows, is fully admitted by modern 'Friends,' is substantially the same as that of quietistic mysticism.

This extreme form of individualism has not been very prominent in the history of Christianity. The authorities which in history have swayed the destiny of nations have been more external and more august. They have spoken to man, not within him.

Let us first consider the historical evolution of the idea of the *Church*, as the divinely inspired source of authority.

I have already shown that the conception of Faith as a body of doctrine, supernaturally accredited and therefore to be accepted in its entirety, is primitive. The guiding idea of Catholicism began to establish itself as soon as there was a Church for it to grow in. 'The Catholic theory of apostolic tradition,' says Sabatier,² who writes from a Protestant standpoint, 'is found clearly defined and established as an infallible and sovereign law in the times of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus.' The concentration of power in the hands of the Roman Church, as the authoritative interpreter of this tradition, advanced as if by an automatic process. To quote Sabatier again: 'The future centre of the Catholic Church appeared from

¹ Grubb, *Authority and the Light Within*, p. 81.

² Sabatier, *Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit*.

the commencement of the second century,' and in the year 194, 'for the first time a bishop of Rome, Victor, speaks as master to the other bishops, presents himself as interpreter and arbiter of the universal Church, acts as universal bishop, and proclaims heretical the churches that would resist his authority.' In Cyprian's time the bishops were all theoretically equal. Yet such is the interior logic of the system that Cyprian himself laid the foundation of a new evolution which was to produce from the body of bishops that *episcopus episcoporum* against whom he had tried to guard himself. The trend of the Catholic polity towards a centralised despotism went on irresistibly and inexorably.

When once the Roman primacy is recognised, all later developments of the papal prerogative, down to our own times, are only the logical conclusion of the Catholic conception of the Church. The infallibility which was the attribute of the universal Church was gradually concentrated in the Roman Church, and thence passed to the Roman bishop. When the Pope was held to be the head and voice of the Church, the infallibility of the Church could not express itself through another mouth.

Roman Catholicism is a religion of authority. When a man who has been a Protestant becomes a Roman Catholic, he must learn a kind of submission that we in England, or America, know nothing of in any other relation of life, unless we are soldiers on a campaign. Where the Church has spoken, the loyal Catholic must obey without question. Nor is this authority confined to religious matters. 'That authority,' says Cardinal Newman,¹ 'has the prerogative of an indirect jurisdiction on subject-matters which lie beyond its own proper limits, and it most reasonably has such a jurisdiction. It could not properly defend religious truth without claiming for that truth what may be called its *pomoeria*,

¹ *Development of Christian Doctrine.*

or, to take another illustration, without acting as we act, as a nation, in claiming as our own not only the land on which we live, but what are called British waters. The Catholic Church claims, not only to judge infallibly on religious questions, but to animadvert on opinions in secular matters which bear upon religion, on matters of philosophy, of science, of literature, of history, and it demands our submission to her claim. It claims to censure books, to silence authors, and to forbid discussions. It must, of course, be obeyed without a word, and perhaps, in process of time, it will tacitly recede from its own injunctions.' How like this is to the history of the growth of the Roman world-empire ! Each new province demands a further annexation to secure its frontier ; and nothing short of military discipline and military organisation will keep the vast dominion together.

But we must examine more closely the claims of a theory which has so august a history. It rests entirely on the theory of a clearly distinguishable special divine revelation, as does the Protestant theory of an infallible book. At the close of this discussion we must consider how far this distinction is valid. According to the Catholic theory, the Church is not simply a divinely founded establishment which continues to administer the trusts committed to it by its Founder, but it is in its corporate capacity a direct continuation of the Incarnation, permanently and fully inspired by the Holy Ghost, who, in accordance with the promise of Jesus Christ, made while He was on earth, was to take His place as a Divine Presence among men, until His coming again. It is true that God had never left Himself without witness, even in heathendom ; but from the first Whitsunday He has had ' a special abode, an organised and visible agency for distributing a higher and supernatural order of grace,'¹ a guidance differing in kind from natural wisdom and

¹ Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, p. 130.

goodness. If we ask how we are to know that one particular corporation, and no others, has the privilege of being the sole trustee of this supernatural revelation, we are referred to four marks, the famous 'notes' of a true Church, viz. Unity, Sanctity, Universality, and Apostolicity.

We are bound to ask, whether, as a matter of historical fact, the Roman Church, or the Catholic Church, which is so defined as to include all Episcopalian bodies having the 'Apostolic Succession,' but no others, can claim to exhibit these marks. If it fails to do so, it will be unnecessary to ask the further question, whether these four notes, if they were established, would be sufficient foundation for so tremendous a claim. The first note, *Unity*, used to be understood to mean that there have been no changes in the teaching of the Church since Apostolic times. Dogma is unchangeable—*immobilis et irreformabilis*. This theory, as we shall see presently, has been abandoned by the Liberal school of Catholic apologists in favour of the doctrine of natural and necessary development. It is, indeed, only by completely rewriting Church history that the mutability and mutations of dogma can be disputed. The Roman Catholics have made a legitimate point against their Anglican opponents by proving that the germs of modern Catholicism can be detected even in the sub-Apostolic age. But they have not proved, and cannot prove, that there have been no important changes.

The verdict of history has been pronounced decisively against the theory that the supernatural character of the Church can be demonstrated by the miraculous and unparalleled 'stability' of its teaching.¹

It would not be in accordance with the plan of those lectures to give detailed examples of the mutability of dogma and culture. Martineau has given some clear

¹ Cf. Burkitt, *Early Christianity outside the Roman Empire*, p. 6.

examples in his *Seat of Authority in Religion*, and any fairly written Church history will supply abundant evidence.

The exclusive claim to *Sanctity* can hardly be taken seriously. We have no means of determining who are God's true saints, and we are expressly forbidden to attempt to do so. If sanctity is an occult quality, known to God alone, it obviously cannot be appealed to as a 'note.' It is useless to offer evidence which, from the nature of the case, cannot be produced. But so far as we have the means of forming an opinion, it would appear that men and women of the highest character have appeared in nearly all religious bodies, and that, though the Roman communion may claim to have been exceptionally rich in saints, it is also true that among the most odious scoundrels who have disgraced humanity have been found some of the most highly placed ecclesiastics of the Roman Church.¹

The third 'note,' *Universality*, is interpreted to mean that Catholics everywhere profess the same Faith. It is difficult to see what argument can be based on such a fact, were it true. The Tariff Reform League everywhere professes the same faith, because those who happen to be free-traders do not subscribe to it. But in point of fact, divergences of belief have never ceased to show themselves in the Catholic Church, in spite of the prompt amputations to which she has always been ready to resort.

The fourth note, *Apostolicity*, is a simple begging of the question as between Catholicism and other bodies. For

¹ A good example of the manner in which history must be written to satisfy the demands of the Catholic theory is furnished by a recent biographical work: *Chronicles of the House of Borgia* by Frederick, Baron Corvo. 'Alexander VI., as earthly Vicar of Jesus Christ, merits our reverent admiration. His personal piety was simple, diligent, and real. He greatly revered the Deipara, the Blessed Virgin Mary. In her honour he ordained the bell which rings at sunset, sunrise, and noon, for the Angelus Domini in memory of the Incarnation. On his deathbed he said, We have always had a singular affection for the most holy Virgin.' This singular affection for the Virgin was testified, among other ways, by having one of his mistresses painted as the Madonna with the infant Saviour.

all Christian bodies claim spiritual descent from the Apostolic Church. Whether a particular method of devolution is essential or not is the main point at issue between them.

The four 'notes,' then, completely break down, and a theory of Church authority which has no better arguments than these to rely upon must be in a very precarious position. In truth, the legitimate claim of authority in matters of Faith is grievously weakened by these attempts to narrow its sphere. It is assumed that if there is such a thing as a Church, it must be the Roman Church; and the religious consciousness of Europe is naively assumed to have sanctioned not only the divinity of Christ, but the apotheosis of Mary and the cult of the saints.

At the present time, however, the most interesting feature in Roman Catholicism, from our point of view, is the growth of a *dynamic* theory of Church authority. This is, at least for Catholics, the most important practical question as to the nature of authority in matters of Faith. In order to understand it, it will be necessary to contrast the *static* and *dynamic* theories of revelation, outside the Roman Church, as well as within its borders.

By a *static* view of revelation, as opposed to a *dynamic*, I mean the theory that a supernatural revelation was at some past time granted to mankind, which now persists only in its effects. The date when the authoritative and infallible revelation began, and when it ceased, may be fixed anywhere, the limits being purely arbitrary. According to the old-fashioned high Anglican theory, we can only rely with certainty on the pronouncements of the undivided Church. The seven general councils may claim infallibility. After the schism between East and West, the supernatural guidance of the Holy Ghost went into abeyance among the different Churches, which had excommunicated each other, exactly as an old English

peerage goes into abeyance when a peer leaves two or more daughters, and no sons. None of the daughters may take the title, which accordingly is erased from the roll of the peerage: but if the descendants of all the daughters except one die out, or if the head of one clan of cousins marries the head of the only other remaining clan, the eldest representative of the family may claim the title, and the series is resumed where it left off. Just so, if all except one of the divided Churches which have the Apostolical Succession were to disappear, or if they would resume communion with each other, and would agree to hold an eighth general council, that council would be infallibly guided in its decisions, in spite of the absence of non-episcopal schismatical bodies, which are neither churches nor integral parts of the one Church. This fantastic theory is not often heard of by the younger generation, but it was part of the foundations of the Tractarian position. It is, in effect, a *static* view, because the conditions of infallible guidance ceased to exist long ago, and there is no likelihood of their being revived. The Church can never modify its constitution, because the only body which could legalise changes is a body which can never meet. It is much as if no Act of Parliament were valid until it had been passed by a joint session of the House of Commons and the American Congress. The theory is well adapted to support the old Anglican 'appeal to antiquity.' If no further developments of doctrine, or practice, which have taken place since the seventh general council, can claim any authority, modern Romanism and theological Liberalism, and anything that is new in Protestantism, are alike condemned.

Another essentially static theory of revelation, which at present shows more vitality than the old-fashioned Anglican theory, is that which is usually called after the name of Albrecht Ritschl, of Göttingen (died 1889). I shall have occasion, later in this course, to consider the

theory of value-judgments which is the most famous part of his philosophy. Here I must only refer to his theory of revelation. This is a curious blend of Schleiermacher's view of Faith as pure feeling, with an old-Protestant insistence on preaching 'Jesus only.' In order to understand Christianity, he holds, we must go back at every point to the historical revelation once given in the Person of Jesus Christ. And this revelation was definitely closed at the time of the Crucifixion. He will have nothing to do with the Pauline doctrine of communion with the glorified Christ. 'Christ brings us to God'; but only by the impression made upon us by the study of the Synoptic Gospels. This position is as untenable as the old Anglican theory, though for different reasons. The obvious and fundamental fallacy in Ritschl's theory is the supposition that Faith in a historical fact can be based on grounds which are altogether independent of historical judgment. For Ritschl will not allow us to base our Faith in Christ on intellectual conviction that the narratives about Him are trustworthy. Judgments of fact, of this kind, seem to him irrelevant in religion. And yet religion, he says, must be before all things 'historical.' So glaring is this inconsistency that some of the ablest of the so-called Ritschlian school, such as Kaftan, lay great stress on 'the exalted Christ,' though they still refuse any respect to the Logos-Christology.

Church history, written under the influence of this static theory of revelation, must needs be a depressing record of deterioration and corruption. Even Harnack's great *History of Dogma*, (though Harnack is too independent a thinker to be called without qualification a Ritschlian), takes the standpoint that later developments were a 'secularisation' and 'depotentialisation' of the original Gospel. We are always to look back, not forward, for our inspiration.

The older Roman Catholic apologetic did not differ very

much from Anglicanism or Protestantism in the respect which it paid to primitive authority. The chief difference is that Scholasticism, as represented by St. Thomas Aquinas, gives a larger place to human reason in corroborating revelation. The authorised Catholic apologetic does not rest everything on authority. On the contrary, St. Thomas maintains that the being and chief attributes of God might be demonstrated, even apart from revelation, by ordinary reason. There is therefore in his system no disparateness between reason and authority. Authority supplements reason, and reason interprets authority. But the Nominalists who followed Duns Scotus cut authority loose from its moorings, and erected it into a wholly independent principle of belief. Duns Scotus himself, and still more Occam and Alexander of Hales, are as sceptical of the old proofs of God's existence as Kant himself, and unlike Kant they fall back not on the practical reason, but on bare authority. Occam declares that monotheism is, on intellectual grounds, only a more probable theory than polytheism. God's will, according to Scotus, cannot be ascertained from our moral sense; it is imparted to us only in revelation. Thomas Aquinas had himself abandoned the position of Bonaventura and Albert the Great, who had undertaken to prove the beginning of the world in time. The Creation, and the doctrine of the Trinity, must be believed, he says, 'by Faith alone.' This was a dangerous concession, which the Nominalists made the most of, carrying the same principle over to other dogmas. It was not intended, I think, by any of the Schoolmen to cut authority loose from the past, as well as from reason; but the Nominalist theory gave the Church a free hand to order anything to be believed. The privilege of interpreting tradition infallibly is not far from the privilege of determining it. The time came when Pio Nono could say, 'I am tradition.'

The recognition of development, of the 'dynamic'

principle as it is called in contrast with the 'static' theory that dogma can undergo no change, is modern in apologetics. It laid strong hold on Newman when he had freed himself from the false position in which he had remained for some years. He set himself to prove that Catholic theology is a legitimate development, and not a corruption, of the primitive Faith. Now, what are the tests of a legitimate development? The first test, Newman tells us, is the preservation of the type; the second, the continuity of principles. Thirdly, doctrines must have the power of assimilation, like living organisms. They will also show anticipations of further development, to be fully exhibited hereafter. Next, they will show logical sequence, not that political evolution proceeds logically, but when it is accomplished, we can see that a kind of unconscious logic has determined its course. Next, the new doctrines must tend to establish and illustrate, not to contradict, the original creed. Lastly, it bears the test of time. Heresies flourish and then disappear; the truth continues.

We cannot help feeling how far superior this is to the static theory of revelation. Nothing is more clear about our Lord's ministry than that He designed to give mankind not a code of legislation, but a standard of values; that He laid down principles which future ages were to apply and work out, not a fixed rule to which the religious future of the race was to be forced to conform. The whole conception of the office and work of the Holy Ghost which we find in the New Testament, especially in the Fourth Gospel, involves the clearest grasp of the principle of development which had up to that time been contemplated.

Nor can we find fault with the argument that the collective inspiration of a great society is an easier thing to believe in and to defend than the inspired private judgment of individuals. Authority may claim to be the right of the race against the individual; it may claim to be the conscience or the intelligence of the race, which

develops indeed in a natural and legitimate manner from generation to generation, and from century to century, but stores up and hands on the acquisitions of the past in a way which is not possible to the private inquirer who will take nothing for granted. If Christ promised that the Holy Spirit would be always present to guide the Church, may we not assume that He would have prevented the Church, in her corporate capacity, from taking any serious false steps ?

The weak point of Newman's argument is very apparent to all who are not Roman Catholics, though within his own communion it is less obvious, because of the aristocratic contempt which prevents its members from paying any attention to other forms of Christianity. 'Catholicism,' says Dom Cuthbert Butler, in an article in the *Hibbert Journal* intended for the religious public generally, 'Catholicism, and, for Western Europe, Roman Catholicism, is *the religion* into which, as a matter of fact, the religion of Christ and His Apostles has grown.' It was this assumption that lent so great a weight to the words *securus iudicat orbis terrarum*, which seemed to Newman decisive against Anglicanism and in favour of Rome. But how strangely narrow the outlook which sees no alternative except between atheism and the Vatican ! Newman's *orbis terrarum* is, as I have said elsewhere, a dwindling and harassed minority in a few countries round the Mediterranean sea. It comprises, broadly speaking, the Latinised part of the Roman Empire ; and within those limits, though it has been fairly successful in suppressing other forms of Christianity, it has not succeeded in retaining either the masses or the 'intellectuals.' If then the ultimate test of a creed is its vitality, the argument recoils with fatal force on Newman's own head.

Newman is not insensible to the fact that this very argument has led many to reject Roman Catholicism,

because history seems to prove that it is not compatible with social and intellectual progress beyond a certain stage. He meets this objection by rejecting modern civilisation as a huge mistake. He would prefer, he says, to see people much more bigoted and superstitious than they are, for a dishonest Irish beggar woman, who is chaste and goes to Mass, is better than an honourable English gentleman whose ideals are, after all, secular. It is enough to say in reply to this, that it is a complete abandonment of his test. He begins by saying, 'The great world shall judge'; and ends by saying, 'If the world decides against Rome, so much the worse for the world.'

Newman is claimed as one of the inspirers of the modern Liberal movement in the Roman Church, though he would have recoiled in horror from the critical conclusions of Loisy and his friends. One passage will be enough to prove this. 'First of all,' writes the Cardinal, many years after joining the Roman Church, '*ex abundanti cautela* [that is, as something almost too obvious to need stating], every Catholic holds that the Christian dogmas were in the Church from the time of the Apostles; that they were ever in their substance what they are now.'¹ There is an essential difference between this theory of apparent development which excludes real changes and the Modernist theory of an idea clothing itself in new forms from age to age.

That movement rests partly on a dynamic conception of authority, carried to the pitch of admitting the right and power of the Church to change its creed and dogmas if necessary, and partly on the agnostic position that human reason cannot go beyond phenomena, from which the corollary is drawn that whatever helps souls may be taken as true, or as near the truth as we can get. This latter contention belongs to a later chapter of our inquiry—viz.

¹ Quoted by Bishop Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 186.

the practical, or pragmatic, ground of Faith, and I will try to give you a fair account of the position of the Liberal Catholics when we come to that branch of our subject. Here I am dealing with the claim of one branch of the Christian Church to be the sole trustee of a definite supernatural gift—the power of pronouncing infallibly and authoritatively on matters of Faith. And our conclusion is that there never has been, and never will be, any corporation which can decide such questions *ex cathedra*. I am not disputing the right of any society to impose its own conditions of membership; that is quite a different thing; but there is nowhere any man or institution which can impose silence upon the moral and intellectual protests of the human mind, in the name of some still higher authority. There is nowhere any dogma which is exempt from examination, because it is guaranteed to be *de fide*.

The Modernist position with regard to authority may be thus summarised. 'Religion, like everything else that lives, is subject to the law of growth, which involves change. The God of the Old Testament differs widely from the Father whom Christ preached, and the formulas of our day differ in meaning, if not in form, from the *regula fidei* of the early Church. Jesus Himself believed in an approaching 'end of the age,' a catastrophic inauguration of a 'kingdom of God' upon earth. It is therefore impossible to suppose that He meant to organise and legislate for the coming centuries. In the Gospels, as in the rest of Scripture, the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. But this law of change is not inconsistent with the authority of belief. For though truth is changeless, its image as reflected in human minds continually alters. The living Faith is the important thing; the forms which it employs in the vain attempt to be articulate are mutable and imperfect.' The Catholic Modernist differs from such Protestant writers as Harnack

and Sabatier, with whom, in other ways, he has much in common, in that he has no wish to discard the luxuriant growth of dogma and return to a fabled 'primitive simplicity.' He does not find in the historical Jesus the basis for a working faith; he cannot admit that the interpretation of His life and teaching given by German Protestantism is historically true; but he is content with the incontestable fact that a great institution has come into existence, and flourished for nearly two thousand years, which has created a series of dogmas, the products of its 'faith and love,' dogmas which have been necessary for its existence, and which therefore are valid until they cease to perform their office. This is really opportunism *in excelsis*. The seat of authority is the verdict of history, and in history no judgment is final. 'The visible Church,' writes Mr. Tyrrell in his *Much-abused Letter*, 'is but a means, a way, a creature, to be used where it helps, to be left where it hinders. . . . Who have taught us that the consensus of theologians cannot err, but the theologians themselves? Mortal, fallible, ignorant men like ourselves. . . . Their present domination is but a passing episode in the Church's history. . . . May not history repeat itself [as in the transition from Judaism to Christianity]? Is God's arm shortened that He should not again, out of the very stones, raise up children unto Abraham? May not Catholicism, like Judaism, have to die in order that it may live again in a greater and grander form? Has not every organism got its limits of development, after which it must decay and be content to survive in its progeny? Wine-skins stretch, but only within measure; for there comes at last a bursting-point when new ones must be provided.' In a note to justify this startling passage he explains: 'The Church of the Catacombs became the Church of the Vatican; who can tell what the Church of the Vatican may not turn into?'

The spectacle presented by the Modernist movement is a very interesting one. The principle of authority as the custodian of primitive tradition, which was so admirably successful in maintaining discipline and unity, ended in binding the Roman Church hand and foot in chains of her own forging. And so the Pope claimed the right to declare and interpret 'tradition' in his own way. Thus authority turned against itself; and the liberty of the Papacy has let loose the unbounded licence of the Modernists. 'The differences between the larval and final stages of many an insect,' says Mr. Tyrrell again, 'are often far greater than those which separate kind from kind.' And so this chameleon of a Church, which has changed its colour so completely since the Gospel was preached in the subterranean galleries of Rome, may undergo another transformation and come to believe in M. Loisy's God, who is 'never encountered in history.' The warning against putting new wine into old wine-skins is somewhat rashly introduced into such a programme!

We are, then, able to see in the Roman Church of to-day the bankruptcy of the old theory of authority. The theory of a 'static' revelation given to the Church long ago has been proved to be untenable, both historically and politically. And if, abandoning this old position, the inspiration of the Church is explained to mean the continuous inspiration of its earthly head, the questions cannot fail to be asked, Is autocracy the divinely ordained government for the Church? Is it so certain that the Holy Spirit speaks only through the mouth of the Bishop of Rome? With this doubt disappears the possibility of confident reliance on the authority of the Church, as a primary ground of Faith.

The true 'Church,' as the depositary of inspiration in matters of belief and practice, is the whole body of men and women who have any enlightenment in such matters. This Church has no accredited organ, and claims no finality

for its utterances. It does homage to the past, not to fetter its own future, but to preserve the knowledge and experience already gained, which are easily lost through carelessness or presumption. Ideally, this Church is the Divine Spirit immanent in humanity. This identification of the Church with the indwelling Holy Spirit is ancient, but it is far too great a privilege to be claimed by any ecclesiastical corporation.

But though we cannot for a moment admit that infallibility resides in the decisions of any man or any council, present or past, it would not be easy to overestimate the advantages of venerable traditions in matters of Faith. Each age is liable to be carried away by some dominant idea, which soon becomes a superstition, as 'progress' did in the nineteenth century. Authority has a steadying influence, forbidding as to ignore doctrines which for the time are unpopular, and preserving, to some extent, 'the proportion of Faith.' In these high matters the dead as well as the living have a right to speak ; and respect for authority is the courtesy which we pay to the voices of ' famous men and our fathers that begat us.'

CHAPTER VII

AUTHORITY AS A GROUND OF FAITH—*continued*

IN this lecture I wish to consider further the relations of Faith and Authority. We have considered the theory of an infallible authority vested in the Church, and have shown how, just as in the Roman Empire authority became more and more centralised until the emperor became a sultan, so in the Roman Church authority has come to be vested in one man. When this one man says, 'I am tradition,' the last restrictions on autocracy have been removed, for the 'living voice of the Church' is independent of the past. Thus the principle of authority, in completing its evolution, turns against and destroys itself. At the same time, the *regula fidei*, in the hands of some bold reformers, has become independent of existential fact. The only authority is the course of history, and the Church is a Proteus who justifies each metamorphosis in turn by the plea *Il faut vivre*. These two developments may be said to constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of Church authority as an independent ground of Faith.

We have now to consider the Protestant alternative to the infallible Church—the infallible Book. 'The Bible,' said Chillingworth, 'is the religion of Protestants.'¹

Plato long ago exposed the necessary limitations of the written word as a guide. 'When they are once written down,' he says, 'words are tumbled about anywhere

¹ The words are written on his tombstone, but they do not deserve to be perpetuated, for they are false. Protestantism is the democracy of religion. Not the Bible, but belief in the inspiration of the individual is the religion of Protestants.

among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not; and if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.' ¹ There is another kind of writing, he goes on, graven on the tablets of the mind, of which the written word is no more than an image. This kind is alive; it has a soul; and it can defend itself. The wisdom of these utterances has been amply proved by the history of the doctrine of Inspiration in the Christian Church. ²

It was not till long after the Captivity that the religion of Israel became the religion of a Book. While prophetism flourished, the living word of the prophet was more than the written scroll; but no sooner had the fount of prophecy began to run dry than rigid and mechanical views of inspiration began to be applied to the sacred literature. The canonisation of the Law, which began in 621, was accomplished for all time in 444 B.C. The historical books, called the 'former prophets,' obtained nearly their final form during the exile, but the text was not inviolable till long afterwards. The list of prophetic books, the 'latter prophets,' was closed about 200 B.C., according to Cornill. ³ The third section of the Canon contains second century writings, but they were all supposed to be much earlier. The Canon was practically settled more than a century before the birth of our Lord. ⁴ It excluded certain books, like Ecclesiasticus, which revealed their late origin, while admitting the pseudonymous Daniel and Ecclesiastes. The Book of

¹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, p. 275.

² There is a remarkable echo of this passage in Milton (*Christian Doctrine* i. p. 30). 'It is difficult to conjecture the purpose of Providence in committing the writings of the New Testament to such uncertain and varying guardianship, unless it were to teach us that the Spirit which is given to us is a more certain guide than Scripture, whom therefore it is our duty to follow.'

³ *Introduction to the Canonical Books of the Old Testament*, p. 476. Cf. also *Encyclopædia Biblica*, p. 665.

⁴ So Bishop Ryle thinks; but no certainty has been arrived at.

Wisdom can have been excluded only because it was written in Greek. The scribes seem to have acted on the belief that the age of inspired prophecy was now past, and not to have purposely admitted any recent work. The grandson of the son of Sirach does not dare to claim for his grandfather's book so much inspiration as the latter clearly believed himself to have possessed. The Canon was being closed.

But the rigid doctrine of inspiration was not formulated at once, as is shown by the state of the text of the LXX.¹ Only by degrees were the other Scriptures raised to the same position as the Law.

Meanwhile, the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture was at once making the written word more august, and removing objections to belief in its divine character. Hatch has shown that this method is Greek in its origin, and goes back as far as the fifth century B.C.² Plato deprecates it. 'It would take a long and laborious and not very happy lifetime,' says Socrates, to find the allegorical value of all the old myths. It was, however, pursued by apologists for the Pagan legends; and when the Alexandrian Jews adopted Greek culture, they found the same method serviceable in meeting objections to their own sacred literature. Philo is our great instance of this, which he calls 'the method of the Greek mysteries.' In his hands 'every living figure who passes across the stage of Scripture ceases for all practical purposes to be himself, and becomes a dim personification. Moses is intelligence; Aaron is speech; Enoch is repentance; Noah righteousness. Abraham is virtue acquired by learning; Isaac is innate virtue; Jacob is virtue obtained by struggle; Lot is sensuality; Ishmael is sophistry; Esau is rude disobedience; Leah is patient virtue; Rachel innocence.'³ Thus the whole Bible becomes an insipid

¹ Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 262.

² *Hibbert Lectures*, 1888, p. 59.

³ Farrar, *History of Interpretation*, p. 145.

ethical and metaphysical romance, the interpretation of which is either an arbitrary fancy or a learned science.

The Apostolic Fathers are almost equally absurd in their exegesis; but they propound no theory of inspiration. Justin Martyr is the first to use the figure of a man playing on a harp, which he says, is like the manner in which the Divine Spirit uses righteous men, to make what sound he will.¹ The use of allegory was first elaborated (with reference to Christian literature) by the Gnostics, and is opposed by Tertullian. But it took firm root in Alexandria; and this was one of the most characteristic differences between the Alexandrian school and that of Antioch which discouraged allegorism. Irenaeus advocates the most mechanical view of inspiration; Tertullian lays more stress on the character of the medium chosen.² Origen's principles of exegesis permit him to acknowledge many discrepancies in the New Testament. There are many incidents in the Gospel, he says plainly, which are not literally true. As the evolution of Catholicism proceeded, the authority of the Church, and of the 'tradition' guarded by the Church, grew steadily at the expense of the Bible. The authority of the latter was not disputed, but it was ignored; the majority had small opportunities of even knowing what the Scriptures contained. The Schoolmen improved upon Origen's allegorism by finding a *fourfold* sense in Holy Scripture—literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogical. Their subservience to Patristic exegesis is quite Talmudic. Alcuin says that he has written '*cautissimo stylo providens ne quid contrarium Patrum sensibus ponerem.*'

So matters stood when the Reformation came. By the Reformers allegorism was attacked at once, especially in England. Tyndale writes very sensibly: 'We may

¹ Athenagoras, *Leg.* 9, uses the same figure. Hippolytus, too, retains it, but guards it against the error that the prophet loses his senses while under inspiration.

² Cf. Bethune Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, p. 46.

borrow similitudes or allegories from the Scriptures, and apply them to our purposes; which allegories are no sense of the Scriptures, but free things besides the Scriptures altogether in the liberty of the Spirit. Such allegory proveth nothing; it is a mere simile. God is a Spirit, and all His words are spiritual, and His literal sense is spiritual.' ¹ So Colet says: 'The New Testament has for the most part the sense that appears on the surface; nor is one thing said and another meant, but the very thing is meant which is said, and the sense is wholly literal.'

In Germany, Luther also pronounced against allegorism, and with his habitual intemperance of language described allegory as mere 'monkey-tricks,' 'dirt' or 'scum.' We may follow St. Paul's example, he says, and occasionally use allegories as spangles and pretty ornaments, but that is all.

This return to sane methods of interpretation was dearly purchased. The allegorical method had become very futile in the hands of the schoolmen; but for Origen it was a means of accommodation by which moral and other difficulties in Holy Scripture could be set aside. The theory of verbal inspiration was far less difficult under medieval Catholicism than for a modern Protestant, for the literal sense could be disregarded in favour of some fanciful, but edifying interpretation. The combination of the *literal sense* with verbal inspiration first appeared at the Reformation; ² and it has been the great weakness of Protestantism ever since. Of course, the system could not be consistently applied. Luther himself, very naturally but very inconsistently, introduced a new allegorism. His six rules of hermeneutics are:—(1) necessity of grammatical knowledge; (2) importance of taking into consideration times and

¹ Farrar, *History of Interpretation*, p. 300.

² Cf. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. vii. p. 247.

circumstances ; (So St. Augustine says very truly 'distingue tempora et concordabis Scripturas.') (3) necessity of observing the context ; (4) need of Faith and spiritual illumination ; (5) need of keeping the 'proportion of Faith' ; (6) all Scripture must be explained with reference to Christ.¹ This last canon comes in very oddly, and necessitates feats of exegesis that are quite worthy of Philo, Origen, or the Rabbis. Even so, he could not find Christ equally in all the books ; and in consequence he adopted a very bold tone in respect to some of them, not only refusing to believe that Solomon wrote the Canticles, but stigmatising St. James as 'a right strawy epistle.' The Apocalypse he believed not to be inspired, and Jude to be a late second-hand document. This fearless criticism contrasts oddly with his reverence for the letter of Scripture,² and points to the construction of a new Canon, composed on critical grounds. The Pentateuch he of course accepted, but doubted the Mosaic authorship, and regarded this part of the Bible as of very little authority for Christians. 'We will neither see nor hear Moses ; for Moses was only given to the Jewish people, and does not concern us Gentiles and Christians.' In fact, we can only describe Luther's attitude towards the Scriptures as a mass of inconsistencies. His theory of inspiration was mainly a residuum of his Catholic training. On the other hand, his view of Faith is really independent of this belief, being based on the subjective assurance of the Christian consciousness. This consciousness is therefore a parallel authority with the Scriptures. The Word of God is to be found partly in the Bible, partly in the consciousness of the Christian. He really cares little for any part of the Bible which cannot be 'referred to Christ.'

Calvin is a much greater expositor than Luther ; but his

¹ Farrar, p. 332.

² 'One letter of Scripture,' he said, 'is of more consequence than heaven or earth.'

view of the authority of Scripture is even more ambiguous. He seems to admit of no difference in value between the various parts of Scripture, while at the same time he asserts verbal inspiration, and yet rejects with scorn the whole ceremonial law.

Meanwhile, the Council of Trent was defining its theory of Inspiration. It is a remarkable fact that up to this time the Canon had never been fixed. Not only were the books of the Apocrypha included in the Old Testament, in disagreement with the Hebrew Canon, to which the Reformers reverted, but other books, such as the Shepherd of Hermas, were included in some manuscripts in use. The Council rejected these, but rehabilitated the Apocrypha, and declared that Hebrews was written by St. Paul. With regard to the authority of Holy Scripture, the Council declared : ' That truth and discipline are contained in the books of Scripture and in unwritten traditions, which, having been received from Christ's own lips by the Apostles, or transmitted as it were manually by the Apostles themselves, under the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down to us.' Thus Scripture and tradition are put side by side as parallel authorities. This was a new thing, and was no doubt devised to defeat the Protestants. The authority of the Church is not mentioned in this sentence, but assuredly is not forgotten. It was enacted that ' every one shall be obliged to adhere to the sense of Holy Scripture to which the holy mother Church adheres, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of Holy Scripture, and no one shall dare to set himself up against the unanimous consent of the Fathers.' It was not said how the opinion of mother Church is to be arrived at : the time was not come for openly proclaiming that the Pope is the Church.

The history of the Roman Church since the Reformation has been a record of the constantly growing weight ascribed to tradition, at the expense of the written word. A fully

developed traditionalism has no need of an inspired book, which might, indeed, have been very inconvenient but for the prerogative claimed by the Church, that is, by the Pope and his Council, of interpreting the Bible exactly as they pleased, free from any questioning of their decisions. But this gift of infallible interpretation is not often needed, for the Scriptures are too little known, and too little valued, in the modern Roman Church, to enter into serious competition with Catholic tradition.

It might be supposed that the Roman Church would have seen and utilised the immense advantage which their system possesses, as compared with those of the Protestant bodies, in being independent of any theory of inspiration. It might be supposed that they would have granted to their students a liberty in dealing with problems of Biblical criticism greater than has been generally conceded in Protestant Churches ; and that they would thus have been able to claim that Catholicism, on this side, puts far less strain on the intellect than orthodox Protestantism. They might have taken this course without in any way endangering the real foundations on which the authority of their system rests. Such, however, has not been their policy. Since the accession of the present Pope, the most uncritical notions about the Bible have been reaffirmed and made binding on all Catholics. The books of the Bible, it is declared, were all written by their traditional authors. The Pentateuch did not gradually grow into its present form. The Patristic expositors were superior in learning and piety, and in their methods of exegesis, to the scholars of the nineteenth century. No concession whatever is made to ' Modernism ' on this side, any more than on any other.

The Pope's advisers are perhaps not so ill-advised as most Englishmen think. The expostulations of the intellect have already been so thoroughly trampled on in that Church that a small additional burden is not worth considering ;

while if Liberalism is allowed to gain a foothold anywhere, it may be difficult in the future to say, 'Thus far shalt thou go and no further.' In any case the result is that in the Roman Church, though no independent authority remains to the Scriptures, its members are tied to an even more rigid and irrational theory of inspiration than that which has prevailed in the Reformed Churches.

Among the German Protestants the comparative freedom of Luther's own teaching about the Bible soon gave way to an iron, or wooden, scholasticism. In their controversy with Rome they needed a rival oracle, and found it in the Bible. Bibliolatry was soon in full flood. To speak of solecisms in the style of the New Testament writers was blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. Hellenistic Greek was not poor Greek; it was holy Greek—a form of speech peculiar to God.¹ The vowel points and accents of the Hebrew Bible were directly inspired. Not a single word of the Gospel narrative comes short of absolute accuracy. Moreover, magical powers came to be attributed to the Bible. Just as some humanists had consulted *sortes Vergilianæ*, so both the Wesley brothers advocated this mode of divination with a Bible when in difficulty.

The Lutheran mystics, Frank and Weigel, protested in vain against this bibliolatry. 'It is an abuse and superstition,' says Frank, 'to treat Scripture as every one is in the habit of doing, to make it into an oracle, as though we were no longer to ask counsel of the Holy Spirit, no longer to resort to God about anything, but only to Scripture.' And Weigel wrote: 'Knowledge must well out from within, and must not be introduced merely by a book, for this is in vain. It is the most mischievous deception when that which is most important is rejected. We put out a person's own eye, and then try to persuade him that he ought to see with some one else's eye.'²

¹ Farrar, p. 374.

² Cf. Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, i, p. 11.

So Protestantism rapidly fell back under the tutelage of the weak and beggarly elements, and became, like its rival, a religion of authority. The nemesis has been severe. Our false views of inspiration gave us many searchings of heart during the last half of the nineteenth century; they survive to cripple the usefulness of the noble Evangelical party, which in this country still shows an unfortunate antipathy to modern Biblical scholarship; and they have alienated an incalculable amount of devotion and energy which ought to have been at the service of the Church.

The theory of verbal inspiration is indeed more incapable of defence than the theory of an infallible Head of the Church. The writers of the sacred literature certainly make no such claim for themselves; nor can their inerrancy be proved by internal evidence. The Bible, in fact, needs another authority to guarantee its authority; and where can Protestants find such a guarantee? In the Roman Church, as we have seen, the Canon was not finally fixed till the Council of Trent, and the Vatican now is content to enjoin the acceptance of current traditions as to authorship, etc., with a contemptuous disregard for the weight of evidence. In earlier times it was necessary to use one's private judgment, giving due weight to authority. Augustine says: 'In regard to the Canonical Scriptures let him follow the authority of as many as possible of the Catholic Churches, among which, of course, are those which are of Apostolic foundation, or were thought worthy of having Epistles addressed to them. He will therefore follow this rule as to the Canonical Scriptures, to prefer those which are accepted by all the Catholic Churches to those which are accepted only by some; and among those which are not accepted by all to prefer those which the greater and more important Churches accept to those which are accepted by fewer Churches, or those of less authority.'¹ At this period, authenticity was rightly re-

¹ Augustine, *De Doctr. Christi*, ii. p. 8.

garded as of small moment. Jerome says that it does not matter who wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews, since in any case it is the work of a Church-writer, and is constantly read in the Churches.¹ The acceptance or rejection of doubtful books was largely determined by their agreement or disagreement with the beliefs of the Church, and with undisputed Canonical writings.

The Reformers could not accept the living Catholic Church as the authority for Biblical inspiration, nor did it occur to them to have recourse to the verdict of the undivided Church—that distinctively Anglican theory. To judge the Bible 'like any other book' would have been fatal to the position in which they wished to place it, as an oracle to be obeyed without question. Accordingly, they fell back, for the most part, on what they called the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, which for them was not the voice of the Church, but the feeling of assurance and comfort awakened in the heart of the believer by the perusal of the sacred pages. The Westminster Confession thus states the grounds for believing in the authority of Scripture: 'We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of Holy Scripture, and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.'

Now this is an admirable statement of what revelation through the Bible really is. The 'testimony of the Holy

¹ Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 52.

Spirit' is the response of our inmost personality to the external stimulus supplied by the inspired literature. This testimony I have argued to be the primary ground of Faith. It is 'God working in us,' and working through concrete experiences of various kinds, as it appears that He always does work. But this is not a theory of inspiration which can either erect Scripture into an oracle for determining off-hand difficult matters of conduct, or which can cut the knot of critical problems. The Holy Spirit testifies that the character and teaching of Jesus Christ are divine, and that we may follow Him and believe in Him with perfect confidence. It certainly does not testify that the Mosaic account of creation is scientifically correct, or that the book of Daniel was written in the sixth century B.C.

The theory of a written oracle is, in fact, another instance of the almost universal tendency to arrest the normal development of Faith at a certain point. We need a light to show us our way, and it is granted to us; but then, instead of using it, we shut our eyes and ask to be led like blind men. Clement saw this very clearly when he defined Faith as σύντομος γνώσις, and spoke of it as an expedient for 'men in a hurry.' That definition would disparage Faith, if he had not added that knowledge is πίστις ἐπιστημονική. It is true that we must act before we know, but knowledge will come by acting, if we keep our eyes open. If Faith meant belief in the efficacy of magic, it would not lead to knowledge.

The theory of verbal Inspiration is essentially *static*. It assumes that revelation is permanent only in its effects. Also, it admits of no degrees in inspiration. Nothing can be more contrary either to the modern way of reading history, or to the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: 'God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son.' Revelation is gradual, progressive, and admits of

degrees. It is personal. It is given through men who are able to receive it, and in proportion as they are able to receive it. Prophecy is conditioned by the spiritual capacity of the prophet, not by the arbitrary choice of God, selecting no matter whom as His mouthpiece. The true prophet is not inspired when in a state of frenzy or ecstasy, like the Delphic oracle. (We find in the early Church a very decided dislike of ecstatic prophecy ; it is discouraged already by St. Paul.) The inspired man is he who sees the world—the world of his own knowledge and experience—more nearly as God sees it than other men do. He interprets events according to their deepest meaning. We may say, if we choose, that he sees what he sees *sub specie aeternitatis*. He certainly so interprets what to him is the present as to throw a flood of light on what to him is the future. But plenary inspiration has never been given to any mere man. Inspired writers see further into the nature of things than other men ; but they have their limitations. The reporters of Jesus Christ are obviously unable to understand all that He wished to impart ; He is driven again and again to remonstrate with those who heard Him. ‘ O fools and slow of heart ! ’ ‘ Are ye so without understanding ? ’ We are driven every now and then to criticise even the Gospels from themselves, or rather from our knowledge of Christ and His Gospel ; *e.g.* it is not likely that, after declining to give the ‘ sign ’ which the multitude demanded, He at once proceeded to refer to Jonah and the whale, and promised to give them a sign of the same order. It is not likely that He ever said, ‘ Tell it unto the Church,’ when no Church existed. He can hardly have used the expression, ‘ From the days of John the Baptist until now,’ when He Himself lived in the days of John the Baptist. No ; there is no infallibility of this kind about the sacred records. The men were inspired, but they were not raised above the intellectual limitations of their times and of their own endowments. Christ never intended to shut up

His Gospel in a book. The Spirit of Truth was to be the main factor in the Faith of the Church. He was to interpret and call to remembrance the deposit of oral teaching enshrined in the Gospels, but also to develop it in a manner which would have been unintelligible to the first disciples. The Christian view of inspiration, so long as it is true to the intentions of Christ, is dynamic; and this involves a continuous moral and intellectual activity on the part of those who receive the revelation.

Revelation and inspiration are the same thing viewed from different standpoints.¹ Revelation is the word we use when we view the matter from the side of God, inspiration when we view it from the side of man.² And both must be regarded as living, active processes. It is not possible to receive revelation passively, whether it comes through a book or in any other manner. And in order to receive it actively, in such a way as to make it our own and respond to it, we must bring to it the best of ourselves, the reasonable service of all our faculties. The more certain we are that the revelation is divine, the more convinced we ought to be that it makes an exacting demand upon us to understand and profit by it. God does not throw His best gifts at our heads, nor does He give us anything to save us the trouble of finding it. At the same time, we are not given conundrums to guess in matters of vital importance. We may accept Chrysostom's maxim (*Comm. in 2 Thess.*) that 'all necessary things are clear' (πάντα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δῆλα), though certainly not the preceding word that 'everything in Scripture is clear and straightforward.' And we shall miss much if we are satisfied with the 'plain, necessary things.' Erasmus's

¹ Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, vol. i. p. 168.

² Dr. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 496 *seq.*, reverses this. 'God inspires, man reveals. Inspiration is the process by which God gives; revelation is the mode or form in which man embodies what he has received.' This is to use 'revelation' in a forced and unusual sense, which even the authority of Martineau can hardly justify.

advice for the study of the Bible is good. '*Adsit pia curiositas et curiosa pietas.*'

The desire for an infallible guide is so strong in the human heart that it often causes distress and disappointment to show that the inspired records were drawn up by fallible human beings; that the selection of the Canonical Books was made by fallible men, who, in certain cases in the Old Testament, and in at least one case (that of 2 Peter) in the New Testament, appear to have been deceived by documents which claimed a greater antiquity and authority than they possess; and lastly that unless the reader of the Bible is also infallible and miraculously protected against human infirmity, there is no guarantee that he may not entirely misunderstand what he reads. But those who feel distress cannot have understood the nature of Faith. An infallible oracle would destroy the possibility of Faith, or at least would finally arrest its growth at the point where the revelation was made. The '*Bible of the race*'¹ is not yet fully written; and our powers of understanding all that is already written are limited. And we must not forget that an exaggerated view of the infallibility of Holy Writ depresses and deprives of authority all the other channels through which we are justified in believing that the divine will is made known to us. I do not refer only to the writings of great and good men outside the Canon, and even outside the Christian Church, to whom a minor degree of inspiration may be attributed without any disrespect to the Bible, but to divine revelation through science, through art, through the beauties of nature, through the course of history, and so forth. Make any one of these infallible and exclusive, and the rest lose their value.

Our conclusion then is, that, as in the case of the infallible Church, so in the case of the infallible Book, the attempt to make authority a primary ground of Faith has failed.

¹ Lowell: '*Slowly the Bible of the race is writ.*'

Revelation and inspiration, being really two aspects of the same process, can never be separated from each other. Revelation, like inspiration, is a process, not a static condition. There are adequate reasons for putting the Bible in a class by itself, above all other books; but not for regarding it as the primary ground of Faith. The only word that our Lord ever wrote, so far as we know, was traced with His finger on the unrecording ground. It was not His will that His religion should be, like Islam, the religion of a book. He wrote His message on the hearts of a few faithful men, where it was not to be imprisoned in Hebrew or Greek characters, but was to germinate like a seed in fruitful soil. 'The words which I have spoken to you,' says the Johannine Christ, 'they are spirit and they are life.'

The office of authority in religion is essentially educational. Like every good teacher, it should labour to make itself superfluous. The instructor should not rest content till his pupil says, 'Now I believe, not on thy saying, but because I see and know for myself.'

Theology is the most conservative of the sciences, and among other tendencies of bygone days it has retained a timid and superstitious reverence for the written word, whether it be text or commentary. Too many theologians persist in looking back, though the people are looking forward. They look back, and they pay the penalty for doing so, like Lot's wife. The deserts of theological literature are strewn with these dreary pillars of salt. Commentaries on the Old and New Testaments, full of palpably absurd explanations borrowed from the Fathers; books on dogmatic theology constructed on the same principles; anxious researches into the liturgies and ritual of the Middle Ages with a view to careful imitation—all alike show how potent the dead hand is in matters of religion. The scribe who is instructed to the Kingdom of Heaven, said our Lord, is like a householder who brings out of his

treasure things new and old. The wise scribe does not, however, bring forth some things that are new and other things that are old, but he gives a new life to things that are old (for indeed we cannot truly believe in our authority unless we believe *with* it—the truth must be born anew in the heart of every believer), and he discerns the ancient, eternal truth of what seems to be new. In part, our objection to orthodox dogmatism is that it does not go back far enough. ‘*Res ipsa, quae nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nec defuit ab initio generis humani, quousque ipse Christus veniret in carne, unde vera religio, quae iam erat, coepit appellari Christiana.*’¹

The ultimate authority, which alone is infallible, is the eternal and living Truth.

¹ Augustine, *Retract.* i. 13, 3.

CHAPTER VIII

AUTHORITY BASED ON JESUS CHRIST

WE have discussed two great historic attempts to make Faith rest on external authority. We have investigated the claims of the infallible Church and of the infallible Book, and have found them both defective. At the same time we have found that each contains a true principle. The authority of the Church, rightly understood, is the authority of the redeemed race, the elect—the stored spiritual experience of humanity. The authority of the Book, rightly understood, is the authority of the records of revelation, the testimony of those who have been inspired, to whom truth has been revealed. Neither authority is, or can be, absolute or infallible; for there is no way of escape from the objection that an infallible authority requires infallibility in the recipient as well as in the author of the revelation. If such infallibility were in the possession of any man or any institution, there would be no room for Faith.

My subject in these lectures is Faith, not the Christian Faith. But I have naturally taken my examples from our own religion, and as my aim in choosing this subject is not purely speculative, but also practical, I have felt no scruple in approaching each department of it mainly from the side which is familiar to thoughtful persons in our own age and country. And having said so much about the Catholic Church and the Bible, as the alleged seats of authority in matters of Faith, I feel that I cannot

leave the subject without considering, however cursorily and inadequately, what for very many Christians, and in a sense for all Christians, is the ultimate court of appeal, viz. neither the Church nor the Bible as a whole, but the recorded utterances of Jesus Christ, and, in matters of conduct, what those records tell us of His example and character.

I shall maintain that there is a sense in which every Christian must own the authority of Christ as the primary ground of his faith. It is not enough even to say that Christ is our primary *authority*, leaving it open to admit other grounds of Faith besides authority. But it will be necessary to explain how this is consistent with my thesis that the primary ground of Faith is an instinct or faculty which impels us to seek and find God. We must also remember that, in connecting the name of Christ with what is primary and essential in Faith, we must be careful not to do less than justice to what is true and spiritual and genuinely religious in non-Christian ages and countries, and in high-minded Agnostics among ourselves. I hope, before the end of these lectures, to deal with both these difficulties.

What kind of authority did Christ Himself claim, so far as we can judge from the Gospels? We know that it was a distinguishing feature of His teaching, that He taught 'as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.' The doctrine of the Scribes was founded on documents, traditions, *responsa prudentum*; that of Christ was fresh from the mint; it was all at first hand, clean-cut and unhesitating. He also required that His disciples should adopt a definite attitude towards His Person. They were to 'take up the cross and follow Him.' For His sake and the Gospel's, they were to be ready to sacrifice all earthly goods, and life itself. They were never to be ashamed of Him and His words, on pain of being disowned at the great day. An action done in His name is meritorious; a friendly act done to Him has the same value as an act done for God

Himself, who sent Him. That man is blessed, who shall not be offended in Him. He is the stone on whom whosoever shall fall shall be broken, and on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall scatter him as chaff. These sayings are all from the Synoptics. In the Fourth Gospel this personal claim is even more dominant and all-embracing.

In His teaching He calmly sets aside even the revered law of Moses in one particular after another. 'Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you'—something quite different. 'Ye call Me Master and Lord, and ye say well, for so I am,' He tells His disciples. In spite of His meekness and gentleness He rebukes sharply any one, no matter whom, who presumes to offer Him advice. Two of the severest rebuffs recorded in the Gospels are inflicted upon His Mother and the foremost of His disciples for attempting to suggest to Him what He should do. So far as we can judge from our records He claimed absolute obedience, unqualified trust and confidence. He taught and acted 'with authority' in the fullest sense of the word.

And yet there is another side. In the Fourth Gospel, no less than in the other three, Christ always declares that 'the Word which ye hear is not Mine, but the Father's which sent Me.' 'I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me.' It is, after all, His cause rather than His Person, the Revelation rather than the Revealer, on which He desires to fix men's thoughts, and for which He claims their homage. He will resent no personal affronts, avenge no private injuries. The Samaritan village which refuses to receive Him remains unpunished. He declares that a word spoken against the Son of Man would find forgiveness: it is only blasphemy against the Holy Ghost that is unpardonable. He never sought to be anything of Himself as man, but only as the vehicle of redemption and salvation.

This combination of unlimited claims with unlimited

self-abnegation is the key to the understanding of Christ's authority. He came in the Father's name ; and the Holy Spirit was to continue His work. The former linked His mission with the past ; the latter with the future. The Faith in Himself and His Person which He demanded was not a homage which obliged the Jew to renounce his past, nor the Gentile his future. He came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfil them. He placed Himself in the line of historical evolution. The law and the prophets were until John. At that point—with the appearance of the last and greatest of the prophets, His own immediate forerunner—the old dispensation had fulfilled its historical task of a παιδαγωγός. The time had now arrived for humanity to come of age and live the freer, fuller, more responsible life of manhood. 'Ego sum cibus grandium,' as Augustine heard Christ say to him. But the God of the prophets was His Father, and it was as His envoy that He came to the people of His choice.

And it is equally certain that the Galilean ministry was not intended to be the last stage in God's active dealings with men. Nothing was further from Christ's intentions than to leave a code of legislation for all future generations. Neither the substance of His teaching, nor the manner in which He chose that it should be transmitted, is compatible with any such intention. His teaching lays down all-embracing principles ; it gives few or no rules. The difference between it and the Old Testament legislation differs not only in the often-noticed fact that the latter is chiefly negative in form, the former positive. There is an even greater difference, in that the Law is dead, the Gospel alive. The Law, like all other sacrosanct codes, must end in cramping and fettering the growth of those who are subject to it. The Gospel looks forward,¹ and has in itself a principle of growth and development which, so long as

¹ This is true, whatever views may have been entertained by the disciples as to the approaching Parousia.

His Church was true to itself, could never leave it behind the true progress of civilisation towards the realisation of all the highest potentialities of mankind. 'I have still many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of Truth is come, He will guide you into all truth; for He shall not speak of Himself; but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak; and He will show you things to come.'

The action of the Father, of the Incarnate Word, and of the Holy Spirit are thus indissolubly linked together. The Son comes to reveal the Father, the Holy Spirit to reveal the Son, or the Father through the Son. There is no question of a dynasty in three reigns; but there is a Trinity of dispensations, that of the Father before the Incarnation, that of the Son during the earthly life of Christ, that of the Spirit ever since. The third period may justly be called the 'reign' of the Son, but assuredly not as superseding that of the Father, nor as looking forward to a later reign of the Spirit.

There is, no doubt, a difference between the mode of action of the Incarnate Christ, and that of the Spirit. The former was external, the latter internal. The Incarnate Christ addressed Himself to all who came in contact with Him; the Paraclete is a principle of spiritual life in the hearts of believers, on whom He acts directly and without intermediary. But the New Testament writers are far more concerned to identify the indwelling Spirit with the exalted Christ than to separate them. Bengel's words, '*Conversio fit ad Dominum ut Spiritum*,' are thoroughly Pauline. St. Paul speaks quite indifferently of the Spirit, the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ, and Christ. In one passage he formally identifies the exalted Christ with the Spirit, at least as regards their functions. 'The Lord is the Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.'

If we are guided by the New Testament, we must dispossess ourselves of the idea that the Incarnation came to

an end within a few weeks of our Lord's last Passover on earth. When Christ said, 'I will not leave you orphans, I will come to you,' He was not using a metaphor, but making a real promise. 'Lo, I am with you all the days, even to the end of the world.'

You will see at once how this bears on the question of the authority of Christ as a primary ground of Faith. To those who share the religious philosophy of St. Paul and St. John there is no difficulty—or rather, there is an absolute necessity—in identifying the mainspring of religion in the heart of man with the action of the Second Person of the Trinity. If any philosophy has a right to call itself *the* philosophy of the Christian religion, it is that which won the intellect of the ancient world for Christianity in the third and fourth centuries, which shaped our Creeds, and which has satisfied the deepest Christian thinkers from that time to our own day. According to this philosophy there is an unbroken chain uniting the creative Logos, through whom all things were made, with the historical Jesus of Nazareth, and with the mysterious Power which works unseen in every human soul. The universe, as Bishop Westcott says, is the hymn of the Word to the glory of the Father. This World-Spirit was once incarnated in a human life. That life is the expression of the meaning of the world, so far as the meaning of the world can find expression in a human life. Christ revealed to us that God is the Father of His creatures; that God is Light, Life, Love, and Spirit (I will not now stop to draw out the meaning of these pregnant utterances); and above all, He revealed to us in word and deed the law of sacrifice, of life through death, which is the master-key to the understanding of the universe. We are quite right in calling this revelation final; but we must remember that it was the inauguration of a new dispensation of revelation, not the termination of an era of direct divine intercourse with mankind; and also that this new dispensa-

tion is characterised by *inwardness*—by the action of the Spirit of Christ bearing witness with our spirit. The primary ground of Faith may be identified with the authority of Christ, if by Christ we mean ‘Christ that died; nay, rather that is risen again.’ It is not strictly correct to say that the historical Jesus of Nazareth, whose mission terminated when He ceased to walk and teach in Galilee and Judæa, is the primary ground of Faith. To say so would be to adopt a static and not a dynamic view of Faith. It would rivet our gaze on the past instead of on the future. It would commit us to a pessimistic view of the course of history. It would fill us with disquieting doubts; for how can we base our Faith on the shifting sand of historical tradition, which leaves us at the mercy of the good faith of reporters about whom we know little or nothing? Those who think otherwise are compelled to choose between the apologetics of the evidential school, of whose methods we may surely say that by them ‘nothing worthy proving can be proven, nor yet disproven’—at any rate within the religious sphere, or, as an alternative, they must rest their religion on the mere subjectivity of feeling, which we have found to be so utterly inadequate and treacherous a ground for a living Faith.

I wish, however, to give you as fair an account as I can of the attempts which have been made to arrest Faith at this stage—to fix it as consisting of devotion to a historical figure which was finally withdrawn from any further direct influence upon human affairs nearly nineteen hundred years ago.

In speaking of the Lutheran treatment of the Bible I said that, though Holy Scripture as a whole was elevated to a primary authority in matters of Faith, the real centre was found in the Person of Christ, round which all the Old Testament, as well as the New, was made, by forced and unnatural exegesis, to revolve.

Modern Lutheranism, as represented by the Ritschlian

school, does not follow Luther in this new Scholasticism. Indeed, Ritschl boldly affirms that 'the ideas of the Reformation were more concealed than disclosed in the theological works of Luther and Melancthon.' But the language of Ritschlians about the 'historical Christ' is very similar to that of Luther. It is part of their theory that the Christian Church began to go wrong from the very first, i.e. as soon as Greek influences began to modify the Palestinian gospel. Forgetful of the essentially quiet and unemotional character of Christ's teaching, they find true Christianity in the enthusiastic revivalism of St. Paul's Corinthian converts, and complain (as Harnack does) that Christianity was 'secularised' when 'what made the Christian a Christian was no longer the possession of *charisms*, but . . . the performance of penance and good works.' They can see little but progressive decline between St. Paul and the Reformation, and the Reformation, it appears, has never yet rightly understood itself. 'History,' for Faith, begins and ends, according to them, with the ministry of Christ in Palestine.

Dislike of Greek metaphysics has much to do with this view. It is part of the movement against speculative intellectualism, which swept over Germany and almost destroyed the once tyrannical power of Hegel's philosophy. Of the rigorous moralism and theoretical agnosticism of the neo-Kantians I must speak later. Here I wish to consider only their Christology, and especially the real significance of their maxim, 'Back to the historical Christ.'

It goes without saying that the orthodox Church doctrine of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation of the Eternal Son, is condemned by this school as part of Greek metaphysics. They do not object to our speaking of the 'Godhead' of Christ, if we add that this statement is only a judgment of value, not of fact. (I shall discuss the validity of this anti-thesis in a later lecture.) This is no arbitrary view; it belongs to the logic of the system. If metaphysics, that is to say

the quest of ontological truth, is ruled out as having nothing to do with religion ; if, moreover, a theory of knowledge is held which confines us to phenomena and puts absolute truth wholly out of our reach ; if all mysticism, including of course the Pauline doctrine of the *unio mystica*, is rejected as ' Catholic piety ' ; what have we left but a Christ who for us somehow ' has the value of God ' ? If the Ritschlian is pressed further as to what he means by this phrase, he probably answers : First of all, Christ is the perfect *revelation* of God to men. He manifests to us the will and character of God. He who knows Christ, knows the Father also. Secondly, He completely identified Himself with God's will and purpose. Instead of the orthodox union of natures, we have a complete harmony of wills, which, from the peculiar standpoint of this school, is a greater thing. Thirdly, they say, He manifests a complete supremacy over the world, in the sense of inward independence of it. This is a characteristic survival of Luther's own thought, that the Christian is essentially the world's master. It is not an idea which has any prominence in a well-balanced Christianity, but it is extremely popular in German Protestantism.¹ As the result of these qualities in Jesus Christ we are allowed to say that He has for us the value of God, and are forbidden to ask any more questions about this Divinity. As for His present condition, we are given to understand that He is living somehow and somewhere in glory, but this belief is carefully and jealously deprived of any religious significance by the reiterated warning that the exalted Christ is hidden from us, and cut off from any direct contact with us, even in the life of prayer. Thus the mystical Christology, which was the root and source of all St. Paul's personal religion, and the inspiration of his life, is repudiated absolutely. The Incarnation lives only in its effects. ' The work of Christ in the state of exaltation must be represented by

¹ Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 128.

the permanent effect of His historical appearance.'¹ This Christology is closely akin to the theology of the Deists, according to whom God created the world, and then left it to itself. The exalted Christ of Ritschlianism is a *roi fainéant*, politely ushered, like the Epicurean gods, into some astral limbo where He is comfortably out of the way. It is not clear why these men do not say plainly that He passed finally out of existence on Good Friday; for the logic of their system has no further use for Him. Ritschlianism in fact has no eschatology. In place of the Christian doctrine of eternal life, we have phrases like the following curious sentence: 'Man compares himself with the whole natural system, since in his spiritual self-feeling he apprehends himself as a being who in greatness stands near to the supra-mundane God, and makes the claim to live, notwithstanding the experience of death.' Whether this 'claim' is allowed or disallowed we are not told, though the matter is presumably of some interest to mankind. The truth is, that according to the logic of the system there is no room for a future life. 'The world's master,' when removed from the world, is a king without a kingdom.

There are many German theologians who are in partial sympathy with Ritschl, but who accept the Resurrection, the continued activity of the living Christ, and the future life. Herrmann, the author of the little book *Communion with God*, which has a great popularity in his own country, and has been translated into English, occasionally indulges in language about the exalted Christ which is in flat contradiction with his principles, and in consequence, in spite of his violent tirades against mysticism, he has been accused by more logical Ritschlians of falling himself into the error of the mystics.² Kaftan, one of the ablest of the school, fairly breaks away from it in his Christology, and

¹ Ritschl, quoted by Orr, p. 134.

² Orr, p. 223.

says: 'Even Christ has become to us, in this age, a distant historical appearance. The sole means of removing this impression is a powerful and immediate faith in, and communion with, the exalted Christ.' Compare this with Herrmann's: 'Of a communion with the exalted Christ there can be no question.'

Another point in which the position of Ritschl has obviously become untenable, even to his disciples, is the virtual denial of any other channel of revelation except the historical Christ. Instead of forcing Christology into the Old Testament, like Luther, the Ritschlians denied the latter any value at all. Nor was any value attached to revelations coming from secular history, science, or art. The vigour and rigour of this position have been found impossible to maintain.

My object, however, in this lecture, is not to criticise any particular school of theology, but to arrive at a clear idea of what is meant by saying that for us Christians Christ is our primary authority.

According to the view which I uphold, and which has been that of the best Christian philosophy from the first, there is an original, natural bond between God and the human soul. This innate 'tendency to God,' as Robert Browning calls it, may be explained or expressed in very various language. To the psychologist, who rightly disclaims the intention of establishing ultimate truth by means of mental science, it is simply a fact of consciousness to be taken note of and analysed as it stands. He will give no answer to the question whence it comes, or whether it is in correspondence with any objective external reality. He will not attempt to determine whether its source is human or divine, whether it belongs to ourselves or is imparted by God. The scholastic mystics had their own names for it. They often called it by the queer name *συντήρησις*, the origin of which is obscure. They explain it as a faculty which never consents to evil, a sort of divine

core of the soul, by which it can come into touch with what is akin to it, the divine nature. It is much the same as the *κέντρον ψυχῆς* of Plotinus, and the *Funkeln* of Eckhart. According to the Logos-Christology, this can only be the operation of the creative and indwelling Logos which 'became flesh' in Jesus Christ. Put away, if you will, all that is fanciful and arbitrary in these figures. But do not lightly surrender the belief which they try to express: that there is in the human soul a potential God-consciousness, which was antecedent to the historical revelation, and was a necessary condition of it. For the mystics are surely right in holding that like can only be known by like. 'If there were not something akin to the sun in us, we could never behold the sun.' If this is denied—if there is no such inner bond between human nature and the divine, it is very difficult to show how the two can ever be brought together. And so we find that the revelation of Jesus Christ, for the school which we have been considering, is not so much a reconciliation of man with God, as a reconciliation of man with the world. If we reject and put out of court all that this school means by Mysticism, and also all that they mean by Natural Theology, what channel of revelation is left? God does not act directly upon the human soul, according to them; how then does He reveal Himself? 'Through Jesus Christ' is their answer; but how was the revelation made to Him? The apologists of this school seem to take refuge in the word 'mystery,' which is the usual expedient of a theologian when caught in an awkward dilemma. There is no mystery about it. Either Christ must have received the revelation by direct personal union with God, or the knowledge of God possessed by Christ must be only the intellectual concomitant of that right direction of the will which Christ exhibited in a pre-eminent degree. The former alternative is excluded by the whole principles of the school. For if the *unio mystica* is a reality between God

and the human Christ, why are no traces of it to be allowed between God, or Christ, and the Christian? And the latter alternative deprives the testimony of Christ of its authoritative character.¹ For remember that the uniqueness and solitariness of the revelation through Christ is one of the points which are most insisted on.

If there is no essential kinship between God and man, no revelation of God to man could ever take place. This seems to be an irrefragable truth. And it follows that if Christ was divine, as the Church teaches, and in the sense which the Church teaches, His revelation cannot have been purely external or purely historical and static, but must be given to and through the Christ-like element in our consciousness. In fact, it seems to me that the doctrines of the divinity of Christ and of the indwelling Spirit of Christ stand or fall together.

You will now see in what sense only I think we can accept the statement that the authority of the historic Christ is primary for Christians. Strictly, it is the indwelling Christ who is the primary authority; but assuredly I do not wish to separate the two, and postulate *comme deux Christs* with M. Loisy. The difference between my view and that which I have been criticising is important because my view makes revelation *dynamic*: it gives room for further growth; it gives a reason and justification for the long history of the Church, seeing that only through long experience, much suffering, and many mistakes could the dispensation, begun at the Incarnation, fulfil its course and attain its end.

Some of you will suspect, I am afraid, that I am minimising the historical facts connected with the Incarnation—whittling away the significance of our Lord's life, making it only a stage in the evolution of humanity. Well, let us ask ourselves what a *fact* means—whether it is just the same as a phenomenon, or whether it means something more.

¹ Orr, p. 251.

The distinction between fact and phenomenon has never been better explained than by that very interesting philosopher, Rudolf Eucken. The essential function of a fact, he says, is to yield its living meaning to the present in some imperishable form, and therefore the fact must itself first own and exercise the life which it communicates. No atomic conception of a 'fact' is possible. The 'fact' must be what Eucken calls a *Lebens-system*, a systematised whole of life. '*Isolated events are not facts, but abstractions from them.*' The "fact" must have a certain independence and capacity for development according to its own nature. If it has less than this, it is only a mutilated and fractional fact. . . . A fact of history must be some historic movement with at least a beginning and a middle, even if it lack a finish. So understood, a historical fact is a true historical unit, and the essential significance of "unit" is "unity." A historical fact is a historical unity. Such unities do not lie on the surface of life. . . . It requires spiritual insight to pass from phenomenon to fact.'¹ It is, then, a false abstraction to isolate the events of three or thirty years as is sometimes done. So isolated, they are degraded from a fact to a phenomenon. The plan of the Incarnation was to initiate a movement which in its entirety was to constitute a theophany in the life of humanity itself. The Christian revelation embraces, or rather is, the whole of that movement, by far the greater part of which is, for us, in the unknown future.

It appears to me, then, that this attempt to isolate the records of the Galilean ministry as closing for ever the revelation of God to man, is only another example of the tendency which we have found in other cases, to arrest the natural development of Faith at a certain point, in order to gain the convenience of an unchangeable standard of belief and conduct. It is nearer the truth than belief

¹ Boyce Gibson, *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, p. 41; and cf. Eucken's latest book, *The Life of the Spirit*.

in an infallible Pope or an infallible Bible ; but it is open to very grave objections, which I hope I have made clear to you.

In practice, it may lead to an uncritical appeal to this or that precept in the Gospels, and, on the other hand, to a regretful repudiation of Christ's authority, on the ground that some of His precepts are manifestly inapplicable, if taken literally, to present conditions. Our Lord unquestionably used hyperbole in His teaching. He was accustomed, like other teachers who wish to impress their points on a popular audience, to make without qualification statements which need qualification, and to supply the necessary correction on another occasion. In plain words, they occasionally contradict themselves ; and such formal contradictions occur in the Gospels. It follows that in order to understand them we must use reason and common sense, and consider particular sayings in the light supplied by the teaching as a whole. This, and not the attitude of a suppliant consulting an oracle, is the proper way to consult the authority of Christ. We have also to face the possibility that we have not got always the exact Greek equivalents of the words used by the Divine Speaker ; and the strong probability that some of His sayings are out of their places, placed by His biographers in a wrong setting, or, in a few cases, perhaps, even wrongly put into His mouth. All this would be disquieting if the Christ of the Gospels were our sole primary authority. It is not disquieting if we may interpret particular words by the known drift of His teaching, by the witness of His Spirit in our hearts, and, to some extent, by other sources of revelation.

Lastly, I am not following those modern Roman Catholic apologists who depreciate the authority of the earthly Christ in order to exalt that of the Church speaking in His name. That is an error which we have already considered and rejected. The Church is to grow up *into* Christ in all

things, not out of Him into something very different. He is very much more than the historical Founder of a great institution with a very chequered record. Nor could we possibly confine His activities since the Ascension to the supervision of one religious body, however august. But the Catholic apologetic has this great advantage over the Protestant that it accepts development, and looks forward. It does not worship a dead Lord.

I have now finished that part of my course which deals with authority. I have shown, I hope, that external authority, in whatever form, cannot be a primary ground of Faith, and that the authority of Jesus Christ, for the well instructed Christian, is not external, but is a voice which speaks within us as well as to us. The complete autonomy of the human spirit would be identical with perfect obedience to Christ; His service, as the Collect says, is perfect freedom.

As a matter of experience, this way of thinking about Christ does not dehumanise Him into a cosmic principle. Rather, we find with Robert Browning, that

That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows,
Or decomposes but to recompose,
Become my universe that feels and knows.¹

That face, explained the poet to a friend, is the face of Christ.

¹ Robert Browning, *Dramatis Personae*, Epilogue.

CHAPTER IX

FAITH AS AN ACT OF WILL

IN my last lecture I considered the proper place of authority in matters of Faith, and came to the conclusion that no authority can claim to be primary except the clear affirmations of Faith itself—those spontaneous assertions of the basal personality which religion calls the voice of God within us, and which philosophy, in more cumbrous phrase, might describe as the self-revelation of the objective in our subjectivity. This voice, as I have said, speaks through, rather than to, the human heart and conscience and intellect, nor is it possible to separate the divine and human elements in any act of Faith. To-day I pass to another branch of our subject, one of great interest and importance. We have resisted the temptation to arrest and fix the development of Faith in the region of undifferentiated feeling. We have found that reliance on external authority, of whatever kind, is at best only a makeshift, a substitute for a full and manly Faith. We have decided that Faith must operate through our natural faculties. But which of our faculties is the chosen organ of Faith? Is it the will, or the intellect, or that specialised feeling which creates æsthetic judgments? We must consider the claims of these faculties in turn. And first, What is the relation of Faith to the will? Is Faith simply and solely a moral postulate, an act of choice? Is the ground of Faith our moral decision to believe?

The proverb that the wish is father to the thought assuredly calls attention to a fact which we cannot afford to forget. People do, as a matter of fact, believe things because they wish to believe them. Hobbes declared that 'even the axioms of geometry would be disputed if men's passions were concerned in them'; and we have only to contrast a page of Euclid with a political or theological harangue, in order to realise how differently we reason when we are dealing, not with mathematical symbols having a fixed connotation, but with living ideas and disputable values. People believe what they wish to be true, both voluntarily and involuntarily. They will say without shame, 'I like to think so and so,' as a reason why they do think so. And they will not change their opinions because they are beaten in argument.

He that complies against his will
Is of the same opinion still.

Moreover, without intending it, we often listen to the flattering tale which hope tells. Charlatans of all kinds trade on this weakness of human nature. Without it, a great many popular follies, such as betting on horse-races, and gambling at Monte Carlo or on the Stock Exchange, would come to an end. The dry light of reason would generally convince the gambler that he stands to lose; but he throws his desires into the scale, and vaguely hopes that 'luck will be on his side.'

In matters of practice, when any end is being pursued, the advantages of a sanguine temperament are so obvious that men look very indulgently on the self-deceptions which it produces. 'If you do not hope,' said Heraclitus, 'you will never find that which is beyond your hopes.' In many cases, a strong will has the power to bring about the realisation of that which it desires, and the refusal to limit hopes by the evidence of probability brings its own reward and justification.

None without hope e'er loved the brightest fair,
But love may hope where reason might despair.¹

We encourage the wilful optimist, the dogged struggler who cannot see when he is beaten, because this temper so often achieves great things.

How far are we to approve of the same temper when it is applied to our religious beliefs? There is no doubt at all that by determining to believe a doctrine, by deliberately refusing to dwell on arguments on the other side, by refusing to listen to objections or read books by opponents, above all, by making, so to speak, a personal wager by acting as if it were true, and incurring loss should it be false—by these methods we can make ourselves believe many things against the weight of evidence. As Clough puts it :—

Action will furnish belief,—but will that belief be the true one?

That is the point, you know. However, it doesn't much matter.

What one wants, I suppose, is to predetermine the action

So as to make it entail, not a chance belief, but the true one.

There is no doubt that this is an effective and practicable method of determining and fixing our beliefs. The will to believe is, as Professor William James and his friends maintain, a real and actual ground of belief, whether such a belief deserves the name of Faith or not. However, the question is (and I do not agree with Clough that it doesn't much matter), not whether men do form their beliefs in this way, but whether they ought to do so. This question is the subject of my lecture to-day.

One fact is indisputable. Wherever we find great emphasis laid on the practical support given by Faith as a reason for believing, there we find also intellectual scepti-

¹ Lord Lyttelton, 1709-1773.

cism. The argument would never be advanced by any one who (to use a phrase of Renan) 'believes heavily.' At the same time, it does not imply such complete distrust in human faculties as is implied by reliance on external revelation. Writers like Mansel are complete sceptics,¹ whose choice of orthodoxy instead of agnosticism seems to be almost a matter of chance. Herbert Spencer was able to accept all Mansel's arguments, while rejecting his conclusion. The school which we are now to consider base their religious Faith not on external authority but on the affirmations of the 'practical reason,' which is at any rate part of our endowment as human beings. They are intellectual sceptics, but moral believers.

Periods of ambitious construction in philosophy are regularly followed by periods of doubt and discouragement. The imposing thought-palace, which was to incorporate in its fabric every kind of truth, betrays unsoundness in its foundations. The invulnerable Achilles is discovered to have an unprotected heel; and forthwith scepticism threatens to engulf everything. But scepticism can always be turned against itself; and unwilling scepticism welcomes its own discomfiture. Faith, we will suppose, finds itself menaced by natural science. But on what grounds, men soon begin to ask, is science made a judge and ruler over us? Is not science, as well as theology, the product of human thought and of human instincts? Her conclusions are not infallible, her fundamental assumptions are still disputable and disputed. Her chief dogma, the uniformity of nature, is admitted to be a matter of Faith. Why is Faith to be allowed an entrance at this one point and here only? Why may we not have Faith in the practical reason as well as in the speculative? Might it not even be plausibly maintained that the theoretical reason is more

¹ So far, at least, as any philosopher can be a complete sceptic. An absolute sceptic does not construct a philosophy out of scepticism—he does not philosophise at all.

fallible than the practical? Almost every paradox has been plausibly maintained by philosophers. Παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται, as Aristotle said; and the greater the intellect, the greater may be the blunder. 'There are errors which lie out of the reach of an ordinary mind':¹ *magna magnorum deliramenta doctorum*, says St. Augustine. Further, psychology has proved that desires and emotions do influence belief. Pure reasoning is a pure figment; no man was ever guided by pure reason. Again, what is the test of truth to which the rationalist or intellectualist refers us? Has he any ultimate criterion of knowledge? If not, may not what he calls superstition be as respectable as what he calls truth? If the so-called superstitions work, they justify and verify themselves. They may claim to be 'protective organs,' or something of the kind; and what more are the rationalist's reasons? Lastly, these new apologists tell us that the bases of our intellectual constructions are not axioms but postulates; i.e. we reject the alternative propositions, not because they are, on the face of them, ridiculous, but because we have 'no use for them.' The will and the understanding are both instruments of living, and the will is the more efficient of the two. If we still desiderate some proof that the claims of our will are ontologically true, we may be reminded (as a concession to our weak-minded and benighted 'absolutism') that even though the ground of our belief in certain theories lies in the fact that we need them, we did not create the circumstance that we need them. Either the nature of things, which is responsible for the fact that we need them, is irrational, 'which is absurd,' or our needs must be founded on the real constitution of the world.

The school which we are now considering deliberately amalgamates will and feeling—thus getting a broader basis for its constructions, though discursive thought is excluded as a sort of pariah. This fusion of will and feeling seems to

¹ Balmez, quoted by Rickaby, *First Principles*, p. 116.

me psychologically untenable ; it leads to an extension of the use of ' will,' which is contrary to earlier usage, and very misleading. These writers set out to prove the primacy of will, and then smuggle into the idea of ' will ' a great deal that does not belong to it. But they are strong on the empirical side. The influence of a steady determination on the formation of character is undeniable ; and the phenomena of faith-healing, hypnotism, and suggestion point to a hitherto unsuspected potency residing in the will, and capable, at least under some conditions, of being utilised. These obscure psychical energies have been more studied and more exploited in America than in any other country ; and I believe that this fact has had much to do with the revolt against intellectualism in philosophy, which is now so powerful in the United States. Not only do these phenomena seem to present a practical refutation of Spinozism, and of its modern representative the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, but the present condition of psychology seems to demand a modest hesitation in laying down any limits to the possible action of mind upon matter. It is felt that we are only at the beginning of what may be a new epoch in mental science, and that when our knowledge has been extended and systematised, the bogey of determinism may be laid once for all, and science may be compelled to take a much humbler attitude towards religion and ethics.

This line of thought is very welcome to many, who have long felt that the mechanical theory, which reduces men and women to the condition of cunningly devised automata, is fatal to moral freedom, to human dignity, and to religious hope. It is also very convenient to the conservative apologist, anxious to vindicate divine interventions in history.

It will be well first to give a short historical account of the growth of ' pragmatist ' tendencies in religious philosophy.

The first serious attempt to exalt the will above the

intellect as an instrument of religious belief was made by the Nominalist opponents of Thomas Aquinas. With the doctrine of the primacy of the will came the adoption of a practical or empirical criterion of truth instead of a theoretical one.¹ This cleavage appeared even among the mystics, the followers of the Platonic and Augustinian tradition insisting on the knowledge of God as the concomitant or condition of spiritual progress, while there were others who maintained that a complete dedication of the will was sufficient. The latter teaching, with mystics, led to quietism, while the former was accused of tending towards speculative pantheism. The *Theologia Germanica* represents a moderate quietism; Eckhart is a stronger example of the pantheistic tendency. Among the scholastics proper, the school of Thomas Aquinas represented the speculative tendency, while William of Occam was the chief champion of the will and practical reason. Nominalism was at first suspected, but was afterwards encouraged, when realism was seen to favour determinism and pantheistic mysticism. Nominalism could also do a great service to the Papacy by deciding that, since reason cannot arrive at the truth, we ought to bow absolutely to the authority of the Church. The doctrine of *fides implicita*, which practically means blind obedience, was developed. But after a very short reign nominalism itself decayed, when Plato (the real Plato this time) was rediscovered.

Among modern philosophers before Kant who laid great stress on the practical ground of Faith, we need only mention Spinoza. This writer sees the religious value of dogmas not in their actual truth, but in their power of moving to action. We are allowed and encouraged to state

¹ The following brief statement of the epistemology of Nominalism will show its close affinity with Kantianism and American pragmatism. 'Theologia nostra nullatenus speculativa est, sed simpliciter practica. Theologiae objectum non est speculabile sed operabile. Quidquid in Deo est practicum est respectu nostri.' (Frassen.)

our dogmas in the form which suits us best. The end of Faith, he says, is obedience and piety. In this theory of Faith he prepared the way for thinkers who were strongly opposed to his philosophy as a whole.

Kant's attack upon the scholastic 'proofs of God's existence,' and upon intellectualism generally in matters of Faith, is well known. There is, according to him, 'a deep gulf between thought and being, which nothing can overcome. Things in themselves are the condition of all thought; but what exists we cannot know.' If we say that God, or the Absolute, must be self-consistent and all-embracing, we are told that the logical law of contradiction¹ is concerned, not with real things, but only with the concepts which we form about them. Logical laws are only laws of thought, not laws which bind reality. The result of this assumption is that he separates our theoretical and moral judgments as they are never separated in experience, and gives us first an abstract intellectual scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason, and then an abstract moralistic deism in the Critique of Practical Reason. But it is a pure assumption that because the law of contradiction is a logical law, it must be *only* a logical law and nothing more. Indeed it is meaningless to talk about a law which is 'only a law of thought.' When we say that we cannot think of A as being at once B and not B, we are not laying down a law for psychology. Experience suggests that many people are quite capable of holding two contradictory propositions simultaneously. What we mean is that if we think in this way, we are not thinking truly, or, in other words, we are not thinking of things as they really are. We cannot speak of '*mere* logical laws' without falling into the extreme of scepticism. If necessary thought is no criterion of objective truth, how can we know

¹ The 'law of contradiction' is that a thing cannot at the same time be both B and not B; or, 'It is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny.' Cf. Clarke, *Logic*, pp. 33-42.

anything? It is strange that Kant treats with neglect, and almost with contempt, the hypothesis on which all men act, namely, that the forms of knowing and being correspond because they are manifestations of the same intelligent principle.¹ He did not distinguish this very reasonable belief from the 'pre-established harmony' of Leibnitz, a theory which may be said to have died with its author.

According to this philosophy, we reach solid rock only in the moral consciousness, which Kant supposes to be given to us immediately. This and this only is vouched for by Faith—'I must, and therefore I can.' Morality thus conceived is as empty of contents as it is inexplicable in its origin. Kant excludes the happiness or welfare of the subject as a legitimate motive, and but for an obvious inconsistency would have equally excluded the happiness and welfare of others. For we cannot morally desire for others what we regard as indifferent for ourselves. The motive for moral action must, according to him, be simply reverence for moral law as such. But this is not a sufficient motive for a rational being. We cannot do our life's work like convicts at a crank, whose task is simply to expend a prescribed quantity of muscular energy. We act in order to produce something which we regard as worth producing, and the empty idea of right gives us no intelligible guidance. To make religion merely a transcendental projection from morals is to invert their true relationship. The abstract moral sense is a pure illusion. There is no such fixed and known code of morals as Kant postulates. There is hardly a crime or vice that has not at some time and place been enjoined in the name of morality and religion. Nor is morality 'unconditional,' as Kant supposed. Apart from the question whether pleasure and pain can be excluded from consideration,

¹ In the Critique of Judgment there are hints of this solution, but they are not developed.

as Kant demands, we have already seen grounds for believing that truth and beauty exercise a co-ordinate authority with goodness as attributes of the divine mind, and refuse to be subordinated to morality.

The later Kantians have for the most part modified or abandoned the moral rigorism of their master, and they have also allowed the rationalistic side of Kant's thought to fall into the background. It must be remembered that the rift which turns Kant's philosophy into a dualism is still, according to him, a rift *within* the reason. If the practical and theoretical reason could make up their quarrel, or rather get into contact with each other, the problem would be solved. His philosophy is truly described as 'critical rationalism'; and he cannot justly be classed with the thorough-going voluntarists who followed him. And yet on one side he is the father of modern anti-intellectualism. For there is only one reason, not two; and the 'practical reason,' when set in opposition to the theoretical, and exalted above it, is after all only another name for the irrational will. This has become clear in the development of the neo-Kantian philosophy, in which war is frankly declared against the theoretical or speculative reason. Against this disruption of the human mind, which if pressed to its logical conclusion is fatal to all scientific knowledge, Herbert Spencer protests in language which Christian philosophy can adopt without hesitation. 'Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one can admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.'

My plan in this lecture is to consider first the recent developments of voluntarism and pragmatism in philosophy generally—of course only in bare outline—and then to deal with the influence of this tendency upon Protestant and Catholic theology and apologetics. (It will be convenient to take the Protestants before the Catholics, because

Ritschlianism preceded in time the Modernist movement in the Roman Church.)

Neo-Kantianism in Germany has for the most part been either connected with the school of Protestant theology called after Ritschl, and so falls under the second of my three headings, or else, as with Lange, it has built on a sceptical or despairing view of the existing world an æsthetic superstructure, in which religion plays its part along with poetry and the arts, as an ideal embellishment of the actual. This latter attempt to build an imaginative structure on a Kantian basis does not belong to our present enquiry. We are now dealing with those who wish to base philosophy, and with it, religious beliefs, on free choice, directed only by the practical requirements of life in the world. This now popular unmetaphysical philosophy, which is commonly called pragmatism, has far more disciples in America than in any other country. Its protagonist is Professor William James of Harvard, who has a group of disciples at Oxford, and a very large following in his own land.

The word *πραγματικός*, from which pragmatism is derived, meant in ancient Greek 'practical,' or 'businesslike.' In the political history of medieval and modern times, a 'pragmatic sanction' has meant an inviolable compact. Kant uses the adjective in the sense of 'prudent,' of action directed to a purpose. Bismarck's policy was described as pragmatic, the meaning being that he was determined to achieve his ends *quocumque modo*. Such are the antecedents of the word, as now used in philosophy. Kant's use of it has probably had most to do with determining its present signification. In current philosophy, pragmatism is the theory that 'all our beliefs are really rules for action'; and that 'to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance.'¹ From

¹ Professor W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 46.

this it is made to follow that the 'true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good too for definite assignable reasons.'¹

Professor James is so uncompromising an advocate of the practical principle as the ground of Faith that he brings all the limitations and errors of anti-intellectualism into the light of day. His philosophy, indeed, is in parts an admirable *reductio ad absurdum* of sceptical opportunism as a principle of thought and action. He and his school are so determined to safeguard human personality and the freedom of the will that they give us a God who is 'limited by all other beings in the universe'—a very constitutional President in a society of free and independent spirits—(unless indeed they prefer, as some of them do, to make the Absolute 'a society,' which is either atheism or polytheism); they deny that there are any 'laws of nature' within the sphere of the will; they refuse to acknowledge any unity in experience, or any evidence that the universe (which one of them suggests should be called the 'multiverse') is a systematic whole. 'Not unfortunately,' says Professor James, 'the universe is wild; nature is miracle all.' 'We must leave surprises even for God,' as another writer of the same school says. This seems a high price to pay for free-will. A 'wild universe,' where anything or everything may happen, and which in its unaccountable behaviour administers a series of shocks even to its Creator, would seem to be a fit abode only for a very wild man, the kind of person, in fact, whom we do not permit to be at large.

I will not discuss further this philosophy (if it deserves the name) of personal atomism. In proclaiming the bankruptcy of science it proclaims its own bankruptcy. From the religious point of view it has the fatal defect of denying divine immanence; for a personal independence which rests on exclusion forbids all communion between

¹ Professor W. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 76.

God and man, as well as between man and the world. This objection, it seems to me, applies not only to the extreme pragmatists, like Professor James, but to the 'personal idealists' who are not willing to follow him all the way. They have proved that it is possible to pay too dearly for the assurance of personal freedom. That freedom is not yet ours. Personality, like all else that is imperfect and an unrealised ideal, must die in order that it may live. The way to save our $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ —to 'find it unto life eternal'—is not by claiming that it is lord of the creation, but by being willing to 'lose' it in the service of grander and wider aspects of reality.

Nevertheless, the ethical side of religion is so important that we cannot altogether blame those who have no eyes for any other order of truth. They think that what they call intellectualism or rationalism means in practice naturalism—that is, acceptance of the mechanical order as divine, and a Stoical worship of the blind giant Nature, who cares only for the preservation of her types, and knows nothing of justice or mercy. The nineteenth century witnessed a series of reactions against the supposed tyranny of natural law; even Huxley, in his famous Romanes lecture, could speak of the duty of 'resisting the cosmic process.' But this is to accept a Manichean view of nature. It is to admit an irreconcilable dualism, handing over the world to some non-moral agency, while separating man from his environment. A truer solution is, not to discredit natural law, but to remember that science can admit no exceptions to its sway. Natural law, from the point of view of science, is universal, or it is nothing. It includes the highest principles which actuate the best of men, as well as the blind movements of inanimate things. This consideration may lead us to find spiritual law in the natural world, a far more satisfactory discovery than the notion that man can successfully defy the order of the universe. The fault, however, was largely that of some

scientists of the older generation, who wrote as if molecular physics could prescribe rules for human action, thus explaining the highest and most complex forms of life by the simplest and lowest. We are not powerless in the grip of natural forces, to which we ourselves contribute. This is a good world because it needs us to make it better. If Bacon was right in saying that nature is only conquered by obeying her, it is equally true that she is only obeyed by conquering her.

The school which we are now considering also accuses modern rationalism, and the later Greek philosophy too, of teaching that reality is 'ready made and complete from all eternity.' This view deprives the time-process of all value and meaning, and makes activity a delusion. Pragmatists insist, on the other hand, that the world is still in the making, and that to a large extent we have the making of it. It is quite true that the dynamic aspect of reality has been unduly neglected by some thinkers, and we owe a debt of gratitude to those who have revived the Aristotelian doctrine that 'the end is an action, not a quality' (τὸ τέλος πράξις τίς ἐστὶν οὐ ποιότης). Aristotle, however, never disparages the intellectual life, as this school habitually does. In him, contemplation is the highest kind of action, and spiritual activity as 'practical' as manual labour. The pragmatists are fond of quoting *διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ* ('the intellect by itself moves nothing') as an expression of anti-intellectualism. But all that Aristotle means is that intellect energising *in vacuo* is a false abstraction.

Again, we cannot but be grateful to be reminded that the will and feelings must be constantly exercised in the endeavour to realise facts and to work out our convictions. The struggle for the higher life is so hard that we tend either to leave *ourselves* behind, merely thinking and talking about the truth, like those of whom Aristotle says that they 'take refuge in words and think that they are philo-

sophers,'¹ or we construct a premature synthesis of reality, on the basis of our still disordered selves. The danger of purely speculative thinking has been often exhibited, and is not diminished by the counter warning that a mixture of ethics and metaphysics results in a bad philosophy. The evil effects of one-sidedness must be recognised, and also the extreme difficulty of taking a comprehensive view without incoherence and self-contradiction. The metaphysician who determines to follow the argument whithersoever it leads him, ignoring practical problems, and not even trying to make a practical religion for himself out of his speculations, is likely to produce a more consistent intellectual system than one who all the time regards metaphysics as a handmaid of ethics, and will advocate no principles which he is not prepared to make the standard of his own conduct. Hume is, I venture to think, far more free from contradictions than Kant; and Hume, as we know from his private correspondence, protested against the assumption that his speculative views about religion made it more difficult for him than for believers in Christianity to bear a bereavement. 'In these matters,' he wrote, 'I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine.'² Thus that fearlessly honest thinker was obliged in practice to be faithless to his own intellect, and to testify to the half-truth of pragmatism as well as to the inadequacy of scepticism as a working creed. In the case of Schopenhauer we find an equally independent intellectual life, which apparently had no influence in elevating his moral character. Like Circe's human swine, his higher nature only made him miserable, while it left him to wallow in the mire of cowardly selfishness and sensuality. But even from the speculative standpoint, the consistency of a philosophy which has turned its back on experience is dearly purchased. It escapes contradictions by refusing to consider some essential aspects of

¹ Aristotle, *Ethics*, ii. 3.

² Cf. Burton's *Life of Hume*, vol. i. p. 294.

the problem ; and in consequence its conclusions have only an abstract and hypothetical truth. They are not true of the real world, or at any rate they have not been shown to be so.

The demands of our ethical nature point to the objective existence of a hierarchy of values, and these must be included in any intellectual system which claims to represent the whole truth. The difficulty of harmonising this valuation with the existential aspect of things proves to us, not that we cannot know reality at all, but that we know it only in part. An imperfect experience cannot construct a consistent philosophy.

Let us now consider the results of what we may call ethical idealism in Protestant theology. We shall find our documents mainly in the German Ritschlian school.

The foundation of the Ritschlian teaching is the assertion of the primacy of the ethical sense. With Lotze, whom he greatly admired, Ritschl held that the foundation of metaphysics is to be found in ethics : we are to seek in what *ought* to be the ground of what *is*. Like Lotze, he recognises in man a faculty of forming *value-judgments*, which is of greater importance than the 'merely intellectual' view of the world. These 'value-judgments' take, in Ritschl's philosophy, the same place which Schleiermacher gives to undifferentiated feeling. They are the ultimate seat of authority. Both maintain that the final court of appeal is subjective experience, which is not to be checked by reference to the outer world of phenomena ; but while Schleiermacher's appeal was to a vague sentiment, Ritschl's is narrowed and made more definite—his supreme court is the ethical demand. In order to preclude any disputes as to the authority of this one faculty to decide everything, 'metaphysics,' which include all 'judgments of fact,' are declared to have nothing to do with religion. 'Religion and theoretic knowledge are distinct functions, which even when applied to the same

object do not even partially coincide, but go totally asunder.'¹ So harsh and intractable a dualism is only tolerable if we resolve to treat one of the two sides as a negligible quantity. And this is the treatment which Ritschlianism metes out to existential truth.² The proper philosophical position corresponding to this view of the world is subjective idealism, which some have thought the logical conclusion from Lotze's premisses.

A little more must be said about the famous doctrine of *value-judgments*. According to Ritschl, the judgments which we form on moral and religious subjects are 'independent judgments of value.' They set forth, not the objective nature and relation of things, but only their value *for us*—their fitness to satisfy some want of our own nature. Religion, therefore, has nothing to do with objective fact; truth, in this sphere, is purely pragmatic and teleological. Ritschl, however, shrank from the logical conclusion which has been drawn by some of the modern psychological school, that God Himself has no objective existence, or that if He has, His objective existence is irrelevant to religion. He somehow regards the existence of God, and one or two other dogmas which he prized, to be guaranteed by the faculty of 'value-judging.' But this is a manifest trespass. On his principles, judgments of fact and judgments of value can never come in conflict, because they are 'independent' of each other. But to assert the existence of God is to make a judgment of fact, not a judgment of value. Or if we say that value guarantees existence, that is a judgment of fact, and the whole character of the philosophy is changed by the transit from idealism to realism. On Ritschl's principles, there is no escape from pure phenomenalism and sub-

¹ Quoted by Orr, p. 61.

² The school of Ritschl has split on the theory of knowledge. Herrmann is a Kantian; Kaftan is an empirical positivist; Bender was logical enough to proclaim an uncompromising subjectivism, for which his party, after a heated controversy, repudiated him.

jectivism except by a patent inconsistency.¹ God is, on Ritschlian principles, at best a postulate, arising from the judgment which the human spirit makes of its own worth.

You will gather that in my opinion the whole system is ruined by its attempt to exclude 'judgments of being'—science and philosophy in fact—from any part in the formation or determination of religious Faith. This is partly the result of a very inexcusable confusion of terminology. Just as the Ritschlians extend the province of will, to cover feeling and even unconscious instinct, so they limit reason by regarding it as the faculty which merely observes and reflects on the causes of things. This is psychologically incorrect, and theologically disastrous. The creative Reason, as we learn from St. Paul and St. John, is the immanent cause and end of things. Without Reason the Will is blind, deaf and dumb. And the supreme exercise of the human consciousness, which is to energise in concert with this creative Power, assuredly contains an intellectual element. I shall show in my next lecture that we need by no means despair of reaching solid ground by means of the intellect.

Ritschlian theology is generally as orthodox as it can persuade itself to be, and much more so, in words at least, than its principles warrant it in being.² When set free from dogmatic presuppositions, the school of thought which we are now considering tends sometimes to the metaphysical (or rather epistemological) theory called pragmatism, which we have already discussed so far as seemed necessary for our purpose; and sometimes to a purely moralistic conception of religion. On the whole,

¹ If, however, any friends of Ritschl wish to remind me that their master has also said the exact opposite, I admit it. In the first edition of his great work (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, p. 192) he says: 'The acceptance of the idea of God is no practical faith, but an act of theoretic knowledge.' In the third edition (p. 214) this disappears, and we read: 'The acceptance of the idea of God is practical faith, and not an act of theoretic knowledge.' The second opinion is more in harmony with the dominant ideas of his system, which, however, is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies.

² This is especially true of Herrmann, whose inconsistency is sharply rebuked by Pfeiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 202, 203.

this theory of Faith appears in the most favourable light when it is made to support nothing except a system of ethics. The ultimate authority, on which the whole structure rests, is then the 'categorical imperative' of Kant, the autonomous conscience.¹ The will is king—the will to obey conscience, to do right and make the right triumph.

As a theory of Faith, it has seized one side of the truth ; for the fundamental religious instinct does develop, on one very important side, into an imperious desire to shape our surroundings. The religious equivalent of the pragmatist's 'conation which determines truth' is the thirst for God which bears witness that it is caused by God. Desire does not determine truth, but truth does determine desire, and makes itself known through and as desire. But as in former chapters, we find here too that one-sidedness is fatal. I am certain that one of the great causes of what are called 'difficulties' in the way of Faith is the assumption that the universe was designed simply and solely as a school of moral discipline and probation for human beings. It appears to me that this is a survival of a pre-scientific view of the universe. It was tenable when geocentric theories prevailed ; it is not tenable now. Our planet, and our species, have no such exclusive importance. And as for the exclusively moral character attributed to the Deity, do we really admire a character which is exclusively moral ? Do we feel much respect for one who is blind to all sense of beauty and willingly ignorant of all facts that cannot at once be converted into moral obligations ? Is

¹ Note the following definition of Faith by the Ritschlian Herrmann : 'Religious Faith in God is, rightly understood, just the medium by which the universal demand of the moral law becomes individualised for the individual man in his particular place in the world's life, so as to enable him to recognise its absoluteness on the ground of his self-certainty, and the ideal drawn in it as his own personal end.' Thus God vanishes in the moral order of the world and religion in morality. This however, was not Ritschl's own position : he distinguishes between religion and morals, and compares Christianity to an elliptical figure revolving round those two *foci*. But this part of his system—one of his many illogical concessions—seems to me of very little interest or importance.

it really a worthy or a possible conception of God, that He is interested only in conduct, and is destitute of anything corresponding to what in us are called intellectual and æsthetic interests? If we wish to believe in such a Deity, we are certainly wise to construct a world for ourselves out of our wishes and sentiments, for the real world will contradict our belief at every turn.

The limitations of exclusive moralism are very apparent. It is an irrational type, since it has no standard except the moral consciousness. It will not even ask why things are right or wrong; and so it often confounds things indifferent with things morally wrong, and erects senseless puritanical *tabus*. It rejects happiness and beauty as objects, and lays a coarse and heavy hand on the beautiful things of the world. It is apt to be hard and unsympathetic, and does not escape a sort of sour worldliness.

Matthew Arnold calls this type the Hebraic, as opposed to the Hellenic, which represents the intellectual and artistic ideals of life. He accuses his fellow-countrymen of following the Hebrew ideal too exclusively, and neglecting the Hellenic. Santayana, in speaking of the typically Protestant civilisation, brings a similar indictment in clever satirical form. 'Protestantism is convinced of the importance of success and prosperity; it abominates what is disreputable; contemplation seems to it idleness, solitude selfishness, and poverty a sort of dishonourable punishment. It is constrained and punctilious in righteousness; it regards a married and industrious life as typically godly, and there is a sacredness to it, as of a vacant Sabbath, in the unoccupied higher spaces which such an existence leaves for the soul. It lacks the notes of disillusion, humility, and speculative detachment. Its benevolence is optimistic and aims at raising men to a conventional well-being; it thus misses the inner appeal of Christianity, which begins by renunciation and looks to

spiritual freedom and peace. . . . It is a part of Protestantism to be austere, energetic, unwearied in some laborious task. The end and profit are not so much regarded as the mere habit of self-control and practical devotion and steadiness. The point is to accomplish something, no matter what; so that Protestants show on this ground some respect even for an artist—when he has once achieved success.¹

Such are some of the fruits of making Faith exclusively an act of the will, or moral sense. In my next lecture I shall show how the prevailing distrust of theoretical constructions has given birth to a peculiar kind of empiricism in religion, which has produced rather startling developments in the Roman Church.

¹ Santayana, *Reason in Religion*, p. 116.

CHAPTER X

FAITH BASED ON PRACTICAL NEEDS—MODERNISM

THE rulers of the Roman Church have always fully recognised the great influence of Faith upon conduct, and have paid careful attention to the formation of beliefs. The whole educational method of Romanism assumes quite frankly that it is desirable to prejudice the minds of the young in favour of certain beliefs, and that it is justifiable to use almost any means to strengthen and confirm them. The mind of the child, under Catholicism, is moulded into a particular shape almost from his cradle ; even in the elementary school-room he is not allowed to breathe a non-Catholic atmosphere ; and in mature life he is forbidden to question, even in thought, what his Church has taught him. In many cases this system is as successful in producing the type of character desired as Sandow's gymnastic course is in producing a muscular frame. The Catholic lives and dies in an untroubled assurance that he has possession of the truth ; he performs a number of actions, some morally estimable, others morally indifferent, some perhaps morally flagitious, in obedience to his directors, and abstains from others. Like a hothouse flower, he blooms luxuriantly when carefully shielded from the rude winds of free thought and free discussion.

Catholicism is best regarded as an art of holiness. The theory and method of the system are those of all artistic training. The disciple wishes to acquire certain aptitudes—in this case, a certain kind of character—and he puts himself under the care of trained experts who tell him how

the desired result is to be attained. The young painter does not enquire whether the relation between his pigments and the object which he is trying to copy is 'real' or 'apparent'; he is content if he can produce the effect of a tree or river upon his canvas. A sham relic or miracle is as good as a real one in stimulating emotion, if it is believed in. And the promised results do follow. The Catholic discipline does produce peace of mind and self-control; it economises energy by prohibiting experiments; it counteracts the effect of individual weakness, and utilises one line at least of racial experience.

The merits and defects of this system have been already considered under the head of Authority. Here we have only to note its pragmatic character in all that falls outside religious truth. It is so much more important to avoid sin than to have correct opinions on scientific matters, that error and even imposture will often be encouraged in the interest of belief and conduct.

And yet Catholicism can never acquiesce in the subjectivism and anti-intellectualism of the philosophy which we have just been discussing. Catholic theology is built on a foundation of Greek philosophy, and is intimately connected with the transcendental realism of Plato and Plotinus, modified but not contradicted by the study of Aristotle. The Roman Church has anathematised the Kantian doctrine which confines our knowledge to phenomena; it asserts that the being and attributes of God may be proved intellectually. The active intervention of God in human affairs is rescued from the clutches of the mechanical sciences, not by scepticism about the objective existence of the phenomenal world, but by belief in the supernatural. Belief in miracle, not only certain miracles in the past, guaranteed by authority, but in miracle as a part of the constitution of the world, is an essential part of Catholicism. The Catholic view of the world is a modified realism, within which it is possible to distinguish two 'orders,' the natural and the

supernatural, interacting on the same plane. The Church has left to its philosophers great latitude in attempting to determine the relations of the time-process to eternity, and has never shrunk from crude pictorial images in its exoteric teaching. But it has consistently refused either to accept idealism, in the post-Kantian sense, or to abandon the supernaturalism which forms the connecting link between God and nature.

Modern science has inflicted a grievous wound upon this system by its denial of the miraculous. The nature of the quarrel between science and Catholic orthodoxy, on this head, is often misunderstood. Apologists are pleased when they find that wonderful cases of 'mind-cure' can be substantiated. But this line of defence can only prove that a few alleged miracles are not miraculous, not that any miracles are true or possible. What is necessary for Catholicism is to prove the intercalation of the genuinely supernatural with the natural, and this would be a refutation of the uniformity of natural law, the working hypothesis of all the sciences. The scientific habit of mind, with its exacting rule of testimony, has become so general that belief in miracles grows harder every year. There are still a good many people who are unable or unwilling to separate *Wahrheit* and *Dichtung*, truth of fact from imaginative representation ; but their number dwindles, and those who retain the old beliefs on æsthetic grounds are less earnest defenders of the faith than the genuinely superstitious ; their religion is little more than a mode of refined enjoyment. This blow has fallen with the greatest severity on the ecclesiastical machinery. The sacerdotal and sacramental system of the Catholic Church is based on supernatural mechanism—on divine interventions in the physical world conditioned by human agency. If these interventions do not take place, almost all that makes Catholicism attractive to the laity and lucrative to the hierarchy has vanished.

It was only to be expected that intelligent priests in the Roman Church, who understand the gravity of the situation, should endeavour to find a sounder basis for Catholic truth than this discredited theory of supernatural interventions. We have seen that there is much in the Catholic view of life which is in sympathy with pragmatism, and that the sceptical Nominalists of the Middle Ages came very near to this theory of knowledge. Accordingly, it was inevitable that the suggestion should be made that the traditional realism of Catholic apologetics should be abandoned; and that by reducing the external world to a mere system of instruments, arranged by the human mind for its own purposes, relief might be found for distressed faith. On this hypothesis, there is no sacredness or inviolability in natural laws, in and for themselves. They are approximately true, as diagrams of everchanging phenomena, fixed, for purposes of observation, in a series of discontinuous pictures, like the successive scenes of a cinematograph. But even if the theoretical abstractions of the intellect corresponded accurately to concrete fact, which is not the case, what is the understanding but the tool and instrument of the will? We want to know only in order that we may act and live. These static laws, of which we have made such bug-bears, are of very subordinate importance. The real world is the world of will and feeling, the world of action; and if religious truths—the dogmas of the Church—are found to belong to this sphere, and not to the inferior order of existential fact, that is only what we should expect and desire to hear about them.

The philosophical defence of the Modernist position has been conducted mainly by Frenchmen, among whom Le Roy¹ and Laberthonnière² may be named. As Catholics,

¹ *Dogme et Critique.*

² *Le Réalisme Chrétien et l'Idéalisme Grec; Essais de philosophie religieuse.*

these writers are anxious not to be classed as Kantians, since the name of Kant is obnoxious to the Roman Church ; and in truth they do not define their philosophical position very clearly. In Laberthonnière it takes the form of a revolt against 'Greek idealism,' which, he considers, was occupied with *things*, while Christianity is occupied with *life*. The Greek asked, What are things ? The Christian asks, Whence came I, and whither go I ? The Greeks were insatiable in their desire to see and know ; and in consequence Greek morality is only an aspect of metaphysics. For the Greek, evil is ignorance ; good is truth, and truth is the adequate representation of things. To think is everything, because thought is sight *par excellence*. So came into existence the Greek philosophy of concepts. Plato and Aristotle are agreed in the service which they demand of their 'Ideas.' It is by them that they find the one in the multiple, and the stable in the mobile. These ideas are not *our* ideas but eternal essences, the determinations of which we receive without putting anything into them ourselves. Thus Greek philosophy is an intellectualism or rationalism. It begins with the desire to think and see, and so it ends with a world of ideas. To enter into the unchanging intelligible world is salvation. Thought is the beginning, middle, and end of life.

The fact of individuality, says Laberthonnière, always embarrassed the Greek thinkers. The individual was something which ought not to exist. They longed to wipe out all dividing lines. Theirs was a 'static' ideal, good only to contemplate. But an ideal which can be thus contemplated is necessarily an impoverished view of reality, because it is like a photograph of something which is always in motion. It gives us a picture of movement stiffened into unnatural immobility ; we contemplate a picture, which can only give us some aspects, and perhaps not the most significant, of the living, changing reality. Greek philosophy provides us neither with a science of origins

nor a science of ends. It attaches itself to forms only. Hence follows a sovereign indifference to the accidents of life and the events of history ; for whoever can think, can always contemplate ' the ideas ' in their unchanging harmony and beauty. This indifference, which antiquity praised, is the enemy of charity and of progress.

After this indictment of the great Greek thinkers, our Modernist proceeds to contrast with ' Greek idealism ' the genius of Christianity. Christianity is preoccupied with life, not with things. It is not a system of ideas, fixed and unchanging, above the changing reality of the world, but it is constituted by events occupying a place in the time-series. It is itself a history, and the history is itself a doctrine, a concrete doctrine. The Bible explains the facts of history by stating them in their ' dynamic ' relations—*e.g.* investing the figure of Jesus of Nazareth with the attributes proper to the founder of a great Church, such as He actually did found, though without intending it. The inspired historian ' looked higher ' than literal fact ; he narrates history in the light of his knowledge of the whole drama, of which he is only giving us the first act. Christ is not simply an object of historic certitude ; he is also an object of Faith. And it is the latter aspect which is of practical importance.

At this point the Modernists divide ; it is impossible to attribute to them as a body any one doctrine about the historical side of Christianity. They desire, for the most part, that criticism rather than philosophy should be regarded as the starting-point of the movement. The authors of *The Programme of Modernism* (p. 16) say : ' So far from our philosophy dictating our critical method, it is the critical method that has of its own accord forced us to a very tentative and uncertain formulation of various philosophical conclusions.' But, in point of fact, some members of the school are primarily philosophical theologians, while others are primarily critics. And it is the

specialists in Biblical criticism who are the most radical members of the school.¹

Laberthonnière sounds an uncertain note² on the value of the historical facts narrated in the Gospels. But there is no hesitation or obscurity about M. Loisy's attitude. The Gospels, he says, are like the Pentateuch, a patchwork of history and legend. Even the Synoptics contradict each other. In Mark the life of Jesus follows a progressive development. The first to infer his Messiahship is Simon Peter at Cæsarea Philippi; and Jesus Himself first declares it openly in His trial before the Sanhedrim. In Matthew and Luke, on the contrary, Jesus is presented to the public as the Son of God from the beginning of His ministry; He comes forward at once as the supreme Lawgiver, the Judge, the anointed of God. The Fourth Gospel goes further still. His heavenly origin, His priority to the world, His co-operation in the work of creation and salvation, are ideas which are foreign to the other Gospels, but which the author of the Fourth Gospel has set forth in his Prologue, and in part put into the mouth of John the Baptist. The difference between the Christ of the Synoptic Gospels and the Christ of John may be summed up by saying that 'the Christ of the Synoptics is historical, but not God; the Johannine Christ is divine, but not historical.'

Even Mark, M. Loisy thinks, probably only incorporates an eyewitness document. The Gospel which bears his name was issued, probably about fifteen years later than the destruction of Jerusalem, by a non-Palestinian Christian, who lived perhaps at Rome. The Gospel of Matthew was written by a non-Palestinian Jew who lived in Asia Minor or Syria, about the beginning of the second century. He writes in the interest of Catholic ecclesiasticism, and may well have been a presbyter or bishop who wished to

¹ Cf. my article on 'Modernism' in the *Quarterly Review* for April 1909.

² Compare p. 50 and p. 60 of his *Réalisme Chrétien*.

advocate the monarchic episcopate. The chapters about the birth of Christ seem not to have the slightest historical foundation. The story of the Virgin Birth turns on a misunderstood text of Isaiah. Of this part of the Gospel Loisy says, 'Rien n'est plus arbitraire comme exégèse, ni plus faible comme narration fictive.' The Third Gospel, he proceeds, was probably written in the last decade of the first century ; but the first edition, which traced the descent of Christ through Joseph from David, has been tampered with in the interests of the later idea of a Virgin Birth. As for the Fourth Gospel, it is enough to say that the author had nothing to do with the son of Zebedee, and that he is in no sense a biographer of Christ, but the first and greatest of the Christian mystics.

We have then, according to M. Loisy, only very corrupt sources for a biography of Christ. And the only chance of reconstructing the actual events lies in forming a mental picture of the Galilean Prophet, and rejecting all that fails to correspond to it. This picture, for M. Loisy, is that of an enthusiastic peasant, 'of limited intelligence,' who came to fancy Himself the Messiah, and met His death in a foolhardy and pathetic attempt to proclaim a theocracy at Jerusalem. Any statements in the Gospels which contradict this theory are summarily rejected in the name of what the Germans call *Wirklichkeitssinn*. The guillotine falls upon them and there is an end of it. The Resurrection is of course dismissed as unworthy of discussion. The corpse of Jesus was thrown, with those of the two brigands, into '*quelque fosse commune*,' and 'the conditions of burial were such that after a few days it would have been impossible to recognise the remains of the Saviour, if any one had thought of looking for them.'¹ The disciples, however, had been too profoundly stirred by hope to accept defeat. They hardly realised that their Master was dead ; they had fled to their homes before the last scene ; and besides, they

¹ Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, chap. vii.

were fellow-countrymen of those who thought it quite possible that Jesus was John the Baptist come to life again. What more natural than that Peter should see his Master one day while fishing on the lake? 'The impulse once given, the belief grew by the very need which it had to strengthen itself.' Christ soon appeared also to 'the eleven.' So their faith brought them back to Jerusalem, and the Christian Church was born.

'The supernatural life of Christ in the faithful and in the Church has been clothed in a historical form, which has given birth to what we might somewhat loosely call the Christ of legend.' 'Such a criticism does away with the possibility of finding in Christ's teaching even the embryonic form of the Church's later theological teaching.'¹ The Christ whom the Church worships is the product of Christian Faith and love. He is a purely ideal figure; and it betrays a total absence of the historical sense, and a total inability to distinguish between things so essentially different as Faith and fact, to seek for His likeness in the Prophet of Nazareth.

This new apologetic is likely to take away the breath of the ordinary Christian believer. The Modernist professes himself ready to admit not only all that a sane and impartial criticism might demand with reference to the Gospel history, but the most fantastic theories of the destructive school. And then, having cheerfully surrendered the whole citadel of orthodox apologetics, he turns round and says that nothing is lost—that for his part he claims to be treated as a good son of the Church, and wishes to be allowed to recite her creeds and observe her discipline. Let us see how he seeks to justify this position.

I have already (in speaking of Church authority) said something about the Modernist theory of development. The Church is made to take the place of Christ. It is the

¹ *The Programme of Modernism*, pp. 82, 83, 90.

life of the Church which constitutes Christianity. This great institution has had to live in the world, and to adapt itself, like every other organism, to its environment. 'If,' says M. Loisy, 'Christianity is made to consist in Faith in God as our Father, which is the extreme form of the anti-Catholic and Protestant idea, all the hierarchical, dogmatic, and ritual development of the Church falls outside true Christianity, and appears as a progressive deterioration of the religion.'¹ But these developments were all necessary, if the Church was to survive; and since we may presume that Jesus wished His society to survive, we may say that He would have approved whatever was necessary to be done, in order that the Church, in saving itself, might save His Gospel.² 'To reproach the Catholic Church with the developments of its constitution is to reproach it for having lived.'³ It is very unlike the society which Jesus gathered round Him; but what of that? When you want to convince yourself of the identity of an individual, you do not try to squeeze him into his cradle.⁴

The right of change and self-adaptation is not confined to the externals of government and ritual. Dogmas are only the images of truth, not as it is in itself, but as it appears to our minds. And if they wear out, as they do sometimes, or cease to be helpful, they may be altered without scruple. The value of symbols (and all dogma is symbolic) depends solely on the sense which we attach to them; in themselves they are nothing. And the sense which we attach to them is above all a practical sense. 'A dogma proclaims, above all, a prescription of practical order; it is the formula of a rule of practical conduct.'⁵ Religion is not an intellectual adhesion to a system of speculative propositions. 'Why then should we not bring theory into harmony with practice?'⁶

¹ Loisy, *L'Évangile et l'Église*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³ Le Roy, *Dogme et Critique*, p. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Le Roy gives us some examples of this Catholic pragmatism. When we say, 'God is personal,' we mean, 'behave in our relations with God as you do in your relations with a human person.' When we say, 'Jesus is risen from the dead,' we mean, 'treat Him as if He were your contemporary.' Similarly, the doctrine of the Real Presence means that we should take, in presence of the consecrated elements, the same attitude as we should in presence of the actual Jesus.

His main theses may be summed up in his own words. 'The current intellectualist conception renders insoluble most of the objections which are now raised against the idea of dogma. A doctrine of the primacy of action, on the contrary, permits us to solve the problem without abandoning anything of the rights of thought, or of the exigencies of dogma.'¹ M. Le Roy shows in the sequel that he 'saves' dogma by separating it entirely from scientific fact. He regards all theological and dogmatic propositions as principles of action, not statements of fact, and then argues that since on every page he proclaims that action is more important than thought, and the dynamic aspect of things of higher worth than the static, he has triumphantly vindicated the claims of dogma against unbelieving rationalism. 'A dogma,' he says, 'is a truth belonging to the vital order; it presents its object under the forms of the action commanded to us by it, and the obligation to adhere to it concerns properly its practical significance, its vital value.'²

What, then, is the value and meaning of the scientific truth which M. Le Roy is so eager to reduce to its proper insignificance? It would really seem as if it had none, except what we choose to put into it. 'No fact has any existence and scientific value except in and by a theory, whence it follows that strictly speaking it is the *savant* who makes the scientific facts.'³

¹ Le Roy, *Dogme et Critique*, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

There is a great resemblance between the position of M. Le Roy and that of our leading English Modernist, Mr. Tyrrell. 'The world of appearance,' he says,¹ 'is simply subordinate and instrumental to the real world of our will and affections² in which we live the life of love and hate, and pass from one will-attitude to another in relation to other wills than our own. . . . In this region truth has a practical and teleological sense—it is the trueness of a means to an end, of an instrument to its purpose; and like these truths it is to some extent conditioned by what we know and believe about its object. . . . Hence the religiously important criticism to be applied to points of Christian belief, whether historical, philosophic, or scientific, is not that which interests the historian, philosopher, or scientist, but that which is supplied by the spirit of Christ. Does the belief make for the love of God and man? Does it show us the Father and reveal to us our sonship?' The truth of the creed is a practical or regulative truth. It is serviceable to life, and therefore cannot be a mere fiction, for no lie can be serviceable to life on an universal scale. 'Beliefs that have been found to foster and promote the spiritual life of the soul must so far be in accordance with the nature and the laws of that will-world with which it is the aim of religion to bring us into harmony: their practical value results from, and is founded in, their representative value.' Our assurance of their truth rests on 'the universally proved value of the creed as a practical guide—the consensus of the ethical and religious *orbis terrarum*.'³

'The rule of prayer is the rule of belief.' This means that what alone concerns us is to realise the 'prayer-value' of the various articles in the creed. For instance,

¹ Tyrrell, *Lex Orandi*, chap. viii. (abridged).

² Note the characteristic confusion of the will and the affections.

³ An excellent example of the Catholic *petitio principii*. The Roman Church constitutes the ethical and religious *orbis terrarum*. The Roman Church finds its dogmas practically valuable. Therefore the universal value of the dogmas to ethics and religion is proved.

the belief in God has been fashioned by the religious needs of man's nature.¹ The puzzle about free-will means that our will belongs to the world of realities, whereas our understanding can represent things only in terms of the world of appearances.² 'The understanding is but an instrument fashioned by the will to serve as a guide to life and action.'³ 'The doctrine of the Trinity is the creation of love and life.'⁴ 'While Christianity with its Trinity of divine Persons, its God made man, its pantheon of divinised men and women, is open to the superficial charge of being a reversion to the pagan polytheistic type, it is rather to be regarded as taking up into a higher synthesis those advantages of polytheism which had to be sacrificed for the greater advantages of a too abstract and soul-starving monotheism.'⁵ The 'facts of religious history must, as matters of Faith, be determined by the criterion of Faith, i.e. by their proved religious values.'⁶ 'A man will be justified in holding to the facts until he is convinced that their religious value is in no way imperilled by the results of historical criticism.' 'Mistakings of faith-values for fact-values are to be ascribed to the almost ineradicable materialism of the human mind which makes us view the visible world as the only solid reality.'⁷

Enough has now been said to show what form pragmatism takes in the Roman Church. M. le Roy says very truly, that the ordinary Roman Catholic 'lives pragmatism' to a much larger extent than he realises. He chooses among the doctrines of his Church those which appeal to him, and passively accepts the rest, without making them part of his religion. He may even try experiments at one shrine after another. The Madonna of Lourdes may be kind, though her namesake at La Salette is difficult; if

¹ *Lex Orandi*, p. 73.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁵ P. 149. This is again a characteristic utterance which shows the vast gulf between Roman Catholicism and other forms of Christianity.

⁶ P. 169.

⁷ P. 191.

St. Anne is not sufficiently attentive to his supplications, he may try St. Joseph. Moreover, the whole Roman Church has, in point of fact, lived and thriven by self-adaptation very much as the Modernists say. Certainly it may seem a strange 'note' of divine assistance, that a Church should be obliged to change like a chameleon in self-defence; but it is a tenable view that since Rome became less pliant and receptive, she has lost ground everywhere. And pragmatism may be called in to explain accommodations which would otherwise be rather difficult to justify. Nevertheless, I believe this method of apologetics to be fundamentally unsound, when applied, as the Modernists apply it, to justify their own position in the Roman Church. It is plain that the 'facts of religion' are no facts for them. M. Loisy's Jesus may have been a more respectable Messiah than Theudas, but he belongs to the same category. There has been, after all, a real breach of continuity, and no mere development, in the Church as they conceive it; and it is a breach which divides the Church from the historical Christ. It is as if one were to trace one's descent from some great man, and to establish every link except the first:—our ancestor was after all wrongly supposed to be the son of the great man; or the great man was only a myth. It is quite impossible to justify this position by disparaging existential truth. If it does not matter whether the Incarnation was a fact or a legend; if Faith can create dogmas with the same freedom which Plato's Socrates claims in inventing his myths; if things exist only as instruments for the will, and all events are plastic under the hand of the religious imagination; we are transported into a world where there is no difference between fact and fiction, and where it is difficult to suppose that human conduct can matter much. Such a contempt for actuality is far removed from the Christian view of the world. It will of course be said that it is only religious symbols which are thus removed from the

existential order ; and that it is just because the Modernist has so great respect for historical accuracy, that he carries his critical apparatus even into the holy places of the Christian origins. But with what object is the historical form retained for Faith, when it is rejected as fact ? For whose benefit does the Modernist priest go on praying to the Queen of Heaven, whom he believes to be a purely mythical personage ? Not for his own surely. It would be a strange attitude of mind to be able to offer petitions to a being whom, at the time of praying, one conceived of as non-existent. Then it must be for the sake of the uninstructed laity. But, putting aside the moral objection that might be raised, is it not significant that those who can find comfort and help in such devotions are entirely convinced of the historical facts which the Modernist finds himself unable to accept ? Would any simple Catholic feel that the foundations of his Faith were not assailed by M. Loisy's *Les Évangiles Synoptiques* ? It may be asserted with confidence, that 'dogmatic symbols' are only helpful to those who can find in them an actual bridge between the spiritual and material worlds—just that kind of bridge which the Modernists, as critics, reject as impossible. 'The historian,' says M. Loisy, 'does not remove God from history ; he never encounters Him there.' Now this assumption (for it is of course an assumption to say that God never manifests Himself in history) is absolutely fatal to Catholicism as a living and working Faith. Whatever changes the Roman Church may make, to adjust itself to changing circumstances, it is safe to predict that it will never accept a God who 'never intervenes in history.' The whole system of Catholicism—its sacraments, its discipline, its festivals, its priesthood, is bound up with the belief that God does intervene in history. Those who think otherwise seem to be liable to the reproach which they most of all dislike—that of scholastic intellectualism and neglect of concrete experience.

The authors of the *Programme of Modernism* seem to be right in saying that the philosophy of the movement grew out of its critical studies. There are many intelligent priests in the Roman Church who have become keenly alive to the immense difficulties which historical criticism has raised in the way of traditional beliefs. They can no longer believe what the Church requires them to believe. And yet they are conscious of no rebellion against the spirit of Catholicism. They are ardently loyal and enthusiastic Catholics. Their faith is unimpaired, but it no longer rests on the old base, or carries with it conviction that whatever the Church teaches is true. In this dire perplexity (and we must all sympathise with them in an *impasse* which by no means confronts the Roman Church alone) they turn eagerly to a popular and confident school of philosophy which seems to interpret the situation for them, and to offer them a way of honourable escape from it. The separation of truths of Faith from truths of fact; the primacy of will and feeling over discursive thought; the right to believe what we wish to believe 'at our own risk'—what is this but the very solution they were craving for? And now they find this position maintained by philosophers of repute, who have no personal reason for wishing to justify it. We cannot wonder that voluntarism and pragmatism have made many eager disciples among the liberal clergy.

And yet they are wrong. This philosophy, which seems to promise them an honourable truce between the old Faith which they love and the new knowledge which they cannot ignore, would in reality, if followed up seriously and not merely grasped at in controversial straits, lead them far outside Christianity. It rests on a very deep-rooted scepticism—on a psychology which tries to be a self-sufficing philosophy, independent of objective truth. It is Kantianism without the moral absolutism which gave Kant a πού στῶ. It is a mere experimental opportunism which

can never rise to a high spiritual level, because it acknowledges no fixed eternal standard to which our actions can be referred. Even God, if the idea of God is retained, can be only an ideal projected by the mind, not an objective fact. The scepticism is of a peculiarly intractable nature, because it involves the instrument of thought. We are hardly allowed to form concepts, because all is in a state of flux, and nothing remains the same while we are thinking about it.

Such a philosophy would never have attracted Christian priests except at a time of exceptional difficulty and perplexity. The aid which it brings is illusory ; it enables a priest to blow hot and cold with the same mouth and feel no qualms, but it offers no solution of the problem ; it leaves the tension between Faith and fact as great as before. The Pope was quite right in condemning Modernism ; he could not possibly have done otherwise ; though we may regret that he fails to realise the severity of the crisis, and suggests no way out of it except the impossible one of return to tradition and St. Thomas Aquinas. The treatment of the Modernists is ungenerous ; the total failure of the Vatican to understand the loyalty and distress of these unwilling 'heretics' is not a good omen for the future.

The consideration of these current controversies has provided, I hope, an illustration of what is the main subject of these two lectures—the results of the attempt to separate Faith entirely from scientific or theoretical knowledge. The conclusion which I maintain is that Faith is not independent of the intellectual processes, and that whatever form dualism takes—whether, with Kant, we separate the theoretical from the practical reason, or, with Ritschl, judgments of fact from judgments of value, or, with Loisy, the Christ of Faith from the Christ of history—the result is profoundly unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER XI

FAITH AND REASON

WE have now to consider the place of the intellect in religious belief. The view that the subject-matter of religion is a system of facts and laws, which can be studied and known like any other subject of knowledge, is called rationalism. The word is often used by religious people as a synonym for scepticism or infidelity. But in fact rationalism has quite as often been orthodox as heretical. The scholastic (especially the Thomist) theology, which is still officially recognised by the Roman Catholic Church as the philosophy of the Christian religion, is mainly¹ rationalistic, within certain prescribed limits. God has revealed certain truths to mankind ; but the authority of the revelation, though not its contents, has been guaranteed by signs offered to the reason. Moreover, the existence of God is not only known by revelation, but can also be demonstrated by reason. Nor does official Rome show any disposition to recede from this position. When Brunetière, some years ago, announced ' the bankruptcy of the sciences,' and, in the interests of Catholic orthodoxy, separated Faith from knowledge, the Archbishop of Paris reprimanded him, and referred him to St. Thomas Aquinas, who says that ' Faith presupposes natural knowledge, though that which in and for itself can be proved and known may be an object of Faith to those who cannot understand the proof.' A

¹ The *Summa Theologiae* contains many sound statements about the province of the will in determining belief ; but St. Thomas does not, like so many moderns, set the will against the intellect in order to disparage the latter.

Papal decree of 1855 declares that 'rational conclusions can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spiritual nature of the soul, and the freedom of the will.'¹ The Vatican Council of 1870 decreed: '*Si quis dixerit Deum unum et verum naturali rationis lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit.*' The Modernists are blamed for abandoning this position. Again, the evidential school in England, long held in special honour at Cambridge in the person of Paley, is crudely rationalistic. Paley, who expresses his surprise that in Apostolic times more stress was not laid on the arguments from miracle and prophecy, which seemed to him so convincing, is equally confident of the irresistible cogency of the argument from design, which he thus enunciates. 'The marks of design are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have a designer. That designer must be a Person. That Person is God.'

Speculative idealism, as a philosophy of religion, gives us examples of intellectualism—one can hardly say of rationalism—of a very different kind. Speculative idealism substitutes truth of idea for truth of fact; or rather, it regards ideas as the real facts. I have already quoted Fichte's dictum that we are saved by metaphysics and not by history. Hegel's absolute idealism, or Panlogism, as it is sometimes called, the most imposing philosophical edifice ever reared, belongs to this type. But Kant was also a rationalist on one side—the side on which his modern admirers do not follow him. Among Christian apologists Newman is sometimes thoroughly rationalistic in language, as when he says: 'What I mean by theology is simply the science of God, or the truths we know about God, put into a system, just as we have a science of the stars and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth and call it geology.'² This, however, is not Newman's real position. He belongs, like Pascal, to the type of sceptical orthodoxy.

¹ Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 387.

² Cf. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 435.

Orthodox rationalism is associated, above all, with the famous 'proofs' of God's existence, which were very roughly handled by Kant, and are at present much out of favour. I wish to indicate, as well as I can in a very brief discussion, what value can, in my opinion, still be attached to them.

The *ontological* argument in its scholastic form concludes from the notion of God as the most perfect being, the fact of His existence; because existence is certainly involved in the idea of perfection. Descartes states it in a form which is scarcely defensible. 'God's existence can no more be separated from His essence, than the idea of a mountain from that of a valley.' 'It is true,' he goes on, 'that I may imagine a winged horse, though no winged horses exist; but the cases are not analogous, for I can think of a non-existent Pegasus, but I cannot conceive of God except as existing, which shows that existence is inseparable from Him.' In other words, the ontological assertion cannot be claimed for all ideas, but only for necessary ones, such as the ideas of perfection and infinity, that is to say, of God. Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, states the argument more attractively. 'Our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation or conception that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute non-entity—that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence; much less could our imperfect being create the entity of so vast a thought as that of an infinitely perfect being out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore that, was there no God, the idea of an absolutely perfect being could never have been made or feigned.'¹

Kant convicts the ontological argument of two errors. First, the purely logical possibility of the notion of an *ens realissimum* is transformed into a real possibility, and

¹ Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, vol. i. chap. v.

secondly actual existence is deduced from the notion as one of the attributes implied in it ; which is, he says, much the same as to deduce from the idea of a hundred dollars the existence of that sum in my pocket.

This obvious criticism, which had been made long before Kant, is only fatal to the crudest form of the ontological proof. Hegel rehabilitated the argument in his own fashion. 'The content is right,' he said ; 'it is only the form which is defective.' In his philosophy the idea itself is the absolute, and 'it would be strange to deny to it even the poorest category, that of being.' This, however, is not what religion wants to prove about God. But Hegel also argues that thought, which is a spiritual act, must have its ground in a spiritual principle which is also the ground of nature. The agreement of the ideal laws of thought with the real laws of being, is a fact of experience. There must then be a common ground of both.

Lotze gave the argument a new and characteristic turn, replacing logical proof by immediate certainty of 'living feeling.' It would be 'intolerable' to believe that perfection exists only in our thought, and has no power or being in the world of reality. This removes the argument from its intellectualist basis. God exists, because Faith pronounces it 'intolerable' that He should not. It is intolerable, not unthinkable. It is possible to conceive of such a condition, but only by assuming that the world is bad and meaningless. And we reject such an idea by an act of reasonable Faith.

Professor Ladd ¹ restates the argument in a shape somewhat nearer to its earlier form. All beliefs and cognitions, he says, depend upon an ontological proof or postulate. Every argument for every kind of reality presupposes that we are in contact with ontological truth. 'What is so connected with our experience of reality that it is essential to explain that experience is believed to be real.'

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i. p. 309.

The real force of the ontological argument lies in the reasonable and stubbornly confident claim of the human spirit to be in some sort of contact with the highest reality. The very conception of objective truth is most reasonably accounted for by supposing it to be a 'revelation' from Him who is the truth. Whence comes our idea of God, if not from God Himself? Who else could have put it there? Since then we certainly have an idea of God, and since only God can have put it into our minds, we may infer that God exists. This argument was unfortunately split into two halves in the scholastic period, and took the following unsatisfactory form: (1) The idea of God implies His existence; (2) Our consciousness of God can only be explained by an external divine revelation. Both these are false, the former for the reasons already stated, and the latter because the existence of an Absolute Spirit could not be revealed in such a manner. But when we say that God only can have implanted in our minds the thought of God, we are, it seems to me, using a good argument. We cannot get behind the conviction that 'all existence rests upon a Being the fountain of whose life is within Himself; we must ally the fugitive phenomena, which colour the stream of life with ever-changing lives, to an eternal and unchanging existence.'¹ It is impossible, if we think honestly, to regard the conception of God as a purely subjective development. 'This conception, as human reason has somehow succeeded in framing it, seems to the same reason to demand the reality of God.'²

The *cosmological* argument, in its earliest form, as we find it in Aristotle, concludes from the motion in the world to a first mover. Man is dissatisfied with the fragmentary pictures which his experience of the world presents to him; he wants to find the ultimate causative principle. So he arrives at the idea of a divine first cause. Against this

¹ Fichte.

² Ladd, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 50.

time-honoured argument Kant objected that it is useless to search for cause beyond cause in the hope of finding the beginning of the chain ; the law of causality is only valid for the world of phenomena, and cannot lead us to a first cause beyond the world. Also, we have no reason to seek for any cause of the world outside itself.

We admit readily that the cosmological argument is no longer acceptable in its earlier deistic form, which separates God from the world, and confines His action upon it to the original act of creation. What the religious sense of our day demands is not a Prime Mover but an immanent World-ground. And the demand for an immanent guiding principle, acting in accordance with fixed laws and with a rational purpose, is itself the cosmological argument. What gave us the idea of such a world ? What impels us to find everywhere evidence of law and reason, to be content when we have found them and dissatisfied until we have done so, unless such is indeed the constitution of the real world ? This is in substance the turn which Lotze gives to this argument. The proof is not directed to anything which belongs to the past, but is made to yield an ever present energy as the source and ground of all cosmical change and happening.¹

The *teleological* argument, or argument from design, is treated by Kant with much greater respect than the two preceding 'proofs.' He calls it the oldest, the clearest, and the most rational of the proofs. Nevertheless it shares the fate of the others—that of being implicitly non-suited before the trial begins.² It has a regulative, not a constitutive value. It is a mere introduction to the ontological proof, which he considers himself to have already disposed of.

The argument, as stated fairly enough by Kant, is as

¹ Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 211.

follows. We observe in the world manifest signs of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing over the whole of its vast extent. This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world. The nature of things could not of itself tend towards certain purposes; they must have been chosen and directed by some rational principle, in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause, which is free and intelligent. Its unity may be inferred from the harmony existing between the parts of the world.

It is quite a mistake to suppose that Darwinism, or modern science generally, has destroyed the teleological argument. The naive teleology of Paley is no doubt to a large extent discredited. It is an inner teleology—a vast network of final purposes continually working themselves out in the inextricably complex processes of natural life—to which we are now directed. The very conception of order and law, so far from contradicting the idea of purpose, implies it. The appearance of mechanism is just what we ought to expect from a tremendous power operating constantly and uniformly. What is really significant is that in spite of this appearance of mechanism, in spite of the enormous waste and apparent recklessness of Nature's method, man cannot renounce the idea, nay, the conviction, that an unceasing purpose runs through it all. It is perfectly true, as Kant says, that this drives us back upon the ontological argument again. We have to face the objection that this conviction may have a purely subjective origin. But we have already conceded the righteous and reasonable demand of Faith that when our whole personality—will, thought, and feeling—tells us that we are in the presence of objective truth and reality, we shall believe it.

‘There are many proofs of God's existence, but no demonstrations.’¹ Final postulates of thought are in-

¹ Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, vol. i. p. 9.

capable of demonstration. They are hypotheses, which may be said to be 'proved' if they explain the facts. Some hypotheses, however, are so inwrought with the very texture of rational experience, that to deny them is to destroy experience. Many have thought that we may rest our certainty of God's existence on this ground, and in a sense I agree: but this argument at best only leads half-way to the God of religious Faith.

The history of the *Aufklärung*, and kindred movements in other countries, is very instructive for a due appreciation of the results of pure intellectualism. If it takes the form of rationalism, it tends to slide into naturalistic pantheism. If it takes the form of speculative idealism, it tends to slide into idealistic pantheism. In either case, its final state is to become a cosmological theory, and to fall outside of religion properly so called. A good example in England is John Toland, who in 1696 published his once famous book, *Christianity not Myste-ri-ous*, in which he argues that all the doctrines of Christianity are in complete agreement with 'the religion of reason,' that is, of educated common sense. 'All Faith now in the world,' he writes, 'is entirely built on ratiocination.' He does not reject revelation, but holds that revealed doctrine, though we might not have discovered it for ourselves, is now capable of being proved and verified by common sense. Orthodox Anglican rationalists, like Tillotson and Paley, use much the same language, but lay stress on miracles as signs offered to the understanding in confirmation of the revelation. Tillotson, for instance, says: 'Nothing ought to be received as a divine doctrine and revelation, without good evidence that it is so: that is, without some argument sufficient to satisfy a prudent and considerate man.'¹ Again: 'Faith is an assent of the mind to something revealed by God: now all assent must be grounded upon evidence; that is, no man can believe

¹ Tillotson, *Sermons*, vol. ii. p. 260.

anything, unless he have, or think he hath, some reason to do so. For to be confident of a thing without reason is not Faith, but a presumptuous persuasion and obstinacy of mind.' ¹

It is worth while to contrast these utterances with St. Paul's conception of evangelistic teaching. 'My speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your Faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. Howbeit we speak wisdom among the perfect; yet a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world which are coming to nought: but we speak God's wisdom in a mystery, even the wisdom that hath been hidden, which God foreordained before the world unto our glory.' ² And again: 'By manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.' ³ Few great religious teachers have attached so much importance to mental enlightenment as St. Paul. But he carefully distinguishes the kind of 'knowledge' which makes a man 'spiritual' and capable of discerning spiritual truth, from the prudence and worldly wisdom to which appeal was so frequently made in the eighteenth century. The appeal of the Gospel is not to the logical faculty purged from 'enthusiasm.' That is a temper of mind which precludes acceptance of the evidence which Faith brings with it, namely, what the Apostle calls 'demonstration of the Spirit and power.' It is the peculiarity of revelation that it brings the mind into contact with higher orders of reality and truth than are accessible to worldly prudence and respectability; and these new experiences carry with them their own verification in a new sense of power and spiritual vitality. It is not too much to say that these eighteenth-century divines had quite lost the true meaning of Faith. They regarded

¹ Tillotson, *Sermons*, vol. iv. p. 42.

² 1 Cor. ii. 4-7.

³ 2 Cor. iv. 2.

it as ordinary knowledge or opinion concerned with divine matters. But religious truth is not to be won in this manner. Orthodox rationalism became more and more dry and lifeless ; while some of its defenders, like Toland himself, drifted into pantheistic naturalism, in which the religious valuation of the world quite disappeared.

It is worth noticing how this type of rationalism sometimes shows its affinity with a cold, hard moralism, and with utilitarianism in philosophy. When all the poetical and imaginative side of religion is rigorously banished, the religious sense, which is still not extinguished, may attach itself firmly to conduct, and may give its sanction to a cool-headed ambition to improve the outward conditions of humanity. In this way many excellent men in the last century found a worthy aim and an adequate task. We must always think respectfully of the utilitarian movement which grew out of eighteenth century rationalism.

If utilitarian rationalism may be claimed as a characteristically English type, speculative idealism has been the typical German product of intellectualism. With Leibnitz, and the *Aufklärung* generally, Faith in a divine reason, encompassing the world, and the ground of human reason, had been the basis of belief that universally valid truth is accessible to man.¹ Spinoza made this cosmic reason immanent, so that it is not so much we who think, as God who thinks in us ; and in order to think divinely, we need only purify our souls from all personal interests and selfish aims. But he never taught, like Kant, that our thought is unrelated to objects existing outside itself. His error was in placing this cosmic nature, which thinks in us, too exclusively in intellectual activity. This limitation arose from his great desire to win detachment from mundane concerns, which seemed to him obstacles in the way of cosmic consciousness. The loss involved in one-sided intellectualism was disguised from himself by the mystical

¹ Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit* (translated by Pogson), p. 309.

and genuinely devout side of his own character, which supplied motives and experiences quite alien to the purely speculative nature of his philosophy.¹

With Fichte and Hegel the thought, which Kant had severed from the world, became the workshop in which the whole of reality is created. Thought produces contradictions out of itself and overcomes them, until the whole of existence has been embraced, transmuted, and assimilated into one all-embracing, absolute harmony. For a short time it was thought that this ambitious philosophy had solved the ultimate problem. Then followed a reaction which has threatened to sweep away the substantial gains which these great thinkers really secured for human thought. Their disciples in this country now adopt a much more modest tone, as becomes those who are standing on the defensive. A good example of this school is Principal Caird, who, in his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, thus vindicates for intellect the place of honour in religious Faith :—

‘ It is no valid objection to the endeavour after a rational knowledge of the contents of our religious belief, to say that the primary organ of spiritual knowledge is not reason but Faith. That we must *begin* with intuition is no reason why we should not go on to scientific knowledge. The spontaneous and the reflective tendencies may co-exist. Granting that the act of spiritual apprehension is quite different from intellectual assent, there is still a place left for reason in the province of religion. The science of acoustics is not meaningless because we can hear without it. We act before we reflect ; and religion must exist before it can be made the subject of reflective thought. But in religion as in morality, art, and other spheres of human activity, there is the underlying element of reason which is the characteristic of all the activities of a self-conscious intelligence. To endeavour to elicit and give

¹ Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit* (translated by Pogson), p. 312.

objective clearness to that element—to infuse into the spontaneous and unsifted conceptions of religious experience the objective clearness, necessity, and organic unity of thought—is the legitimate aim of science, in religion as in other spheres. It would be strange if in the highest of all provinces of human experience, intelligence must renounce her claim.

‘What then is the office of intelligence in religion? To purify our intuitions, which often deceive us. Truth is indeed its own witness, but not all that *seems* to be true. We need intellect in order to distinguish that which has a right to dominate the mind from that which derives its influence only from accident and association.

‘Moreover, it is the highest task of philosophy to justify those paradoxes and seeming contradictions in which the religious consciousness finds its natural expression. It seeks to lead us to a higher point of view, from which these seeming contradictions vanish.’

These extracts are not sufficient to make Caird’s standpoint clear. His *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* should be read carefully. He holds that Thought or self-conscious Mind is the only category under which the Infinite can be conceived by us. ‘All other categories are still categories of the finite.’ He agrees with the Intuitivists that religion enables us to rise from the finite to the infinite, and to find the ideal become real.¹ But he considers that feeling, taken at its face value, gives us no sure foundation. We still have to inquire, Is it true? And to this question thought alone can give an answer. Intuitive knowledge which professes to answer this question is not really intuitive or immediate, but inferential, and it is safer to recognise it for what it is.

Edward Caird’s philosophy, though further from orthodox Christianity, at any rate in tone, is very similar to his brother’s. He is equally confident that the right use of

¹ Caldecott, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 149.

reason must lead us to religion. He rejects the Ritschlian value-judgment theory, as luring us into the acceptance of the theoretically false in the guise of the practically true.¹ The mystics, he thinks, are only wrong in being in too great a hurry. The patient processes of thought would give them all that they are eager to snatch.

A particularly good and illuminating discussion of the present attitude of reflective thought towards religion, or rather, I should say, of religion and psychology towards reflective thought, may be found in the *Hibbert Journal* for 1903, in two articles by Professor Henry Jones, of Glasgow. He observes that our possession of the rich inheritance which the nineteenth century has transmitted to us—its store of scientific knowledge and spiritual interests—is threatened by the scepticism which doubts, or even denies, that intellectual inquiry can have any real value in precisely those matters which are best worth knowing. No generation has ever employed intelligence more, or trusted it less, than our own. And yet, as he goes on to say, this is not really a sceptical age. Outside the province of epistemology, which investigates the sources and limits of knowledge, there is no disposition on the part of scientific men to defer to ‘authority,’ as Mr. Balfour would have us do, nor to appeal to immediate assurance, or direct intuition, or the feelings of the heart, instead of to free inquiry, guided only by observation and reason. In all branches of science alike, we find the same conviction of the uniformity of nature and the universality of law. Nor does this faith in the methods of science lead to scepticism in morals and religion. This is an age which believes in God, and in the distinction of right and wrong, as grounded in the nature of things. Our great poets, who are the best representatives of the deeper thought of our time, are profoundly convinced that the spiritual life of man is based on solid foundations. And yet, among professed philosophers,

¹ Caldecott, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 152.

the tide of anti-intellectualism runs very strong. The tendency to give the will supremacy over the speculative intellect, and to interpret the world in terms of human purpose, induces philosophers to use language which if accepted in the world of science would make all science impossible. They assert real discontinuities, uncaused beginnings, and non-logical occurrences in the objective world. Such views are calmly ignored by the scientists; but they are introducing great confusion and perplexity into religious and philosophical thought. Professor Jones maintains that since *both* reason and religion claim dominion over the whole realm of man's nature, to attempt to temporise between them is to be disloyal to both. There can be no delimitation of frontiers where both claimants think they have a right to the whole territory in dispute. And, as he adds, surely with truth, 'No age of the world was ever strong except when Faith and reason went hand in hand, and when man's practical ideals were also his surest truths.' The contradiction, if there is one, between the heart and intellect has somehow to be worked out. The religious and the intellectual spirit of the age are both sincere, and therefore somewhat intolerant. 'There are some things on which the world does not go back, and the right to seek the truth is among the number. The intellectual ardour of the world cannot be damped, far less extinguished, by any theory, blindly advanced in the service of religion, of the radical insecurity of knowledge, or of the incompetence and untrustworthiness of human reason.'

Professor Jones then proceeds to define the issue by an observation which penetrates to the heart of the problem. The standpoint of modern scientific thought is cosmocentric; that of the new psychology is frankly anthropocentric. 'Instead of explaining nature from the being of man,' says a scientific writer, 'we follow the reverse process, and seek to understand human life from the general laws of nature.' On the other hand the pragmatists have

revived the ancient maxim that 'man is the measure of all things.'

Now I must own that my own sympathies are with those who hold the cosmocentric view. 'The conception of reality,' says Professor Jones, 'as a single system, in which man occupies his own irrevocable place, has come to stay. To give it up would be to give up philosophy as well as science, and reasoning as well as philosophy.' If the world is 'wild,' as Professor James thinks, we ought to give up thinking; for connected thought about a disconnected world must be false. But modern thought can never commit suicide in this fashion. That nature and man are in some way continuous, that man is what he is only in virtue of his ontological relation to the world, apart from which he can have neither being nor meaning, is no longer questionable. And yet, so great is the fear engendered by the conception of a cosmos which shuts man up in an iron framework, that we find Lotze reducing natural laws to mere conceptual generalisations, not representing facts in the outer world; we find Ritschlians warning the intelligence from the domain of religion, thus opening the door wide for any superstition; we find Professor James and his followers constructing the universe of enigmatical atoms dignified by the name of persons, and rushing into polytheism.

I have already explained what is the real motive of the attacks upon the intellectual side of our nature which are now so frequently heard. A positive dislike is felt towards the attempt to establish a systematic coherence in the world of experience. It is hoped that the attempt may fail. We are told that there is no such universal system, but only finite particular facts and events. Man, we are reminded, is wider than mere intellect. His moral and religious life falls outside the schematism of the intelligence. It deals with facts 'of another order.'

This last argument I believe to be false and dangerous.

We cannot set up an order of facts which shall be outside the whole intellectual realm. The sphere of the intelligence is not limited in the sense that there are provinces of reality which it cannot touch. No doubt there are many things which we do not know. The world as we know it is not a complete system, and, since all reality is interdependent, no object within it is completely known. But this admission does not oblige us to parcel out the kingdom of truth into several 'orders,' each under the charge of one of our faculties. We have already seen what havoc results from maintaining these rifts within our mental life.

The function of thought is not to invent generalisations and fabricate connecting links. The underlying unity is there already. It is utterly impossible to regard the particular facts as objectively real, and the laws and principles which connect and regulate them as having only a subjective significance. 'Mere ideas' cannot bind together 'real objects.' Or if the particulars also are regarded as merely subjective, everything disappears at once into dreamland. Nothing can be proved false if nothing is taken as true. The sceptic cannot throw his opponent if his own feet are in the air.

It seems therefore that a denial of the Absolute means a denial of the relative as well, and that unless we believe that reality is a coherent system, we can say nothing about the particular existences, which *ex hypothesi* are intrinsically unintelligible.

The pursuit of the Absolute is no invention of the arrogant 'intellectualist.' It is a fact that man always has pursued *the* truth, *the* good, and trusted in a God, who gathers into Himself all the perfections that man is able to conceive. Religion is always a theory of reality. It cannot be separated from the ontological consciousness. Man does pursue absolute ideals, however well he may know that they are never fully attained in his life and action; and in this pursuit his life and his activity consist. He cannot

escape from this law of his being by denying that there is an Absolute. The opponent of absolutism generally sets up an absolute of his own without knowing it: Kant deifies the moral sense, Schopenhauer the irrational will, Hartmann the unconscious, Spencer the unknowable. Even the principle of relativity becomes, with some of its advocates, a kind of absolute.

I must not anticipate the subject of my last lecture, which will be devoted to showing how our conflicting ideals may, as I think, be reconciled. But I wish to consider rather more fully one or two of the reasons which have put intellectualism out of fashion.

A consideration which weighs heavily with many thinkers is connected with the conception of *change*. I have already quoted the Modernists on this point. Scholastic theology opposed the unchangeableness of the Deity to the mutability of the world. But is an absolutely unchanging ground of continuous change thinkable? And if in the *real* world—in the mind of God—there is no change, what is the use of the time-process? If nothing is ultimately real but general laws, universals, which are merely illustrated by happenings in time, is not the world a useless and irrational thing? *Sub specie aeternitatis*, the goal is already attained; *sub specie temporis*, it is unattainable. Whichever way we look at it, activity seems to be useless. In the universe of the intellectualist, they say, nothing ever really happens. The eternal laws of God are elucidated in a million concrete instances; but why is all this illustration necessary? Is it a worthy occupation for the Deity to be perpetually setting Himself easy sums, of which he knows the answer beforehand? Are we to imagine Him playing an unending succession of games of patience by Himself? Does the order of the time-series mean nothing? Might it just as well be read backwards, like a reversed cinematograph? Intellectualism gives us a static universe; and a static universe,

though not unthinkable, is absurd. Beings, such as God has made *us*, claim to live in a world where things really happen, where their energies really count for something and determine something. And if this claim is conceded, the static-intellectualist conception of reality must give way. This claim is made not only in the interests of free-will and morality, but of the rationality of the cosmos.

The difficulty about change and immutability has been recognised by the clearer thinkers among the old philosophers, but has been often forgotten by others who are attracted by the idea of changeless being. Mere flux and mere stationariness are both absurd, and neither can be predicated of reality. The old notion of substance as the unchanging substratum of change gives us no help. Reality must somehow transcend the opposition of *στάσις* and *κίνησις*. Aristotle tried to do this in his conception of *ἐνέργεια*. For him *ἐνέργεια* is a higher conception than *δύναμις*: it is the actual functioning of a substance whose real nature is only so revealed. He says that *κίνησις* is *imperfect ἐνέργεια*. God's energy involves no 'movement'; it is frictionless activity. 'Change is sweet to us because of a certain defect,' he says: the Divine life is one of unceasing and unchanging activity, which is also an eternal consciousness of supreme happiness. This Aristotle calls *ἐνέργεια ἀκίνησις*. It is eternal, because it precludes the conditions of the time-consciousness. For time is the creature of motion (*κίνησις*): the perfecting of *ἐνέργεια* will thus involve the disappearance of time. Time is the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect, and the perfecting of the time-consciousness would carry us into eternity. This conception of an *ἐνέργεια ἀκίνησις* helps us to overcome a very serious difficulty, which lies at the root of many religious and philosophical perplexities.

Plotinus also says that in the world of reality, the *κόσμος νοητός*, the opposition of thought and its object, of identity and difference, of motion and stationariness, is transcended.

It is quite untrue to say that he holds a static-intellectualist view of reality. His intelligible world is not the world of stationariness as opposed to motion, but the sphere where the two are unified and harmonised. He knows, of course, that discursive thought (*διάνοια*) does not effect this reconciliation; but then he distinguishes *νοῦς* and *διάνοια*, as we ought to do. Thought is more than formal logic; reason is greater than reasons. In fact, it would be hardly too much to say that the 'intellectualism' of modern voluntaristic polemic is a figment of the pragmatists. It was not reserved for modern psychology to discover that logic is not identical with reality. And then, having created this bugbear of 'intellectualism,' they proceed to 'empty out the child with the bath,' as the Germans say, and construct their own system with the intellectual factor contumeliously excluded.

However, the objections just mentioned are valid against exclusive intellectualism; and they show how fatal it is to separate any one of our faculties, and make it, by itself, either the constitutive principle of reality, or the organ by which we apprehend reality.

It has also been urged against intellectualism that knowledge cannot be ultimate, because it is always trying to subvert the conditions of its own existence. An absolute conclusion to knowledge would involve the annulling of the distinction between knowing and being, between thought and its object; and it is precisely that distinction which is the condition of knowledge.

This argument is admitted by Plotinus and all other philosophical mystics. Discursive thought, seeking to find unity in diversity, ends ideally in perfect knowledge—i.e. in the complete correspondence of thought with its object. To the realist, this does not mean that the distinction between thought and its object has wholly ceased. The eternal world is not a world in which subject and object have devoured each other, any more than it is a world

where rest and activity have devoured each other. In the eternal world, according to Plotinus, the correspondence of thought and its object is still the One-Many, not the One by itself. It is no doubt true that thought in eternity has passed into a higher mode, in which its objects are present to it as a totality ; and in that sense the process of thought, in completing, has terminated itself. But the same is obviously true of the will, which in achieving any aim thereby takes it out of the sphere of will ; for will requires an unfulfilled end. In heaven, we may say, thought has become knowledge, and morality goodness, though in some way beyond our comprehension both remain activities. In this transformation we may suppose that truth and goodness are at last fully unified. The anti-intellectual objection loses its force if we use intelligence, not of the logic-chopping faculty, but of the whole personality become self-conscious and self-directing, with a full realisation of the grounds of will and feeling. If we must name this highest state, we must call it intelligence rather than will, because will is only conscious of the fact of desire, not of the reasons for it.

The real defect of rationalism or exclusive intellectualism lies in its attempt to *prove* Faith, or, I should rather say, in its belief that it has succeeded in demonstrating what cannot be demonstrated. Rationalism tries to find a place for God in its picture of the world. But God, 'whose centre is everywhere and His circumference nowhere,' cannot be fitted into a diagram. He is rather the canvas on which the picture is painted, or the frame in which it is set.

Reason, in the sense in which the word is used by rationalists, is part of the material of Faith. They forget that this knowledge falls far short of the 'gnosis,' which is the ideal fulfilment and satisfaction of Faith. This true gnosis is not to be attained by thinking only. Julius Hare warns us very well that 'the being able to give a

reason for your Faith is a totally different thing from having Faith; and unless the Faith be really in you, your being able to give a reason for it will only be a witness against you for having it not.' Faith as a practical power can only be strengthened practically. To put the same thing rather differently, the old 'proofs' of God's existence claimed to have made the opposite view unthinkable or illogical. But atheism is not unthinkable or illogical; it is only 'absurd,' in Lotze's sense of the word. It is rejected by Faith as a hypothesis which would reduce the world to a chaos, a malignant trick, or a sorry joke. Being ourselves what God has made us, we have a right to call this hypothesis absurd, and to let it go. But this is not the rationalistic idea of proof.

Pure intellectualism of whatever kind ignores the necessary place of Faith in religion. It confounds Faith with knowledge. It is easy to recognise this type. Its God is 'the One.' He is triumphantly monistic, for that is almost all that is required of Him. His worshippers easily fall into a lofty disdain of the unphilosophic vulgar. This was a weakness of Greek philosophy, and it has reappeared wherever Faith and knowledge have been identified. In the field of practice, we see from the history of the Italian Renaissance how easily intellectual morality becomes Machiavellian, and how, in the region of feeling, intellectualism substitutes artistic sensibility for charity and affection. It is never long before this type proves its unsoundness by passing out of religion altogether. Thus the fatal results of one-sidedness are once more brought home to us.

And yet some intellectual element is an essential condition of the activity of Faith. Faith is a feeling of certitude or positive assurance; but this feeling cannot exist without some notion, or idea, of that about which certitude is felt. We might as well try to walk in the air, as believe without an idea or thought for Faith to embrace. The nebulous forms of incipient thought hardly deserve

the name of ideas ; they must be reduced to the semblance of truth by mature reflection and experience. The great end of the intellectual discipline of Faith is the formation of true ideas of the things believed. This requires much self-denial and honesty of purpose. Things are what they are, not what we think them to be, or have made up our minds that they must or ought to be. Faith loses all its practical efficiency when it is associated with false ideas. The true light saves, but the false light destroys. Much depends on the ideas and objects to which we give our love and trust. There is in operation a spiritual law or 'working of error,' of which St. Paul speaks, the inevitable tendency of which is to cause men who hate the truth to believe a lie.

It is essential to Faith that we should believe in an objective truth, independent of our thoughts and wishes. It is unfortunately no longer a truism, but a controversial statement, to say that facts are stubborn things, or that things are what they are. But we must hold to this rather obvious truth. The first aphorism of the *Novum Organum* is that 'Man, the minister and interpreter of Nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.' That is to say, it is not our business to create truth, but to discover it. Faith believes in the independent reality of its objects, and in the knowableness of truth. The demand for internal consistency and correspondence with external fact is peremptory : it cannot be silenced. The belief in truth, and the reverent worship of it, are a large part of religion with many men, and with a few women. 'With certain persons,' says Mr. Bradley, 'the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity.' Spinoza, whose personal character was purely admirable, is a very good example of this type of religion. 'Blessedness,' he says, 'consists

in love towards God, and this arises from knowledge. And the mind that rejoices in the divine love or blessedness can control its emotions. The ignorant man is agitated by external causes, and never obtains true peace of soul : whereas the wise man, conscious, by a kind of eternal necessity, of himself, of God, and of things, is always in possession of true contentment.' He concludes, 'The way must be arduous, for its discovery is so rare. If salvation could be discovered without great toil, how could it be neglected by nearly all men? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.' Compare too, as a typical example of scientific Faith, these words of Huxley : 'Sit down before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, to follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses Nature leads you, or you shall learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this.'¹

This calm cheerfulness and unshakable confidence that the truth is salvation to him who can find it, seems to me more Christian than such a mental attitude as is described by Lecky : 'Young men discuss religious questions simply as questions of truth or falsehood. In later life they more frequently accept their creed as a working hypothesis, as a consolation in calamities, as the indispensable sanction of moral obligation, as the gratification of needs, instincts, and longings which are planted in the deepest recesses of human nature, as one of the chief pillars on which human society rests.' The American Leuba says rather irreverently that most people don't so much believe in God as *use* Him. But God will not be 'used' for other ulterior ends—He is either the ultimate End, or He is nothing.

It seems to me that we must expect that if humanity is

¹ So in art, J. F. Millet says : 'We ought to be steeped in Nature, saturated with her, and careful only to think the thoughts which she inspires. All you need is intelligence and a great desire. If you abandon yourself to her service, she will give you of her store.'

progressing, the intellect must play a larger part in the life of Faith in the future than it has done in the past. In the brute creation, instinct does the work of reason—sufficiently for the very simple conditions in which the animal creation lives. And so in the spiritual life, it is natural to suppose that a kind of instinct of the Divine is implanted in the human mind as soon as it becomes human. But as humanity advances to a more complex life, and has to adjust itself to new conditions, instinct becomes unequal to the tasks laid upon it. And then appears the new faculty of reason, which acts at first haltingly and uncertainly enough, often failing us where instinct would have guided us rightly. But we must accept these difficulties of adjustment. We cannot choose to continue to be guided by instinct; for instinct begins to fail and grow weaker, wherever the potentiality of reason exists. We see it in the case of the child. The human infant is far more helpless than the young of other animals. Where instinct keeps them alive, it leaves the human child to die, unless it has guardians to take care of it, and bestow upon it an amount of attention which would be utterly impossible in the lower ranks of creation. And yet the human child is destined to advance far beyond the most intelligent of the brutes, by the aid of the faculty of reason, which is so slow to develop, and so unsafe a protector until it is more or less mature. We can trace the same law by comparing civilised man with savages. Our instincts are decidedly weaker and less protective than theirs, though our reason is so much stronger. Is it not likely that the analogy holds good in the spiritual life? The will may be more ‘primary’ and more powerful than the intelligence; it does not follow that we ought to make the will rather than the intelligence our guide. Reason, when it has come into its own, is a far finer instrument than blind will, or instinct. When we know *why* a certain course is right or wrong; when we have a clear idea of what we are aiming at in our

actions, we are not less likely to act morally, and we are much more likely not to act foolishly. It seems to me that this has a practical bearing on social morality. The great danger, in this country at all events, is that we are so prone to be guided by sentiment and wilfulness instead of by reason. We may be told that this is a penalty that must be paid for popular government, since the masses will always be swayed by their emotions and desires, and never by their intellect. To this we can only answer that, if so, we are likely to find that we have paid too high a price for a political theory.

I should also like to remind the Voluntarists that desire, even more than speculative thought, is never for its own continuance, but always for its own satisfaction and consequent cessation. Unless, therefore, the will is eternally self-stultifying, eternally and necessarily disappointed—which is the creed of Pessimism—the heaven of the will is always *static* in respect of its present object. In other words, the will, in seeking its own fulfilment, seeks to pass into that higher sphere where it cannot remain will pure and simple, but must pass into some higher mode of activity.

The danger of Intellectualism, as of other one-sided ideas of Faith, is that it tempts us to make a *premature synthesis*, perhaps leaving us in bondage to the lower categories of mechanism. There are very deep antinomies which we must accept as existing for our minds at present, though we know that they are not real or fundamental. We must take no short cuts to self-consistency by suppressing half the truth. God, for us, is both changing and unchanging, blessed and suffering, eternal and becoming. These are just the antitheses which, according to Plotinus, are transcended in the intelligible world, but not in the world of our common experience.

CHAPTER XII

THE ÆSTHETIC GROUND OF FAITH

BEAUTY is a quality which the Creator has impressed, in various degrees, upon nearly all His works ; and the recognition of beauty is a faculty with which very many conscious creatures are endowed. We are often surprised at the symmetry and beauty which appear in the constructions of animals—for example, in the nests of birds and the honey-combs of bees ; and the sexual ornaments which many birds and beasts exhibit to win the favour of their mates prove both the important part which æsthetic taste plays in modifying species, and the delicate appreciation of beautiful forms and colours which makes these elaborate decorations necessary. Examples of ornaments which to our taste are grotesque, such as the bright colours of the male mandrill in the breeding-season, are so rare as to be negligible exceptions ; far more significant is the exquisite sheen of the humming-bird's wing, or the glory of the peacock's tail. Nor is the æsthetic sense of the lower animals confined to form and colour. The song of the nightingale proves that some birds are no mean musicians ; and even among insects, some spiders, we are told, have to please the female by an exhibition of elegant dancing. Moreover, inanimate nature is everywhere beautiful. Even decay and corruption, which in the animal world are repulsive, are beautiful in things without sentient life.

The view taken in these lectures is that Beauty is one of the fundamental attributes of God, which He has therefore impressed upon His world. I hold it to be a quality

residing in the objects, and not imparted to them by the observer. I hold Beauty to be, like Truth and Goodness, an end in itself, for God's creation. If so, it is right and natural for Faith to acknowledge beauty, and to strengthen itself by the contemplation and practice of the beautiful.

To this view two objections may be made. First, it has been argued that our enjoyment of the beautiful is nothing more than a pleasant feeling arising from our perception of usefulness. For instance, the points of beauty in a human face and figure are all signs of health, strength, intelligence, and character. In the case of a woman, those lines are also thought beautiful which indicate that she is well suited for her special functions. But this theory does not fit the facts. Many of the animal decorations, to which we have just alluded, are apparently 'useless,' except to give pleasure by their form and colour. And the same impossibility of reducing the beautiful to the useful is apparent throughout human experience. Illustrations of this will occur to everybody. Beauty is clearly something *sui generis*. Secondly, we are told that the enjoyment of beauty is purely subjective. Not only does the beautiful object require a beholder, and one who has a seeing eye, but the beauty is in our own mind, and not in what we see. Now it would be a bold theory that the beauties of a play of Shakespeare are put there by us his commonplace readers. Is it not even more absurd to suppose that our minds create the beauty of a sunset, or of a glorious action in history? Again, if the appreciation of beauty is merely subjective, there is no appeal from individual taste. It is then an impertinence to speak of good or bad taste, for there is no standard to which taste can be referred. But no one can seriously maintain that the proverb *De gustibus non est disputandum* has any validity in the higher regions of art, of natural beauty, or of seemliness and propriety of conduct. Moreover, the strong protest of our own consciousness against theories of subjectivity ought to be

given due weight. When we admire anything or anybody, we invariably believe that the qualities which we admire are really there, and if we find that we have been deceived, our admiration vanishes at once. 'All the objects we call beautiful,' says Reid, 'agree in two things, which seem to concur in our sense of beauty. First, when they are perceived or even imagined, they produce a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and secondly, this agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some perfection or excellence belonging to them.'¹ The subjective and objective side are both necessary; but assuredly philosophy does not require us to refuse the name of beautiful to natural objects which man has never beheld.

Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear.

Some have even found in this thought an argument for the existence of God, whose eye sees and enjoys what otherwise would be wasted for want of a beholder.

We may then, I think, assert the independence of the Beautiful as a revelation of the Eternal distinct from other revelations which come to us through science and the moral sense. And since Beauty is thus conceived to have an absolute value, the natural instinct of mankind has led us to connect Beauty with the object and mode of worship. Whatever men have thought most beautiful they have brought and offered to their gods. And since the religious instinct, in all its forms, finds satisfaction in creation and production more than in mere receptivity, art has from the first been consecrated to worship. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, and ritual are varying expressions of this tendency. The noblest works

¹ *Intellectual Powers*, Essay viii. ; quoted by Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 55.

of imaginative genius have been either partially or entirely inspired by religious Faith.

The spirit of worship is somewhat jealous of association with utility. Utility tends to cramp the free exercise of the creative imagination, and forces us to divide our attention between the universal and the particular. Thus religious *cultus* has always contained ceremonies which have no bearing on practical life, and within the sphere of ordinary conduct religion has usually issued some commands and prohibitions which have no rational sanction. Just because the spirit of worship rejects indignantly the limitation of its scope by pragmatic standards, it rejoices in acts which are a revolt against moralism and intellectualism alike. The æsthetic instinct is more independent of utilitarian considerations than the intellect, and far more than the moral sense. For this reason, in the form of poetical and religious imagination, it penetrates and illumines regions which are inaccessible to philosophy and ethics. And its reaction upon life has a distinctive quality, the loss of which cannot be made good from any other source. The mind that is dominated by perception of the beautiful, and by the love of it which can hardly be dissociated from this perception, will certainly carry its habit and its method into every part of life. Among a really artistic people we find a joyful desire to do everything well and appropriately. 'What has to be done is done imaginatively; what has to be spoken or made is spoken or made fittingly, lovingly, beautifully.'¹

Some writers have seen in 'the Sublime' the link between æsthetical feeling and religion. Kant, in particular, quite forgetful of the limitations which in his *Critique of Pure Reason* he had laid upon all our faculties, invests the Sublime with a mystical power of uniting the human spirit with the infinite. 'We call that sublime which is absolutely great.' 'The sublime is that which cannot

¹ Santayana, *Reason in Art*, p. 16.

even enter our thought without the help of a faculty which surpasses the standard of sense.' 'Nature is sublime in those phenomena which convey an idea of its infinity.'¹ So Longinus says, 'When a writer uses any other resource, he shows himself to be a man; but the sublime lifts him near to the great spirit of the Deity.' Kant, like Burke, whom he probably follows,² distinguishes the Sublime from the Beautiful, instead of making sublimity a species of beauty. This is perhaps an error. It would be better to extend the meaning of beauty, which has too often been confined to mere prettiness, to cover the grander and more awe-inspiring phenomena of nature. Winckelmann acutely observes that when we gaze over the broad sea, our mind at first appears to shrink and lose itself, but soon returns to itself, elevated by what it has beheld. The perception of the Beautiful, in this wider sense, has seemed to many to be closely akin to mystical intuition.³ This view is put into philosophical terminology by Hegel, who says: 'The Beautiful is essentially the spiritual making itself known sensuously, presenting itself in sensuous concrete existence, but in such a manner that that existence is wholly and entirely permeated by the spiritual, so that the sensuous is not independent, but has its meaning solely and exclusively through the spiritual and in the spiritual, and exhibits not itself but the spiritual.'⁴ This belief is the romantic side of Greek philosophy. It finds its classical expression in a famous passage of Plato's *Symposium*⁵:—'He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes towards the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this was the object of all our toils), a nature which in the

¹ From the *Critique of Judgment*.

² Bosanquet, *History of Æsthetic*, p. 275.

³ Ladd, *The Philosophy of Religion*, vol. i. p. 441.

⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 8.

⁵ Plato, *Symposium*, pp. 210, 211.

first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, not waxing and waning; not fair in one point of view and foul in another . . . but beauty absolute, separate, simple and everlasting, which without increase or diminution or any other change is imparted to the ever-growing and ever-perishing beauties of other things. He who, ascending from these under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order . . . is to begin with the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and going on from fair forms to fair practices, and from these to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. . . . What if man had eyes to see the true beauty, the divine beauty, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life—looking thither and communing with the true beauty, simple and divine? In that communion, and in that only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for it is the reality and no image that he grasps), and producing and cherishing true virtue he will become the friend of God, and immortal, if mortal man can be immortal.'

According to this passage, which contains the essence of the poetical and romantic side of Plato's philosophy, the sense of beauty is a joyous witness within us to the kinship of the human spirit with that source of all spiritual life from which whatever is fair and noble in the world proceeds. Plato is not afraid to trace a high symbolic meaning in the connection of the æsthetical sense with sexual passion. 'All love is of the immortal. Mortal nature seeks as far as possible to be everlasting and immortal; and since absolute unity in continuance is not to be had, even in the life of the individual, men desire to

produce a new generation to take the place of the old.' This transmission of life is the human substitute and symbol for the unchanging life of Eternity.

Thus our sense of beauty is an imaginative¹ representation which connects our present experience with the eternal. It is the æsthetical sense which most vividly makes the past and future live in the present. The gift of imagination is thus a psychological intimation of immortality. This prophetic office of the imagination has been far too much neglected by religious teachers and philosophers. We see the result in the tendency of cultivated people to turn to the poets for spiritual guidance and sympathy. The poets seem to be nearer to the heart of things than the men of thought or the men of action. They have the advantage of working in the most plastic of materials, and their interpretation of ideal reality may therefore have a higher truth than the somewhat sorry experiments which history records in the field of the actual, and a richer colour than the 'grey' hues of philosophical theory. It is for this reason that myth and legend have played, and still play, so important a part in religion. They are prized, consciously or unconsciously, for their representative value. 'Poetry,' says Aristotle,² 'is more philosophical and of higher worth than history; for history records what has actually happened, but poetry describes what may happen' (i.e. universal truth).

In spite of this, Faith has always looked upon the æsthetical sense as a somewhat dangerous ally. Being potentially of infinite scope, it endeavours to embrace all experience and classify it according to its own standards. And 'of all premature settlements, the most premature is that which the fine arts are wont to establish.'³ A lovely

¹ 'Imaginative' is not the same as 'purely subjective.' There may be an essential connection between the image and reality.

² In the *Poetics*.

³ Santayana, *Reason in Art*, p. 217.

dream leaves the world no less a chaos, and makes it seem by contrast even darker than before. Visionary pleasures make the world no better, and generally bring visionary pains and disorders in their wake. As soon as art loses touch with science and morality, it becomes corrupt. Just as morality for morality's sake is (in spite of Kant) impossible and self-contradictory; just as truth for truth's sake takes us no further than pure mathematics, in which all values are hypothetical, and the connection with the actual world is broken off, so beauty for beauty's sake stultifies itself and ceases even to be beautiful. Our three strands of natural revelation are intertwined; we cannot unravel them. And there seems to be a mysterious law in the spiritual world, that to aim directly at a thing is not the way to hit it. Just as pleasure, according to Aristotle, attends virtue as the bloom upon a young face attends health, but is not the immediate object of moral effort, so beauty regularly appears as a by-product of ethical striving and of intellectual search. Perhaps beauty has an ethereal and evasive quality which belongs only to itself. It is, says Plotinus, the light that plays over the symmetry of things, rather than the symmetry itself. A modern poet, William Watson, has expressed the same idea in a fine stanza:—

Forget not, brother singer, that though Prose
Can never be too truthful nor too wise,
Song is not Truth nor Wisdom, but the rose
Upon Truth's lips, the light in Wisdom's eyes.

Even in art itself, Goethe tells us, the *principle* is the significant, the *result* the beautiful. This maxim cuts at the root of artistic diletantism, such as made the 'æsthetic' coterie in Victorian England ridiculous and contemptible; for what does art 'signify' except eternal reality, which is good and true as well as beautiful?

The warning furnished by decadent art is indeed valuable

and instructive. The hero of Huysmans' unpleasant novel *À Rebours* makes it the object of his life to enjoy every kind of voluptuous thrill of which the æsthetical sense is capable. The result, as might be expected, is spiritual rottenness. Decadent art generally shows its character by over-elaboration of details which have no significance for the whole. This is a symbol of the mental disintegration which accompanies it. The decadent is in a state of mind clean contrary to Faith. He despises life, hopes for nothing, and loves nobody. It is no wonder that he loves to sing the praises of death and dissolution.

Plato, whose hostility to art has surprised so many of his admirers, dreaded its tyranny because he knew its power. Unless it can cover all practice, ennobling action as well as delighting the imagination, he will have none of it. The mere artist, as he knew, is always something less than a gentleman.

The attitude of Greek thought toward art is often misunderstood. The defects of Greek æsthetic theory were mainly three. First, in accordance with their preference for plastic representation, in which their pre-eminence is undisputed, they attributed too high a value to symmetry as compared with expressiveness. Secondly, they only slowly outgrew the mistaken notion that art directly copies reality and must be judged by its fidelity to some given original. It was this error, in part, which led Plato to disparage art, as further removed from reality than nature. Being a great thinker, he could not state a fallacy of this kind without suggesting a way out of it; but it was reserved for Plotinus¹ to enuntiate the truth that the arts do not simply imitate the visible, but go back to the creative principles (λόγοι), from which nature also derives its

¹ The first clear recognition of *imagination* (φαντασία), as the creative faculty in art, is due to Philostratus, who states clearly the principle that we desire in vain to find in Aristotle's *Poetics*. 'It was *imagination* that produced these masterpieces, a more cunning artist than imitation. For imitation represents what it has seen, but imagination what it has not seen.'

forms. Natural things themselves, he says, 'imitate' something else, namely, these formative principles or types. The arts are not, then, wholly dependent on the actual; they create much out of themselves, and supply deficiencies in nature from the ideas of beauty which they find in themselves. 'Pheidias did not create his Zeus after any perceived pattern, but made him such as Zeus would appear if he deigned to be visible to mortal eyes.'¹ Thirdly (this is a feature in Greek thought which is often forgotten), the Greeks throughout demanded that serious art shall be morally edifying. A poet is blamed for making his characters worse than the plot demanded. In fact, there was a confused tendency to apply the same moral standards to works of art as to real life. The error here is not in holding that the good and the beautiful are ultimately one, for this is true; but in imposing *our* morality on the ideal world, and 'playing providence' in a region where only the divine wisdom and goodness bear sway. It is not the province of art to solve moral enigmas, least of all by the cheap and facile expedient of inventing a 'poetical justice' which is untrue to experience. Our moral sense is not a limiting sphere for the beautiful, though nothing is beautiful which is really repugnant to the Divine purity and goodness. Art, when not hampered by the 'moralistic fallacy,' may often be a moral educator, just as goodness has often an unstudied beauty of a very high order.

The attitude of Christianity towards art was naturally determined in the first place by the traditions of Jewish and Graeco-Roman culture, which coalesced in the new religion. Hebrew art was symbolic, not pictorial, the

¹ *Ann.* v. 8. Bosanquet (*History of Æsthetic*, p. 113) has perhaps given Plotinus too much credit for this. The illustration from the Zeus of Pheidias must have been a commonplace: cf. Cic., *Orator*, 2: 'Nec vero ille artifex, cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervae, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret; sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat.' Also Seneca, *Controv.* v. p. 36: 'Non vidit Phidias Iovem. . . . Dignus tamen illa arte animus et concepit deos et exhibuit.'

Hebrew genius being very deficient in the sense of form. For instance, in the Apocalypse, such images as that of a *cubic* city show how vaguely the writer visualised even his visions. On the other hand, the sense of the sublime in nature receives a nobler expression in some of the Psalms than in any other ancient literature. The grandeur of some of these descriptions has indeed never been surpassed. We may follow Dean Church¹ in his selection of examples :—

‘The day is thine and the night is thine ; thou hast prepared the light and the sun.’

‘The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork. One day telleth another, and one night certifieth another. . . . Their sound is gone out into all lands, and their words to the ends of the world.’

‘Praise the Lord upon earth, ye dragons and all deeps : fire and hail, snow and vapour, wind and storm, fulfilling his word.’

Or that noble Psalm, which begins with *Gloria in excelsis* and ends with *In terris pax*—the twenty-ninth :—
‘Give unto the Lord, O ye mighty, give unto the Lord glory and strength. Give the Lord the honour due unto his name ; worship the Lord with a holy worship. The voice of the Lord is upon the waters ; it is the glorious God that maketh the thunder. The voice of the Lord is upon many waters. The voice of the Lord is mighty in operation. The voice of the Lord is a glorious voice. The voice of the Lord breaketh the cedar-trees ; yea, the Lord breaketh the cedars of Libanus. He maketh them all to skip like a calf ; Libanus also and Sirion like a young unicorn. The voice of the Lord divideth the flames of fire. The voice of the Lord shaketh the wilderness ; yea, the Lord shaketh the wilderness of Kades. The voice of the Lord maketh the hinds to calve, and discovereth the forests ; in his temple doth every one speak of his glory.

¹ Church : *The Gifts of Civilisation*, p. 402.

The Lord sitteth above the waterflood ; the Lord remaineth a King for ever. The Lord shall give strength unto his people ; the Lord shall give his people the blessing of peace.'

The distinctive note of Hebrew religious poetry is that it is never pantheistic in its homage to the glories of nature. '*The Lord is King*, be the people never so impatient ; he sitteth above the waterflood, be the earth never so unquiet.' '*The Lord is King*, the earth may be glad thereof ; yea, the multitude of the isles may be glad thereof.' The world is the living garment of God—'God hath put on his apparel, he hath girded himself with strength'—but there is no tendency to deify the non-moral processes of nature. Rather, God's hand is seen in the bounty which giveth food to all flesh, and in the mercy which is over all His works. 'Thou visitest the earth and blessest it, thou makest it very plenteous.' 'He healeth those that are broken in heart, and giveth medicine to heal their sickness. He telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names.'

This firm belief in the transcendence of the Creator gives a richer note to the nature-poetry of the Psalms and Prophets, in that the nothingness and vanity of the material creation, apart from Spirit, are recognised as well as its awful magnificence. 'Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night. Thou carriest them away as with a flood ; they are as a sleep. In the morning they are like grass which groweth up. In the morning it flourisheth and groweth up ; in the evening it is cut down, and withereth.'

Later Judaism was prosaic ; and the early Christians also do not appear to have entered into the spirit of these glorious hymns. In fact, the Psalms have probably been

more appreciated in our own day than in any previous century since they were written. The early Church was not much inspired by the beauty of nature ; and in its attitude towards art, it maintained, on the whole, the distrust which is found in Plato. The utter inadequacy of all sensuous representations of the divine was recognised, (the more fully since the arts were now decaying rapidly), and art was tolerated mainly as picture-writing for the ignorant. Augustine, however, introduces a great deal of Neoplatonic teaching into his theology, on æsthetics as well as other subjects. What this teaching was will be understood better if we quote from Plotinus, the fountain-head, than from Augustine's paraphrases.

‘ Just as it would be impossible to speak of sensible beauties if we had never seen them, so we should not be able to speak of the arts and sciences if we were not already in possession of this kind of beauty, nor of the splendour of virtue if we had never contemplated the face of justice and temperance, which are more beautiful than the evening and morning star. We must contemplate these beauties by the faculty which our soul has received for seeing them ; then we shall feel much more pleasure, astonishment, and admiration than we do in presence of sensible beauties. Let us consider what it is that men experience when they love beauties which are not corporeal. What do you feel in presence of noble aspirations, good qualities, and all the acts and sentiments which constitute the beauty of souls ? What is the object which causes these emotions ? It is no figure, or colour, or magnitude. It is that invisible Soul in which one sees the brightness of all the virtues to shine, when one contemplates greatness of character, justice of the heart, pure temperance, and courage with her stern countenance ; dignity, and modesty with her calm, steady, imperturbable bearing, and above all the Intelligence, the image of God, blazing with divine light. No one who beholds these things can doubt that he beholds the

very reality. And the very reality is beautiful.' Ugliness, for the soul, consists in intemperance, injustice, and cowardice. The soul contracts these stains by mixing itself with earthly and carnal things. All virtue, therefore, is only *purification*. 'The purified soul belongs entirely to God, in whom is the source of the beautiful and of all the qualities which have affinity with it. The good and the beautiful for the soul is to become like unto God ; for He is the principle of beauty and of being ; or rather being is beauty. And the good and the beautiful are identical. . . . We must ascend then to the Good, for which every soul craves. If any has seen it, he knows how beautiful it is.' 'How shall a man see the ineffable beauty, which dwells in the inner shrine of the temple, and is not brought out to the gaze of the profane ? When he sees the beauty of material objects he must not pursue them, but knowing that they are only images and shadows he must flee to that of which they are the images. He must call into activity a faculty of spiritual vision which all have but few use. What then can the inner eye perceive ? Being newly awakened it cannot at once look upon things wholly bright. First, the soul should be accustomed to look upon beautiful actions, then upon beautiful works (not such as the arts produce, but such as men produce who are called good), and then let it look upon the soul which produces these good works. How then canst thou behold the beauty of a fair soul ? Look within ; and if thou seest thyself to be not yet beautiful, then, just as a sculptor who desires to make a beautiful statue removes this and chisels down that, polishes here and cleanses there, until he brings to view a beautiful countenance in the image, so do thou take away that which is redundant, make straight that which is crooked, cleanse that which is foul ; and cease not to work upon this thine image until the divine beauty of virtue shine forth upon thee.'¹

¹ Plotinus, *Enneads* i. i. 6-9 (abridged).

This beautiful passage shows how the later Platonism reconciled the ascetic and æsthetic strands in Plato's philosophy of the beautiful. Stern discipline is needed to purify the soul from the taint which it has contracted by contact with evil and ugliness. For only the pure in heart can see God ; only the purged mind can behold the loveliness of divine reality. This is no artificial combination of contradictory theories ; the two parts complement and safeguard each other. This view passed, practically unchanged, into Christianity. St. Thomas Aquinas argues, quite in the manner of Plotinus, that since nature is symbolic of the divine mind, and the human mind is the image of God, the human mind, if pure from sin, can behold God in nature.

In English theology also we find the truest appreciation of the beauty of holiness, and of the high religious value of the æsthetic sense, in writers who have passed under the spell of Neoplatonism. The Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century are lifted out of scholarly pedantry by the poetic feeling which beautifies their writings. The following extract from John Smith's Sermons may be taken as typical :—

' Let us inform our minds as much as may be in the excellency and loveliness of practical religion ; that beholding it in its own beauty and amiableness we may the more sincerely close with it. As there would need nothing else to deter and affright men from sin but its own ugliness and deformity, were it presented to a naked view and seen as it is ; so nothing would more effectually commend religion to the minds of men, than the displaying and unfolding the excellencies of its nature, than the true native beauty and inward lustre of religion itself : neither the evening nor the morning star could so sensibly commend themselves to our bodily eyes, and delight them with their shining beauties, as true religion, which is an undefiled beam of the uncreated light, would to a mind capable of

conversing with it. . . . Religion is not like the prophet's roll, sweet as honey when it was in his mouth, but as bitter as gall in his belly. Religion is no sullen Stoicism, no sour Pharisaism; it does not consist in a few melancholy passions, in some dejected looks or depressions of mind; but it consists in freedom, love, peace, life, and power; the more it comes to be digested into our lives, the more sweet and lovely we shall find it to be. Those spots and wrinkles which corrupt minds think they see in the face of religion, are indeed nowhere else but in their own deformed and misshapen apprehensions. It is no wonder when a defiled fancy comes to be the glass, if you have an unlovely reflection. Let us therefore labour to purge our own souls from all worldly pollutions; let us breathe after the aid and assistance of the Divine Spirit, that it may irradiate and enlighten our minds, that we may be able to see divine things in a divine light: let us endeavour to live more in a real practice of those rules of religious and holy living commended to us by our ever-blessed Lord and Saviour. So shall we know religion better, and knowing it love it, and loving it be still more and more ambitiously pursuing after it, till we come to a full attainment of it, and therein of our own perfection and everlasting bliss.' ¹

In the eighteenth century Lord Shaftesbury propounded in attractive style a theory of ethics which is predominantly æsthetical. His philosophy is little more than an easy-going pantheism, but he has won considerable fame as the chief English exponent of this type of theism. Hutcheson, who is usually mentioned with him, claimed that the sense of beauty is universal and immediate, a view which I have maintained in these lectures.

The English poetry of the nineteenth century has borne noble witness to this side of religion. Shelley and Wordsworth, in spite of the vast chasm which divides them, are at one in their insistence on the sacredness of natural beauty.

¹ John Smith, *The Nobleness of True Religion*.

Both are, in a sense, pantheistic ; but while Shelley gives us a kind of non-ethical Platonism, Wordsworth is strong in his severe self-discipline and moral earnestness. No lover of the beautiful has escaped more triumphantly the pitfalls which beset the direct worship of beauty than the great poet of the English Lakes. His purity, unworldliness, and high seriousness give him an exalted rank among religious teachers ; and, as has been observed more than once, he stands the practical test of being resorted to, and not in vain, by many troubled spirits.

Ruskin describes four sources of beauty : the record of conscience ; the symbolising of divine attributes in matter ; the felicity of living things ; and the perfect fulfilment of their duties and functions.¹ ' External nature is glorious as a symbol of God's nature ; the felicity of animal life is evidence of His kind presence ; excellent working is evidence of obedience to His will ; and conscience is His approving voice.'

Professor Seeley² points out that science and art are both ' religions ' ; which is the reason why they clash so violently, at times, with what is commonly called religion. In other words, the worship of the true and the beautiful is as much a worship of God as the worship of Him under the form of goodness. This again is in accordance with the view taken in these lectures. Seeley very properly protests against the abuse of the word ' atheism,' which was more common when he wrote than it is to-day. ' Art and science are not of the world, though the world may corrupt them ; they have the nature of religion.' ' If we look at the history of the modern theory of culture we shall perceive that its characteristic feature is precisely the assertion of the religious dignity of art and science. Goethe and Schiller habitually apply the language of religion to art. . . . In their minds beauty, truth, and goodness are of one

¹ *Modern Painters*, vol. ii. ; Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 190.

² *Natural Religion*, *passim*.

family ; only they oppose the Puritanism which sets goodness at an unapproachable height above its sisters, and they are disposed rather to give the highest place to beauty.' Seeley gives us no theory of the beautiful ; he only bids us observe that its votaries pursue it in the spirit of the genuine worshipper.

On the Continent, the philosophers who have laid most stress on the æsthetical ground of Faith are perhaps Fries, Novalis, and Cousin. For the first two I will be content to refer you to histories of philosophy, or to the writers themselves. Cousin (1792-1867) is a good modern example of the type which we are now considering. All natural beauty, he says, is an image of ideal beauty, which is realised only in God. The physically beautiful is the wrapping of the intellectually and morally beautiful. Moral beauty comprises two elements, justice and charity. He who is consistently just and charitable is in his way the greatest of artists. God is the principle of all three orders of beauty, physical, intellectual, and moral. Moreover, the sublime and the beautiful meet and amalgamate in His nature.

Enough has now been said to show that in the opinion of many great minds the beautiful is one of the chief avenues to the knowledge of God. I believe that in this country we have neglected it to our great loss. We have been too prone to throw away one of the chief antidotes to worldliness and lowness of aim. Neglect of beauty is stamped on our whole civilisation, which still presents far too many coarse and unlovely features. Commercialism has helped to destroy what might be a source of inexhaustible spiritual wealth. For, like all the best gifts of God, beauty is within the reach of all, and there is no limit to its store. The æsthetical sense refines and gladdens life, making poverty dignified, and wealth no longer vulgar.

But, more than any other type of religion, this needs discipline and true seriousness. 'Romanticism'—the

movement which began with Novalis and survives in many supporters of the 'Catholic revival'—is too often a somewhat frivolous mental attitude, a mode of mild sensuous pleasure. It is most agreeable, perhaps, to those who have time on their hands, and who wish to *enjoy* their religious sensations. The whole romantic movement, on its religious side, bears the marks of a *revival*—an imitation of the past. In its earlier stages the most conscientious efforts were made to recover the entire religious atmosphere of the Middle Ages. Just as pseudo-Gothic castles were erected by pacific nineteenth-century squires and retired stockbrokers, so the ecclesiastical fashions of the centuries before the Reformation were carefully copied, and the beliefs and disciplines of our semi-barbarous ancestors were held up for our acceptance and imitation. The temporary success of so artificial a creation is a measure of the loss which the human spirit feels when worship is divorced from beauty.

The deepest service which Christianity has rendered to art is closely connected with the ground of their frequent estrangements. The Incarnation means that the universe shares man's relation to its Creator. As the world is the living vesture of God, so when the Logos, through whom all things were made, assumed human form, in exalting humanity He ennobled also the whole of man's environment. In proclaiming this truth, Christianity introduced, potentially, a new force and freedom into art. Deeper notes were sounded; discords, formerly ignored, were caught up into a higher harmony. Suffering was recognised as divine, and thereby transmuted; death was faced, welcomed, and conquered. Henceforth the facile grace and symmetry of ancient art were impossible, and each pagan revival has viewed Christianity askance, as introducing ugliness and discord into the new Olympus. But the stone gods can never live again. Beauty is too large and too divine a thing to ignore any part of reality. It was

not given us to use as a decorative adjunct to life. Faith bids us go through the whole of our life in the spirit of a worshipper ; and, as in the ancient mysteries, the fairest and fullest visions are reserved for the end of the course. Faith, meanwhile, has to grapple with much intractable ugliness, only secure of her final victory.

CHAPTER XIII

FAITH AS HARMONIOUS SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

WE have now reached the last stage of our inquiry into the nature of Faith. We have found that it is a divine endowment of human nature, which operates through our natural faculties. It emerges into consciousness as a vague instinct—a prompting which impels us to look for a *meaning* in life—to seek behind the veil of ever-changing phenomena some permanent and solid reality which shall be proof against ‘the wreckful siege of battering days,’ and which, by setting before us an absolute standard, shall give us the right always to aspire. This instinct is of varying intensity, but at first it is without form and void. It seeks for forms, for a mould which it may enter, and generally finds it in one or other of the creeds which are presented to it as authoritative. But whereas it is potentially rich in varied contents, capable of correspondences which link our complex human nature with the divine, and whereas all these correspondences are at first wrapped up and withdrawn from consciousness, Faith can never come to its own except by being lived into—experienced in a life which should be as full and rich and as many-sided as possible. There are no short cuts to a perfect Faith, though there are many provisional and avowedly premature syntheses of which we may and must avail ourselves.

‘Faith is life,’ as Mr. Skrine says in his beautiful little book, *What is Faith?*¹ ‘What to the vine-branch is

¹ P. 30 *sqq.*

living, that to man is believing. We, like the branch, are saved if we abide in the Vine, that is, if we are alive. If life is the adjustment of the internal relations of a living thing to the external relations, Faith is the response of the organism which we name the soul, to that environment which we call God. Souls are kept in life by their obedience to one law—their true response to all the forces touching them, which come from God.' 'A man's salvation is measured by the degree in which he is alive. Is he in definite, full, various, increasing correspondence with God? Is he alive on the side of mind? Does the organ, by which he is sensible to the world of fact, adjust its activities to the arrangement of those facts? Does it mirror things as they are and not as he would wish them to be? Does it weave on the magic loom of consciousness the true pattern of the landscape beyond the window of self? Is he alive on the side of emotion? Is there an answer of the heart to the relations of that nearest environment, Humanity? Has he love, which is the response to the fact of a brotherhood encircling him? Are his sympathies quick, and does a neighbour's grief stir pity in him, and his joy a joy? Is he alive on the side of action? Does the movement of the practical order—the thing that is done upon earth—stir a vibration in his will? Do the things that God doeth Himself—His works seen in the process of nature and in the state—find him a fellow-worker? Does he by his activity propel, and by his passivity smooth, the march of betterment? To do and be these things is to be alive; and to live is to be in Faith.'

I am glad to quote these eloquent words, which express very well the general view of the normal growth and life of Faith which I have upheld in these lectures. All through I have been deprecating that tendency to snatch at some creed or formula or theory which will save us any more trouble. We have found guides who say to us: Take this vague Faith-consciousness as it is. Intensify it

and enjoy it, but do not analyse it or test it. Or : Tell it to endorse, unexamined, the creed which we present to you. Let Faith back the bill, recklessly, and you will then be happy. Or : Make Faith the sworn ally of your moral sense, which is the most important part of us, and let the rest go. Regard the ' world as will,' and all that is non-moral in it as merely instrumental, even unreal. Or : Pin your Faith to science or philosophy, and let your religion be ' the intellectual love of God.' Or, lastly : Love harmony and beauty within and without. Let your life be a poem in God's honour. These premature syntheses all leave out some essential part of our nature. We cannot acquiesce in them, just because we are *one* ourselves, not a collection of independent faculties. We are driven to aim at unifying our outward experience as well as our inward lives. So strong is this craving for unity that it seems to me a faithless act to refuse the quest.

The belief that Reality must be one does not rest on any fancied superiority of the number One over the number Two, but on the fact that inclusiveness and harmony belong to the idea of reality. If there is such a thing as a Divine Mind, it must be at unity with itself, and it must embrace all things.

But though our object is to discover the underlying unity of reality, we do not wish to fall into the error attributed by some to Greek philosophy—that of regarding the individual as something to be explained away. We *understand* a thing in proportion as we recognise its *unique* features, the things which make it *different* from all other things. If we begin by saying that since all things are one, all dividing lines must be illusory, our minds will be reduced to a blank. It is only in the dark that all colours agree. There is a sense in which the only way to know the whole of reality is to know one part, no matter how small, through and through. This is why the quietistic mysticism, to which I referred in an early lecture of this

course, is so unsatisfactory. It shuns and distrusts all particular truths, and in consequence gives us only a blank sheet of paper, at which we may gaze if we will till we fall into a trance. If any definite form emerges from the trance, it is certain that it was not created by the trance, but that it is a vivid picture of something which we have been taught; probably the product of ages of reflection upon the eternal world. Moreover, the fact that the whole may be known by thoroughly knowing one part, is a principle of great practical importance. For complete all-round self-culture is an impossibility, and we cannot even aim at it without danger of becoming futile dilettanti. We have to limit ourselves strictly and narrowly. We have to be something particular, which excludes the possibility of becoming a hundred other particular things. Some real self-sacrifice is a necessary consequence of being members of a body, and we must accept it. What we miss in this way we must supply as best we can from authority—by borrowing, that is to say, from others. But the loss is not very great. For all thorough work has an universal quality about it; so that the man who can do any one worthy thing well, is not generally narrow-minded. He knows far more about God, the world, and his own soul than the dabbler who is Jack of all trades, and master of none. This is one of the things which justifies us in holding a reasonably optimistic view about human society. No civilisation is possible without division of labour, and all division of labour involves one-sidedness, and, in a sense, the mutilation of personality. But as the theologians of the Divine Immanence have insisted that God is not only everywhere, but *in omnibus totus*, so it appears that faithful devotion to any worthy pursuit does open to us avenues extending to the Infinite. Browning's grammarian found this even in the study of Greek syntax. If this case is historical, some of you will think that no one need despair.

Every one may follow Emerson's advice and 'hitch his wagon to a star.'¹

At the same time this division of labour naturally produces religious difficulties. 'Specialised values,' as Höffding says, 'attain a self-dependence over against that concentration of all values which characterises religion.' The very fact that we have found a measure of universal truth in our chosen pursuit—that it has been a means of grace and revelation to us—makes us jealous of granting the same kind of value to other pursuits which have taught us nothing. If we have made the order of nature, or art, or active social service, the frame for our picture of the Deity (and 'every concept of God is,' as Fichte says, 'the concept of an idol, an εἰδωλον, not the whole reality'), we are apt to regard ourselves as the only true worshippers, and those who have come to the truth from another side as robbers who climb into the fold 'some other way' instead of through the door. Every exclusive object of interest acquires a spurious universality, which is the progenitor of intolerance.

I referred briefly in one of my earlier lectures to what I called the threefold cord—the ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness, which emerge as ideals when Faith becomes conscious of its aims. The life of God, so far as we can apprehend it, is the sphere in which the ideals of wisdom, beauty, and goodness are fully realised and fully operative. I say fully realised *and* fully operative, though the two may seem difficult to harmonise. We think of God under the two modes of *essence* (or substance) and *existence*. Under the first mode He appears as pure *Thought*, perfect, unchanging, completely victorious over evil. Under the form of existence—the 'moving image of eternity'—He appears as pure *Act* or Will—involved in

¹ Nevertheless it is true that Christianity, as a social religion, has renounced the Greek aspiration after αὐτάρκεια.

temporal and spatial inter-relations, in which He energises and 'works His sovereign will.' In this second mode the thought of God's action is split up doubly, as it were, (1) into past, present, and future; (2) into power and resistance. As regards the former, if the time-process is fully real, and if it is the externalisation of the conscious life of God, we are driven to the hypothesis of a God who is really in a state of becoming, of self-evolution. But this, besides the objection justly taken on the religious side to the conception of a God who is not yet fully divine, involves, I believe, a radically unscientific view of progress. Science knows nothing of universal progress, nor of a world-process which is only valuable for the sake of its last term. A truer philosophy holds that there is no development in the life of God Himself, but only in the changing phenomena which represent His thoughts under the form of self-fulfilling activity. The divine in the creation is only adequately represented when the whole of the time-process is gathered up into its final meaning and purpose, when, in fact, the mode of becoming is united with the mode of being. This I conceive to be the eternal world—not a world of immobility in contrast with a world of change, but a world in which the antinomy of becoming and being, of motion and rest, is transcended. A system of thought without will and action has a merely potential reality; and on the other hand will and action are nothing without a permanent background which is not in a state of flux. Thus, as I have tried to show, static intellectualism and empirical positivism are both wrong—they are one-sided systems which ultimately destroy themselves. To view things *sub specie aeternitatis* is not to view them as abstractions, floating in the air, and only illustrated by 'the things that are made,' but to penetrate to the inner meaning and permanent value of phenomena, giving them their proper rank and spiritual significance, separating that in them which has only a transitory importance, and realising

their connection with larger aspects of the divine plan, which stretch out in all directions beyond our ken. And as the object perceived by Faith is neither a pure idea nor a pure activity, but an idea embodied in an activity, an activity expressing an idea ; so the energy of Faith is not thought detached from action, nor action detached from thought, but what St. Paul calls a λογικὴ λατρεία.¹

Hartley Coleridge's lines are worth quoting :—

Think not the Faith by which the just shall live
Is a dead creed, a map correct of heaven,
Far less a feeling fond and fugitive,
A thoughtless gift, withdrawn as soon as given ;
It is an affirmation and an act
That bids eternal truth be present fact.

The eye of Faith tries to discern this eternal significance, this absolute value, in all our varied experience. And, as I have said, there are three aspects or attributes of God's nature which glow like a constellation of three stars, whose light is blended, but which remain distinct, not to be fused with each other.

I wish also to guard against the error of supposing that goodness is solely the affair of the will, truth of the intellect, and beauty of another separable faculty. Will, thought, and feeling are present in every mental process. By *Goodness* I mean a certain disposition of the whole man, which in the intellectual sphere manifests itself as a just appreciation of moral values, a clear insight in the discerning of spirits, an enlightened conscience. In the sphere of the will it is a sincere and steady purpose to make the moral ideal actual, to favour the positive values and suppress the negative. (Remember that the law of the conservation of energy, precluding any real increase of force, which prevails in the mechanical order, has no validity in the

¹ Cf. E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii. pp. 2-5, on the Aristotelian conception of θεωρία as transcending the opposition of theory and practice.

spiritual order. There is no fixed limit to spiritual gains, which do not involve any corresponding loss in another quarter.) In the realm of the affections, goodness is an emotional attraction to all that is pure and noble and of good report, and (as a necessary correlative) a repulsion from the opposite qualities.

By *Truth* or *Wisdom* I mean the correspondence of thought with fact, *external* fact, until we have thoroughly mastered it. 'Everything is to be called true according as it has its proper form, which is the copy of the idea in the mind of the great Artificer.'¹ Therefore all things are 'true,' as God sees them, or as they are in reality, and their 'truth' consists in the fact that they are possible objects of intellectual perception. In the sphere of thought the quest of truth means humble and patient discipleship to the laws which God has made for the universe. In the sphere of will and feeling, it means loyal obedience to them and joyful acceptance of them. Virtue is 'truth,' or 'reality' (*ἀλήθεια*), in the language of the Fourth Gospel, and sin a lie, as the translation into act of a false idea. Obedience and acceptance do not mean passive resignation to a dispensation which we cannot alter. Stoicism sometimes interpreted duty in this way; but for Christian Faith the choice and worship of the truth is an active co-operation, not a passive acquiescence. The world is a world of living beings, whose nature it is to act. We ourselves are actors in the drama, as well as spectators of it. And, being parts of the nature which we are studying, it is our privilege to make, as well as to observe, history. Law is not an external limitation which prevents us from being as free, as good, and as happy as we should be if

¹ St. Thomas Aquinas, using Platonic language. The old definition of truth, *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, is rejected by Kantians and positivists. But though correspondence between thought and its object is, from the nature of the case, undemonstrable, since thought cannot 'step out and look at itself,' it is a matter of reasonable faith that our highest faculties do not deceive us, and our faculties certainly assure us that there is an objective world closely corresponding to our ideas about it.

there were no law. The Author of nature is one *cui servire regnare est*. We have only to remember that He is the legislator, not we, and that our 'claims' are not the measure of all things.

Beauty, as I have said, seems to consist in the suitability of form to idea—the just translation of an idea into an appropriate symbolic form. We must not narrow the Beautiful into what we admire in external nature or in art ; whatever is admirable falls within its scope. There is beauty of thought and action as well as in the objects of æsthetic contemplation : we must not forget the fine comprehensiveness of τὸ καλόν to the Greek mind. Æsthetic Theism regards God as the Creator of Beauty, and as its Beholder. It assumes that Beauty has an absolute value for God, and is not merely a means towards the True or the Good ; and it holds, therefore, that it has an absolute value for us too.

We are not to suppose that there are three Faiths—that of the scientist, that of the artist, and that of the moralist. We are not to attempt a neat classification by saying that the scientist worships the true with his intellect, the artist the beautiful with his feeling, and the moralist the good with his will. That would be a lame conclusion, leaving us pulled different ways by our several faculties towards divergent ideals, each claiming divine sanction. The three in that case would only thwart and partially discredit each other, and in default of any faculty which could adjudicate between them, we should be driven back again into scepticism.

There must be an unifying principle, in which the different activities of our nature are harmonised as activities of *one* person, directed towards one satisfying end. It is in this unifying experience that Faith for the first time comes fully into its own. It has busied itself with multifarious activities and experiences belonging to time and space : by entering into them it has become self-conscious ; it has

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learned to know itself and the world. But it is not lost in multiplicity ; it ends by drawing the threads together again, and fixing its gaze on one object—the *eternal world*. This is the ‘simplification’ (ἀπλῶσις) of mysticism, and it gives a new meaning to the injunction about receiving the kingdom of God as little children.

Eternity is a mode under which all things in time may be regarded. To view things *sub specie aeternitatis* is to view them in relation to the eternal ideas of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. As we come to know more about this eternal world, we apprehend more and more significant facts about existence, not losing or forgetting the lower, but putting them in their right place. Some facts (*e.g.* local and temporal position) become unimportant. We get rid of the persistent illusion that there is some special degree of reality and importance about the time through which we happen to be passing, which is much as if we supposed that the landscape which we see from the carriage window came into existence at the approach of the train, and faded into nothingness at its departure. We value things according as they seem to participate in the nature of God, as set forth above. That which is isolated, meaningless, useless, self-discordant, is to that extent unreal and valueless. And I think it is true to say that in proportion as we can rise in heart and mind to this sphere, we perceive the truth and beauty of the good, the goodness and beauty of the truth, and the truth and goodness of the beautiful.

Some will say that the Good is the supreme category under which all others are subsumed, and will protest against Truth and Beauty being placed on the same level with it. They may appeal to ancient philosophy in support of their contention. The school of Megara put the Good in the place of the ‘Being’ of the Eleatics ; and the Platonists identified the One with the Good. ‘Dionysius the Areopagite’ puts good, as a divine name, before Being, as does Erigena, who even says, ‘The things which are

not are better than the things that are, for in transcending Being they approach to the superessential Good.' In Aquinas the ascending scale of ideas is Being, Truth, Goodness. I think, however, that Goodness is used in slightly different senses. When it is paralleled with Truth and Beauty, it is used in a distinctly ethical sense, though I have shown that ethics cannot be separated from devotion to the true and beautiful. But when 'God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good,' the adjective implies only approval and satisfaction with the result. It is 'good' that the ideas of truth and beauty should be fully realised. If 'good' is defined (as it is *e.g.* by Suarez) as the perfection which exists in anything, goodness is wider than the ethical ideal.

The faculties of our mind must be really unified before Faith can fully come into its own. The will, feeling, and intellect cannot be driven like the horses in a Russian *troika*, side by side. This is our great difficulty. This is why Faith must be true to its proper temper—that of patient, confident hopefulness and trust. We must not make a hierarchy of the faculties, as Hegel did, and as many of his opponents have done. The intellect is the latest born of our faculties, and the finest instrument we have; there is a very true sense in which it is 'king,' as being alone 'evident to itself.'¹ But I have already shown that in the life of reason, thus conceived, the moral and the æsthetic consciousness find their full satisfaction, and are not relegated to a lower place.

This life of reason is the life of the 'perfect man' grown out of the dim mystical consciousness with which religion began. Faith, when perfected, becomes a real spiritual self-consciousness, in which the human spirit and the divine are in free communication with each other. We have all the time been making a false abstraction in considering Faith as a merely human faculty. It is God's gift as much

¹ βασιλεὺς ὁ Νοῦς—αὐτὸς ὁ Νοῦς ἐναργὴς αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ.—Plotinus.

as man's service ; and the two sides can never be separated. This is the fundamental truth of mysticism. The mystics have often been in too great a hurry, but they are right in their view of the relation of man to God. Some of them have really found what they sought ; but they have not been able to describe their highest experiences. Those who have stopped half way, content with some hasty synthesis, have often been more lucid and intelligible than those who have followed the rugged path to the end. In Edward Fitzgerald's mystical poem, *Attar*, there is a pretty allegory, which tells how the moths sent messengers to find their idol the flame. The first and second come back with slight and uncertain intelligence, and are rejected. A third goes in their place——

Who, spurred with true desire
Plunging at once into the sacred fire
Folded his wings within, till he became
One colour and one substance with the flame.
He only knew the flame who in it burned,
And only he could tell who ne'er to tell returned.

It may be inferred that I find in the idea of *personality* my ground of confidence that the contradictions of experience will be harmonised. In a sense this is so. And yet I differ strongly from some who have already defended Faith by this argument, among whom the most illustrious is the author of the *Grammar of Assent*. Newman, in this celebrated book, ranges himself with the 'Personalists' ; his appeal is to the assent of the *whole* man to religious truth, which cannot be established by the intellect only, still less by the sentiments, which, as a basis for Faith, are 'a dream and a mockery.' He further rejects the argument from our sense of beauty, which seems to him too trivial ; and his intellectual scepticism, as we have already seen, is deep and far-reaching. His 'personalism' is therefore almost exclusively ethical, and his philosophy resembles that of the pragmatists and personal

idealists. This is far too narrow a psychological basis for a true philosophy of personality; and when, after an acute analysis of the process by which beliefs come to be held, he takes us with breathless haste, by a series of leaps and bounds, into the heart of Roman Catholic orthodoxy, we follow with undiminished admiration of his dialectic, but with no inclination towards conversion.

The word 'personality' is in danger of becoming a philosophical shibboleth. It has been so much abused that I prefer not to use it. 'We do not become personalities by pronouncing the word with unction and emphasis. . . . The thought of personality possesses value only so far as the word is backed by action, and action which involves the building up of a new reality. . . . The modern world, like all others, is especially eloquent and enthusiastic about that in which it is most lacking; we are in painful want of vigorous and strongly-marked personalities, and we talk incessantly about the value and greatness of personality.'¹

It is an unrealised ideal—the ideal of Faith. Would Faith be Faith if it were not unrealised? Faith is the felt unity of unreduced opposites.² Have we not found that hope and venture are essential parts of Faith? Every religious doctrine has its inexplicable side, because it cannot be a religious doctrine unless it stretches out into the infinite. The dualistic form of consciousness is seemingly ineradicable; we are condemned to a kind of astigmatism of which we are nevertheless fully aware. This natural limitation has been poetically expressed by William Watson:—

Think not thy wisdom can illume away
The ancient tanglement of night and day.
Enough to acknowledge both and both revere;
They see not clearliest who see all things clear.

¹ Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit*, pp. 385-6.

² From Bradley, who says less accurately that 'Religion is the felt unity,' etc.

The religious consciousness oscillates between two poles, presenting all the highest truths to us under the form of antinomies. 'He to whom time is as eternity, and eternity as time,' says Jacob Böhme, 'is freed from all trouble.' No doubt he would be, as the blessed dead are free; but we have to live in time as citizens of eternity; that is our practical problem. The certainty that all contradictions are reconciled in the eternal world is ours; but the *how* is mainly hidden from us. Meanwhile, as might be expected while we are feeling our way, there is a borderland of half-beliefs, half-fancies, promptings from our sub-conscious life, anticipations of later developments. These vague intimations are neither to be rejected nor superstitiously obeyed, but studied and analysed, and above all brought to the test of action, till they yield something definite.

The *negative* movement in all experience is a great mystery, but it is the condition of Faith's existence. There are some remarkable thoughts in the following words of R. L. Stevenson (*Virginibus Puerisque*, p. 41): 'The true conclusion is to turn our backs on apprehensions, and embrace that shining and courageous virtue, Faith. Hope is the boy, a blind, headlong, pleasant fellow; Faith is the grave, experienced, yet smiling man. Hope lives on ignorance; open-eyed Faith is built upon a knowledge of our life, of the tyranny of circumstance, and the frailty of human resolution. Hope looks for unqualified success; but Faith counts certainty a failure, and takes honourable defeat to be a form of victory.' This is exactly the lesson of the Epistle to the Hebrews, though the New Testament gives Hope a much higher place, as Faith's twin sister. 'The spiritual life, however deep and divine our conception of it may be, is not an oppositionless experience, but shares the essential characteristic of all personal activity—that, namely, of developing through self-diremption and self-return. It is within the spiritual life itself that all opposi-

tions are at once created and overcome.' ¹ Dissatisfaction with the actual is a condition of Faith, and a part of it. We must not conceive of Faith developing apart from the pain and the evil, the ignorance and the ugliness, which it resists. The oppositions which stimulate and perplex our mortality are themselves part of our immortal substance ; the Good, *sub specie aeternitatis*, is a good which has overcome evil rather than an abstract notion of good which excludes it.

This is really fundamental, according to my view. Faith rearranges all experience, which is presented to us at first so chaotically, but it leaves nothing out. Every contradiction must be fairly met and overcome. If we edge round it, if we ignore it or shirk it in any way, we shall enter into life halt and maimed, if we enter at all. Even the claims of piety must give way to the love of truth. To put the needs of the heart before truth is really an act of treason against Faith.

This unified experience is the perfected state, and the fruition, of Faith. There are not many who can hope to attain to it in this life, though, as Browning says, ' moments ' are not ' denied us ' in which ' the spirit's true endowments stand out plainly from its false ones.' The common life of the Church, in most cases, brings us nearer to it than we could get as isolated individuals, and this is a truth which I wish to emphasise, as I have been obliged to traverse some of the claims which the greatest of Christian Churches makes for itself.

Of the object of Faith—God—I have said very little, except that He is known to us in His attributes of perfect Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. I do not agree with those philosophers who say that the Absolute is wholly withdrawn from our ken. ' The fulness of Him that filleth all in all ' is thoroughly conceivable as an idea, though not cognoscible, and is a possible and legitimate object of adoration. If I

¹ Boyce Gibson, *R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life*, p. 154.

am to attempt to clothe my idea of God in philosophical as well as in religious language, I can nearly accept the following statement of Professor Royce (*Hibbert Journal*, July 1907)—only stipulating that the ‘will’ which is eternally in possession of its object can no longer be distinguished from thought:—‘I mean by the term God the totality of the expressions and life of the world-will, when considered in its conscious unity. God is a consciousness which knows and which intends the entire life of the world, a consciousness which views this life at one glance, as its own life and self,¹ and which therefore not only wills but attains, not only seeks but possesses, not only passes from expression to expression, but eternally is the entire temporal sequence of its own expressions. God has and is a will, and this will, if viewed as a temporal sequence of activities, is identical with what I have called the world-will. Only, when viewed as the divine will, this world-will is taken not merely as an infinite sequence of will-activities, but in its entire unity as one whole of life. God is omniscient, because His insight comprehends and finds unified, in one eternal instant, the totality of the temporal process, with all of its contents and meanings. He is omnipotent, because all that is done is, when viewed in its unity, His deed, and that despite the endless varieties and strifes which freedom and the variety of individual finite expressions involve. God is immanent in the finite, because nothing is, which is not part of His total self-expression. He is transcendent of all finitude, because the totality of finite processes is before Him at once, whereas nothing finite possesses true totality.’

The life of Faith admits us to a real, not an imaginary, communion with God. As Faith realises itself in knowledge or reason, as we understand what that vague yearning

¹ The life of the world is not, even in its totality, the ‘self’ of God, but the expression of His thought and will. Royce does not emphasise quite sufficiently (to satisfy me) the transcendence of God.

which has been with us so long really means, namely, that there is a God who has made us for Himself, and who has been drawing us towards Himself, not only do all the tangled threads of life begin to straighten, but our hearts glow with a new emotional warmth. We begin to know the love of God. And so we are brought back to the fine words of Clement about Faith, Knowledge, and Love, which I quoted in my second lecture.

Faith is the human side of the religious relation, Grace is the corresponding divine side. The spiritual life is not a work of man himself, but of the whole world-movement drawing him on. The divine in humanity is unfolding itself in us. Spirituality is, as it were, a new stage in the world's life, a new cosmic force. 'God,' in the words of St. Paul, 'works in us to will and to do of His good pleasure.' Every religious act is an act of Faith and Grace together. They are the two indissoluble sides of one act, through which the union between God and man becomes actual. The human and divine elements must both be active in Faith; otherwise we get either rationalism or magical supernaturalism. In either case, all real relation between God and man is lost.

But in the experience of the growing spirit, Faith and Grace are double, and it is because they are not yet fused that the divine side of the relation is projected as supernatural dogma instead of as the personal self-communication of God, and the human as cultus instead of as the free response to that self-communication. Dogma and cultus are the untransparent middle forms of knowledge and action. Faith passes through them, but does not remain shut up in them.

Revelation is the divine side of intellectual Faith. It is the name given to grace as enlightenment and persuasion of divine truth. All revelation is in part inner and personal: it is never wholly *in* nature or history. All that can be done from outside is to quicken and confirm the

revelation in the soul. Since revelation speaks to the central and most divine part of the personality, it conveys absolute truth, from which, as I have maintained, we are not excluded, though the forms under which it is conveyed are human and imperfect.

As revelation corresponds to intellectual Faith, so redemption corresponds to what we may call heart-Faith. Faith is, on one side, self-surrender. But surrender is only the first stage in the human process which corresponds to redemption; the second stage is atonement, or reconciliation. God redeems man from evil and guilt, and man feels himself reconciled to God. Redemption and atonement are functionally identical, and the feeling of reconciliation is peace. Surrender, reconciliation, peace, are the three stages of heart-Faith, which correspond to the act of grace as redemption.¹

The third form of Grace is that which belongs to the will. The religious relation, says Hartmann in the work just referred to, raises us above relative dependence on the world, to absolute dependence on God, which is freedom. 'Sanctification' is the name given to both the negative and positive stages of this deliverance and elevation. On the human side the first stage is moral freedom, the second moral energy. Holiness is virtue rooted in the religious relation; its activities are the actualising of the religious relation. The distinction between holiness and virtue is qualitative, not quantitative.

But revelation, redemption, and sanctification are closely connected. 'Only the unity of intellectual, affective, and practical Faith embraces the whole conception of Faith, just as only the unity of revelation, redemption, and sanctification realises the whole conception of grace.'²

Hartmann's treatment of Faith and Grace as the human and divine aspects of the same activity seems to me to

¹ Cf. Hartmann, *Religion des Geistes*.

² Hartmann, *op. cit.*

make it easier to harmonise the static and dynamic aspects of spiritual truth.

I will conclude these lectures by a quotation from a writer who speaks with high authority. I am glad to find in his words a powerful support for the view of the nature and function of Faith which I have endeavoured to lay before you.

‘Faith is the faculty implanted in every man made in the image of God, the ally of the reason, the will, the affections, which swiftly discerns and swiftly weighs evidence as to the things of the unseen and eternal order, appealing partly to the intellect and partly to the spirit. The divine gift of reason is educated by the divine gift of Faith; and Faith is educated by reason. For a while reason and Faith pursue their journey together. At length the time comes when reason acknowledges that there is a bar to further progress, and when Faith must press on alone into the realities of the unseen and the eternal. Faith returns at length from that far journey and submits to reason the assurance she has gained as to the things of God. Reason reviews, harmonises, gives expression to the discoveries of Faith. The will translates them into the activities of a holy life. The heart loves and rejoices in the God and Father of whom Faith witnesses. The reason, the will, the heart, are the allies of Faith. Together, if they have their perfect work, they make the life on earth divine. Together they realise that eternal life which lies about us and is in us, but which as yet is hidden from us by the shadows of the seen and the temporal.’¹

¹ Bishop of Ely (Dr. Chase) at Barrow Church Congress, 1906.

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